Haney v. Gregory
Decision Date | 30 November 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 2134 Sept. Term 2006.,2134 Sept. Term 2006. |
Citation | 177 Md. App. 504,936 A.2d 388 |
Parties | Robert L. HANEY v. Jose D. GREGORY. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Louis P. Tanko of Annapolis, for appellant.
Kyle Blakeley of Towson, for appellee.
Argued before HOLLANDER, SALMON, and LAWRENCE F. RODOWSKY, (retired, specially assigned), JJ.
In this motor vehicle tort action, rising out of an accident in which the app ellee's vehicle rear-ended the vehicle of the appellant, plaintiff below, judgment was entered in favor of the appellee on a jury verdict. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting an emergency instruction. The appellee asserts lack of preservation of that issue and that the emergency instruction was generated by the evidence.1 For the reasons hereinafter stated, we shall reverse.
The accident occurred on the northbound side of the Jones Falls Expressway, Interstate 83, on February 23, 2004, at about 8:50 a.m. There is no evidence that the weather conditions were other than clear and dry. The site of the accident was in the area north of where Howard Street overpasses the expressway. In that area, the roadway rises up a hill or knoll.
On the morning in question, the appellant, Robert L. Haney (Plaintiff or Haney), was proceeding northbound in the fast lane. He testified that, when he was "coming over a hill," he saw a police car stopped behind a minivan that had apparently stalled. Both the minivan and the police car were in the fast lane. He looked to his right in an attempt to merge, but there was no room, so he "started to slow down, and started coming to a stop." As he came to a stop, the rear of his vehicle was struck by one operated by the appellee, Jose D. Gregory (Defendant or Gregory). On cross-examination, Plaintiff denied that he stopped suddenly. There was conflicting evidence whether the light on top of the police car was flashing.
The only other eyewitness to the accident was Defendant, who was called to testify in Plaintiffs case. Gregory acknowledged giving the following description of the accident in his answers to interrogatories:
""
Under further examination by Plaintiff, Gregory explained that the events were sequential. He said:
"When I came over the hill, the [brake] lights [of Plaintiffs vehicle] weren't on, and it was daytime so I presumed the car was moving, and right when I came over the hill and — it was almost a matter of two seconds, two or three split seconds — the brake lights [on the Haney vehicle] weren't on, and then they were on, and by the time I realized, it was too late."
When examined by his counsel, Gregory testified that he was traveling "about 40, 45 miles an hour" and that he believed the speed limit was either 45 or 50 miles per hour. There was no other evidence of the speed limit. Again describing the accident on examination by his counsel, Gregory said there was "plenty of space" between his car and that of Haney, but he "lost" the Haney car "over the hill once it went up over." He testified that, when he because the car spun around a couple of times following the impact.
When asked by his counsel how fast the Haney car was moving, Gregory replied that "[i]t didn't seem like it was moving."
There was no evidence of the grade of the hill for northbound traffic approaching the brow of the hill. There was no evidence as to whether there is a downside slope for northbound traffic after reaching the brow of the hill, or whether the road levels at that unspecified higher elevation. There was no evidence of the distance from the brow of the hill to the place at which the stalled minivan and the police car were standing. There was no evidence of the sight distance required for Interstate Highways at the time of final design approval for the subject segment of the Jones Falls Expressway. Haney testified that he first saw the police car when he was approximately 150 yards away. Gregory acknowledged that he had not noticed the police car or the minivan at any time before the actual impact.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the court excluded the jury from the court-room. Defendant renewed his motion for judgment, which was denied. Plaintiff did not make any motion for judgment.2
The Defendant argued "that the emergency is a stalled car in the fast lane of the Interstate on the downslope."3 In response, the court stated:
We distill from the questions presented and arguments in the briefs of the parties the two dispositive issues set forth below:
1. Did the Plaintiff fail properly to object to the emergency instruction so that Plaintiffs issue has not been preserved for appellate review?
2. If preserved, did the trial court err when it granted Defendant's request for the emergency jury instruction?
Maryland Rule 2-520(e) provides, and since July 1, 1984, has provided:
In the instant matter, Plaintiff did not object to the emergency instruction "after" the court had instructed the jury. The consequence, Defendant contends, is that the inclusion of the instruction in the court's charge to the jury cannot be claimed on appeal to be error. Defendant's submission relies on the text of the rule, without referring us to any authority. Plaintiff has not favored us with a reply brief directed to the preservation issue.
Basically, Defendant's position is that an objection to an instruction that is made before the conclusion of the charge to the jury is per se ineffective for preservation purposes. The notion is that the rule limits effective objections to a window of time, opening with the conclusion of the charge to the jury and closing with the expiration of promptness thereafter. As we explain below, that reading is not required by the purpose of the rule, is inconsistent with the concept of substantial compliance that was recognized under predecessor rules, is not required by the "legislative" history of Rule 2-520(e), and is inconsistent with the construction by the Court of Appeals of identical language in Rule 4-325(e), which was adopted contemporaneously with Rule 2-520(e), as part of the Rules Reorganization Project, effective July 1, 1984.
The purpose of Rule 2-520(e) was restated by the Court of Appeals in Hoffman v. Stamper, 385 Md. 1, 867 A.2d 276 (2005), where the Court said:
"Maryland Rule 2-520(e) requires, as a...
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