Hanebuth v. Bell Helicopter Intern.

• Decision Date: 21 December 1984
• Docket Number: No. S-175,S-175
• Citation: 694 P.2d 143
• Court: Alaska Supreme Court
• Parties: Michelle HANEBUTH, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Douglas M. Stuart & Estate of Donevan Harris, Plaintiff, v. BELL HELICOPTER INTERNATIONAL, Defendant.

Page 143

694 P.2d 143

Michelle HANEBUTH, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Douglas M. Stuart & Estate of Donevan Harris, Plaintiff, v. BELL HELICOPTER INTERNATIONAL, Defendant.

No. S-175.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

Dec. 21, 1984.

Michael Flanigan, Clark, Walther & Flanigan, Anchorage, for plaintiffs.

Carl Winner, Robertson, Monagle, Eastaugh & Bradley, Anchorage, for defendant.

Before BURKE, C.J., and RABINOWITZ, MATTHEWS, COMPTON and MOORE, JJ.

OPINION

MATTHEWS, Justice.

On October 9, 1974, a helicopter manufactured by defendant Bell Helicopters, Inc. crashed in a remote area of Alaska. The plaintiff's decedents, Douglas Stuart and Donevan Harris, died in the crash. The wreckage was not discovered until August 21, 1982. Investigation revealed that the accident may have occurred as a result of a mechanical defect.

The present action was commenced against Bell in the superior court on October 6, 1982, and removed to the federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Bell moved for partial summary judgment, contending that the claims of three of the heirs of Stuart and Harris were time-barred because they were not brought within the two year limitation period expressed in the wrongful death act, AS 09.55.580. ¹ The plaintiff argued in opposition that the doctrine known as the "discovery rule" had acted to postpone the running of the statutory period until such time as the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered the cause of the crash.

Inasmuch as the district court could find no Alaska case authority, the court certified the following question to this court pursuant to Appellate Rule 407: ² Does the reasonable failure of plaintiff to discover an element essential to her cause of action toll the running of the two year period provided by AS 09.55.580 within which to commence an action for wrongful death?

We have previously recognized that in appropriate cases a statute of limitations will not begin to run until a plaintiff "discovers, or reasonably should discover, the existence of all the elements of his cause of action." Greater Area Incorporated v. Bookman, 657 P.2d 828, 829 (Alaska 1982) (footnote omitted); see also Sharrow v. Archer, 658 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Alaska 1983). This doctrine has become known as the "discovery rule," and has been adopted by numerous other jurisdictions. ³

We must first decide whether the discovery rule should have any application outside the professional malpractice area. ⁴ We conclude that it should: "[I]t is the nature of the problems faced by plaintiff in discovering his injury and its cause, and not the occupation of the defendant, that governs the applicability of the discovery rule." Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d 1265, 1269 (7th Cir.1980). ⁵

The principal issue before us is whether the discovery rule should apply to toll the two year statute of limitations for wrongful death actions contained in AS 09.55.580. This statute states in part that: "The action [for wrongful death] shall be commenced within two years after death...." We conclude that the discovery rule will toll this period of limitation because this interpretation is the only one which is consistent with the remedial character of AS 09.55.580, and which would not lead to unjust and even absurd results.

In Haakanson v. Wakefield, 600 P.2d 1087 (Alaska 1979), we held that the requirement that a wrongful death action be brought "within two years after the death" did not bar an action brought more than two years after the death of the decedent for the benefit of the minor children of the deceased. In reaching this conclusion we relied on the general tolling provision of AS 09.10.140 applicable to minors. ⁶ We did this even though it was clear that the provisions of AS 09.10.140 were limited to "an action mentioned in this chapter," that is, ch. 10 of title 9 of the Alaska Statutes, and thus the general tolling statute expressly did not apply to an action for wrongful death which was then set out in ch. 55 of title 9.

