Handy v. Luenza
Decision Date | 17 April 2017 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 16-cv-02110-WYD-MEH |
Parties | WYATT T. HANDY, JR., and ASHLEE M. HANDY, Plaintiffs, v. LUENZA, Mailroom Clerk #13083, and UNKNOWN MAILROOM CLERK, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is the named Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' State Tort Claims filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) [filed March 3, 2017; ECF No. 40]. The motion is fully briefed, and the Court finds that oral argument will not assist in the adjudication of the motion. Based on the record and for the reasons that follow, the Court respectfully recommends that the Honorable Wiley Y. Daniel grant in part and deny in part the Defendant's motion.1
Plaintiffs ("Mr. Handy" and "Mrs. Handy") initiated this lawsuit on August 19, 2016, then filed the operative Amended Complaint on September 12, 2016 in accordance with Magistrate Judge Gallagher's order during initial review.
The following are factual allegations (as opposed to legal conclusions, bare assertions, or merely conclusory allegations) made by the Plaintiffs in the Amended Complaint concerning Defendant "Luenza," correctly identified as Laura Vezina ("Vezina"), which are taken as true for analysis under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) pursuant to Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
On November 24, 2014, Mr. Handy sent mail to the Arapahoe County Detention Facility ("ACDF") for his wife, Mrs. Handy. The next day, Defendant Vezina rejected the mail based on "sexually explicit materials" and "references to gang related communications or activities." The letter contained information "related to a sexual assault on Mrs. Handy by gang members, and Mr. and Mrs. Handy['s] attempt[ ] to determine who the gang members where [sic], to report the crime to authorities."
On August 7, 2015, Mr. Handy sent mail to the ACDF for his wife, Mrs. Handy. Four days later, on August 11, 2015, Defendant Vezina rejected the mail based on Plaintiff's enclosure of a "thinking of you" card that was a "multi-layered glued" card. Mr. Handy obtained the card while incarcerated by the Colorado Department of Corrections ("CDOC"), and such cards were sold at the canteen and given to inmates by prison chaplains.
On September 14, 2015, Mr. Handy set mail to the ACDF for his wife, Mrs. Handy. Twodays later, on September 16, 2015, Defendant Vezina rejected the mail because "the mail contain[ed] threats of physical harm against a person." The letter "related to contacting authorities due to the physical abuse" to which Mrs. Handy was subjected.
Based on these factual allegations, Plaintiffs claim Defendant Luenza violated their First and Fourteenth Amended (due process) rights and committed negligence and negligence per se. Am. Compl., ECF No. 7. Plaintiffs request "appropriate declaratory and other injunctive relief," compensatory damages, and punitive damages. Id. at 10.
Defendant Vezina filed the present motion arguing the Plaintiffs fail to state plausible claims for negligence (Claim Three) and negligence per se (Claim Four). In addition, Vezina contends any negligence claim brought on behalf of Mrs. Handy is barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act for her failure to file a notice of claim ("NOC").
Plaintiffs counter that they have alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate a duty on the part of Vezina to "not fabricate reasons to reject mail," which arises under the First Amendment and ACDF's mailroom policy. Resp. 4. In addition, they argue Vezina cites no legal authority for her position that a NOC must be filed for each injured individual. Plaintiffs contend that, under Colorado law, the notices filed by Mr. Handy provided Vezina sufficient notice as to the claims of both Mr. and Mrs. Handy.
Vezina replies that neither the First Amendment nor the ACDF mailroom policy set forth or create any duty or standard of care owed to Plaintiffs. Further, Vezina contends that the law on which Plaintiffs rely to demonstrate sufficient notice is factually and legally distinguishable and, thus, not persuasive.
Vezina seeks dismissal for this Court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over certain claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and for Plaintiffs' failure to state claims for relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Rule 12(b)(1) empowers a court to dismiss a complaint for "lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) is not a judgment on the merits of a plaintiff's case, but only a determination that the court lacks authority to adjudicate the matter. See Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576, 1580 (10th Cir. 1994) ( ). A court lacking jurisdiction "must dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceeding in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is lacking." Full Life Hospice, LLC v. Sebelius, 709 F.3d 1012, 1016 (10th Cir. 2013). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss must be determined from the allegations of fact in the complaint, without regard to mere conclusory allegations of jurisdiction. Smith v. Plati, 258 F.3d 1167, 1174 (10th Cir. 2001). The burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction is on the party asserting jurisdiction. Butler v. Kempthorne, 532 F.3d 1108, 1110 (10th 2008). Accordingly, Plaintiffs in this case bear the burden of establishing that the Court has jurisdiction to hear their claims.
Generally, Rule 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction take two forms. Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1002 (10th 1995).
Id. at 1002-03 (citations omitted). The present motion launches a factual attack on this Court's subject matter jurisdiction; therefore, the Court will accept not the truthfulness of the Amended Complaint's factual allegations for its Rule 12(b)(1) analysis.
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Plausibility, in the context of a motion to dismiss, means that the plaintiff pled facts which allow "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Twombly requires a two prong analysis. First, a court must identify "the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth," that is, those allegations which are legal conclusions, bare assertions, or merely conclusory. Id. at 679-80. Second, the Court must consider the factual allegations "to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief." Id. at 681. If the allegations state a plausible claim for relief, such claim survives the motion to dismiss. Id. at 680.
Plausibility refers "to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiffs 'have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'" Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Robbins v. Okla., 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008)). "Thenature and specificity of the allegations required to state a plausible claim will vary based on context." Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2011). Thus, while Rule 12(b)(6) standard does not require that a plaintiff establish a prima facie case in a complaint, the elements of each alleged cause of action may help to determine whether the plaintiff has set forth a plausible claim. Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1191.
A federal court must construe a pro se plaintiff's Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (quotations and citations omitted). The Tenth Circuit interpreted this rule to mean, "if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so despite the plaintiff's failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements." Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). However, this interpretation is qualified in that it is not "the proper function of the district court to assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant." Id.; see also Peterson v. Shanks, 149 F.3d 1140, 1143 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989)).
Typically, "[w]hen a defendant seeks dismissal under Rule...
To continue reading
Request your trial