Handley v. Sprinkle
| Decision Date | 28 June 1904 |
| Citation | 77 P. 296,31 Mont. 57 |
| Parties | HANDLEY v. SPRINKLE. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Commissioners' Opinion. Appeal from District Court, Choteau County; Jno. W Tattan, Judge.
Consolidated actions by Charles W. Handley against Robert L. Sprinkle. From judgments in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.
Downing & Stephenson and W. S. Towner, for appellant.
Chas N. Pray and Geo. H. Stanton, for respondent.
Appeal from judgments against defendant, and an order overruling his motion for a new trial.
On June 17, 1900, respondent (Handley) brought suit against appellant (Sprinkle) upon two causes of action, viz.: (1) An action for damages for the breach of a contract for the care and running of a certain band of sheep. In connection with this cause of action plaintiff alleges that, at the date of the making of the contract alleged, plaintiff and wife executed and delivered to defendant their promissory note for $1,900, and also executed and delivered a chattel mortgage securing payment of the same, but that the said note and mortgage were solely for the purpose of securing future advances of money to defray the expenses of running the sheep under the alleged contract. (2) An action on account for the value of goods wares, and merchandise sold and delivered to the defendant. The defendant answered the first cause of action by a general denial of all the allegations of the complaint, and by affirmative allegations setting up the existence of a contract with plaintiff for running a band of sheep from the ___ day of August, 1899, for one year, setting up the terms of the contract, among which was an agreement on his (defendant's) part to furnish all money necessary to pay the expenses of running the sheep during the year, which was to be returned to him on final settlement; that plaintiff took possession of the sheep under this contract in August, 1899; that on June 28, 1900, plaintiff's demands for money became so unreasonable that defendant demanded a settlement of all their accounts, which was then and there had, and, after giving plaintiff all the compensation to which he was entitled under the contract, plaintiff was found to owe defendant the sum of $1,900, whereupon plaintiff and his wife gave defendant their promissory note for this amount, secured by a chattel mortgage, a copy of which is attached to the answer. The defendant further alleged that he was the sole holder and owner of the note and mortgage, and that no part had been paid, except the amount specified in his answer to the second cause of action. In his answer to the second cause of action he admits purchasing the articles, mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2, of the plaintiff, at the prices stated; denies all the other allegations of the second cause of action. He then sets forth by way of affirmative matter the same facts as alleged affirmatively in his answer to the first cause of action, with the additional allegation that the sum total value of the merchandise admitted to have been purchased from plaintiff, as stated in his answer, was credited on the note above referred to by the agreement of the parties. To this answer plaintiff replied by way of general denial.
On June 17, 1901, plaintiff instituted another suit against defendant, by which he sought to have the note and chattel mortgage set up in the pleadings in the prior suit canceled, and to have plaintiff enjoined from taking possession of the mortgaged property, and from transferring or disposing of the note. Cancellation was asked for on the ground of fraud on part of the defendant in obtaining the note and mortgage. (Further reference to this complaint will hereinafter be made.) To this complaint defendant answered, admitting that prior to June 28, 1900, the plaintiff was running a band of sheep as lessee, which sheep were owned by defendant as lessor; admits the execution and delivery of the note and mortgage, and that he is in the possession thereof. He then denies "each and every allegation of the complaint not hereinbefore specifically admitted."
When the cases above mentioned came on for trial, the defendant moved the court for a consolidation of the suits, "in accordance with section 1894, Code of Civil Procedure." This motion was sustained, over the objection of plaintiff, and the cases were consolidated. The record does not show the order of the court made upon such consolidation. The suits were tried together before a jury, which rendered separate general verdicts in favor of plaintiff in each original suit. In addition to their general verdicts, the jury made six special findings in plaintiff's favor, two of which were applicable to the suit at law, and four to the suit in equity.
On the day after the rendition of these verdicts, the clerk of the court entered judgment in each original suit, in accordance with the general verdicts of the jury. In the suit at law the judgment was for the sum of $500 (the amount of damages found by the jury for plaintiff), and $217 costs of suit. In the action in equity the judgment is in the following form: "Wherefore, by virtue of the law, and by reason of the premises aforesaid, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the said plaintiff do have and recover from said defendant the sum of ___ dollars, with interest thereon at the rate of eight per cent. per annum from the date hereof till paid, together with said plaintiff's costs and disbursements incurred in this action, amounting to the sum of nine dollars and fifty cents ($9.50)."
On the same day the verdicts were rendered, plaintiff's counsel moved the court in the equity suit to adopt the findings and verdicts of the jury, and render a decree as prayed for in the complaint. On September 28th defendant's attorney moved the court to reject each of the findings in both cases for certain reasons stated in the motion. On December 11th the court adopted the findings of the jury, and rendered a decree in the equity suit against defendant, as prayed for in the complaint, and entered a judgment against defendant for $226.50 for costs.
Two important questions are presented for determination upon the record in these appeals, viz.: What is the practice after the consolidation of suits, under section 1894, supra; and was such practice followed?
This section is as follows: "Whenever two or more actions are pending at one time between the same parties and in the same court, upon causes of action which might have been joined the court may order the actions to be consolidated." It is apparent that the purpose of this provision is to compel a party having different causes of action against another, which might be joined in one suit, to include such causes of action in one suit, so as not to vex the defendant with several suits and place the burden of extra costs upon him. The consolidation of actions under this statute must be distinguished from what has been known for many years as the "consolidation rule," which was first devised and established by Lord Mansfield. Under that rule, where many cases were pending between the same parties in which the same issues were involved, one case was tried, and all proceedings in the other cases were stayed until after such trial. It must also be distinguished from the old practice in equity of consolidating equity cases. Under such practice, each case was decided upon its own pleadings and...
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