Handley v. Phillips

• Decision Date: 09 June 1989
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 87-1176.
• Citation: 715 F. Supp. 657
• Parties: Kathleen HANDLEY and Frank Handley Plaintiffs, v. James PHILLIPS, Michael Kaminski, Leonard Falcone, Allyn Sincavage, Luzerne County Corrections Board, Luzerne County Correctional Facilities Board, Luzerne County Prison Board and County of Luzerne Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

715 F. Supp. 657

Kathleen HANDLEY and Frank Handley Plaintiffs, v. James PHILLIPS, Michael Kaminski, Leonard Falcone, Allyn Sincavage, Luzerne County Corrections Board, Luzerne County Correctional Facilities Board, Luzerne County Prison Board and County of Luzerne Defendants.

Civ. No. 87-1176.

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

June 9, 1989.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Alice T.K. Corba, Kepner & Kepner, Berwick, Pa., for plaintiffs.

Richard A. Polachek, Fine & Wyatt, P.C., Scranton, Pa., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CONABOY, Chief Judge.

Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The Plaintiffs have filed a brief in opposition to which the Defendants have replied. Local Rule 401 et seq. This court has taken into consideration the arguments presented by counsel in this matter and, for the following reasons, shall grant in part Defendants' motion for summary judgment and proceed to trial on the remaining allegations.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Kathleen Handley began her employment with Luzerne County on or about July 1, 1980, when she was hired as a matron at the county prison. Funding for her position was provided by the federal job training program known as CETA until October of 1981, when she was given regular county employment as a prison matron. She continued in this position until indefinitely suspended by the Warden on or about September 2, 1985.

On December 30, 1985, upon the Warden's recommendation, the Luzerne County Prison Board voted three to one in favor of terminating Kathleen Handley's employment.¹ As required by the collective bargaining agreement in effect during the years of her employment, Kathleen Handley's suspension in September of 1985 and subsequent termination in December were the subject of mandatory and binding arbitration.²See Pennsylvania Public Employe Relations Act, 43 P.S. Section 1101.903. A hearing was held before Arbitrator Perry Zirkel on December 13, 1987, and an award in favor of the Luzerne County Prison Board was handed down on April 21, 1987.

A petition to vacate and/or modify the arbitrator's award was subsequently filed with the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas by Plaintiff Handley's union, the Public Service Employees Union Local 1300. By a decision and order of Judge Patrick J. Toole, Jr., dated January 11, 1988, the Union's petition to vacate the award was denied and the matter dismissed.

Prior to the Court of Common Pleas' decision upholding the arbitration award, Plaintiffs filed this suit in federal court on August 20, 1987, after receiving a right to sue notice from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).

At the completion of discovery, the Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that (1) the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution precludes this court from acting under the circumstance of this case; (2) the Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against any of the moving Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; (3) this court should not retain the pendent state claims upon the dismissal of the federal question issues; and (4) that the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act of Pennsylvania cited at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8541 et seq. provides immunity as to the alleged state law claims.

The Plaintiffs have filed a brief in opposition challenging the movants' dispositive motion and a reply brief has been submitted pursuant to Local Rule 401.7, making this matter ripe for consideration.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that "summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." "By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact". (emphasis in original). Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

If the Court finds that there is a material issue of fact in dispute, its inquiry does not end and the motion denied. Rather, it must proceed to determine that this material issue in dispute is genuine in nature. As stated in, Anderson, "... summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is genuine, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury would return a verdict for the non-moving party." Id. 106 S.Ct. at 2512. There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If evidence is "merely colorable" or "not significantly probative," summary judgment may be appropriate. Id. 106 S.Ct. at 2511. In this sense, summary judgment mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), in that the inquiry under each is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury. Anderson, 106 S.Ct. at 2512; Hankins v. Temple University, et al., 829 F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1987); Sonenshein, State of Mind and Credibility in the Summary Judgment Context: A Better Approach, 78 N.W.U.L.Rev. 774 (1983).

DISCUSSION

The Complaint

1. Jurisdiction

According to the complaint, this is a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to redress violations of Plaintiffs' rights under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution as well as matters raised under "the Common Law of Pennsylvania." Complaint at ¶ 1. Although provisions other than jurisdictional statutes are cited in the complaint, the court's authority over these matters is based on Title 28 United States Code §§ 1331 and 1343, as well as pendent jurisdiction.

2. Claims Presented.

The initial pleading consists of an eleven count complaint outlining claims brought by Kathleen Handley and/or Frank Handley against all of the defendants. The allegations in Count I begin with a claim that Kathleen Handley's "constitutional rights" were violated since she did not receive notice or a meaningful hearing before her suspension and eventual termination (Complaint at ¶ 28); that officials violated her due process rights by either delaying or not processing her grievances (Complaint at ¶ 29); that her termination for being "physically unable to perform her required duties" was in violation of due process since based on "vague and overbroad language" in the collective bargaining agreement and an invalid Code of Ethics (Complaint at ¶ 30); that her termination based on a violation of the prison's "yard-out procedure" was invalid (Complaint at ¶ 31); that her liberty interest has been violated since the defendants' actions reflect badly on her, have stigmatized her by loss of good name, reputation, honor and integrity, resulting in difficulty in obtaining employment in the field of criminal justice (Complaint at ¶ 32 and 33); and finally, that the defendants' statements that she was terminated for good and proper cause are false and malicious (Complaint at ¶ 34).

Although counsel for the Plaintiffs was not specific in any of the above cited paragraphs as to which provision of the Constitution was violated, it would appear that a § 1983 claim for an infringement of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process clauses has been attempted.

The Plaintiffs allegations in Count II of the complaint invoke familiar terms for a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, Plaintiff Kathleen Handley claims that the defendants, "while acting under color of state law," deprived her of the constitutional rights to be free from interference with her "contractual rights". Handley claims, once again, a violation of her "rights not to be deprived of liberty and property without due process of law as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution." (Complaint at ¶ 36).

In Count III of the complaint, there is a repeat of the allegations of delay engendered by the defendants in processing the Plaintiff's grievances, including the failure of the defendants to participate in arbitration hearings required under the collective bargaining agreement. Such actions were allegedly taken to deprive the Plaintiff of her constitutional rights of free speech and the ability to petition the government for redress of grievances. (Complaint at ¶ 39).

The allegations in Count IV are challenges to the various disciplinary actions taken against Kathleen Handley throughout her employment. Specifically, Plaintiff disputes the validity of the county's disciplinary actions as to uniform and grooming requirements, the enforcement of a "yard-out" procedure, and suspension for "physically being unable to perform required duties." Complaint at ¶ 41-45. It is Plaintiff's belief that the named governmental officials acted out of "personal animosity" resulting in a violation of her "rights to equal protection of the laws, including but not limited to, her right to the equal opportunity to hold public employment and her right not to be discriminated against in regard to that employment as well as her right to be free from unreasonable and/or arbitrary government interference with her liberty." Complaint at ¶ 46.

The allegations under Count V of the complaint presents a traditional claim of gender discrimination by averring that Plaintiff and members of her class have been discriminated against by the defendants "in respect to terms, conditions and privileges of employment because of sex ..." Complaint at ¶ 54. Specifically, Plaintiff Kathleen Handley claims the...