Bell argues that the two year limitation period for wrongful death actions should apply in the present case in spite of our holding in Haakanson that this limitation period is not absolute. In making this argument, Bell relies on cases from several jurisdictions which have explicitly rejected the proposition that the discovery rule can serve to toll the running of the statutory period for wrongful death. ⁷

In rejecting the application of the discovery rule in wrongful death actions, these cases proceed from the assumption that wrongful death is an exclusively statutory creation. Thus, as an integral part of the statute creating the action, a period of limitations has been imposed which is a condition of the right of action. Cadieux v. ITT, 593 F.2d 142, 144 (1st Cir.1979). Death statutes of limitations are therefore said to bar the right of action and not merely the remedy. Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 397 comment (a) (1934); Presslaff v. Robins, 168 N.J.Super. 543, 403 A.2d 939, 941 (N.J.App.1979) ("The cause of action itself dies after that lapse of time," quoting Evernham v. Selected Risks Ins. Co., 163 N.J.Super. 132, 394 A.2d 373, 375 (App.Div.1978)). The underlying reasoning is that wrongful death actions are created by statute in derogation of the common law and thus should be construed strictly. See Cadieux, 593 F.2d at 144 (The court reasoned "that the time limit is the condition on the existence of a legislatively created cause of action unknown to the common law and therefore not subject to judicial alteration or expansion.")

Proceeding from this assumption the cases have focused on the fact that general statutes of limitation typically commence when the cause of action "accrues," whereas death statutes ordinarily state that the action must be brought within a specified period after death. The cases have reasoned that this difference in language expresses a clear legislative intent to restrict wrongful death actions to a greater extent than other tort actions. ⁸

We disagree with these cases, both in their characterization of the underlying assumptions of wrongful death actions and in their interpretation of the statutory language. First, in Haakanson we specifically rejected the proposition that wrongful death acts should be construed narrowly because they are in derogation of the common law. ⁹ Further, we expressly referred to the doctrine that death statutes bar the right of action, not merely the remedy, 600 P.2d at 1091, and rejected it as a "formalistic legal abstraction." Id. at 1092.

Alaska's wrongful death statute is a remedial statute designed to compensate those who have suffered a direct loss because of the tortiously caused death of a benefactor. Id. at 1090-91. Professor Sutherland states that wrongful death statutes

represent a wholesome remedial policy that has become firmly imbedded in modern jurisprudence, and where the extent of the damages recoverable for wrongful death is measured by the actual injury sustained, these statutes should be liberally construed to accomplish their remedial purpose. But many of the decisions in the past, and a few of the later ones as well, have crippled the operation of the legislation by employing a narrow construction on the basis that these statutes are in derogation of the common law. However, the better and modern authorities are in agreement that the objective and spirit of this legislation should not be thwarted by a technical application.

3 C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 71.05, at 337-38 (4th ed. 1973) (footnote omitted).

We now turn to the significance of the difference in language between the wrongful death statute limitation period, which runs "from death," and the general statute of limitations, which runs from the time that the cause of action accrues. Clearly, Haakanson held that this difference is not necessarily significant because the application of the minor tolling rule was not barred by the "from death" language. We stated that there was "no legislative intent to treat [an action for wrongful death] differently than the common law tort action," 600 P.2d at 1092, and noted our agreement, in spirit, with cases which "interpret the action as any other tort action and apply the general procedural statutes of limitations and the exceptions for disability." ¹⁰ Id. at 1091-92.

The result in Haakanson cannot be explained as mandated by the need to reconcile two facially inconsistent, but applicable, statutes. There was no such compulsion, because, as noted above, the tolling statute did not apply to the death statute. However, a statute may form the basis for a common law rule which applies beyond the prescribed scope of the statute. ¹¹ The inquiry in Haakanson was whether the minor tolling doctrine, as a matter of common law, should be applied to the death act. We answered that inquiry in the affirmative because of the essential justice of the minor tolling doctrine and because such a result was consistent with the purposes of the death act, while the contrary result was not.

There is no hierarchical difference between common law rules which are based on statutory enactments and common law rules which are based on judicial decisions. Neither stands on a higher footing than the other. Thus, the question in this case is similar to that presented in Haakanson, does a common law tolling rule apply to the death act?

We hold that the discovery rule does apply to the death act because of the fundamental fairness of the rule and, like the minor tolling rule, because it is consistent with the purposes of the act. The legislature did not intend that the limitation period in the death act be interpreted to reach unjust and absurd results. The same reasoning, founded on basic justice, that has led us to adopt the discovery rule generally is present in wrongful death actions. It is profoundly unfair to deprive a litigant of his right to bring a lawsuit before he...