Haney v. Legg

• Decision Date: 16 April 1901
• Citation: Haney v. Legg, 129 Ala. 619, 30 So. 34 (Ala. 1901)
• Parties: HANEY v. LEGG ET AL.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

30 So. 34

129 Ala. 619

HANEY v. LEGG ET AL.

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 16, 1901

Appeal from chancery court, Limestone county; William H. Simpson Chancellor.

Bill by Nancy A. Haney against William A. Legg and others. From a decree sustaining demurrers to the bill and sustaining a motion to dismiss the same, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

To the amended bill the defendants demurred upon the following grounds: (1) The demand of the complaint, as set forth in the bill, is stale; (2) it is shown by the averments of the bill that the complainant's demand is barred by prescription or the statute of limitations of 20 years; (3) it is not shown by the bill what distinct portion of the purchase money belonging to the complainant was paid in the purchase of the land involved in the controversy; (4) it appears from the averments of the bill that the complainant's separate estate did not pay the entire purchase money for the lands described in the bill, but that her husband paid a part of said purchase money; (5) said bill seeks to establish a parol trust in real estate. The defendants also moved to dismiss the bill upon the following grounds: (1) Because there is no equity in the bill; (2) because it is shown by the averments of the bill that the complainant has been guilty of laches in enforcing her alleged equity. On the submission of the cause on the demurrers and motion to dismiss the bill, the chancellor rendered a decree sustaining the demurrer and motion, and ordered the bill dismissed. From this decree the complainant appeals, and assigns the rendition thereof as error.

James E. Horton, Jr., and W. R. Walker, for appellant.

W. T Sanders, for appellees.

TYSON J.

The bill in this cause was filed by Mrs. Haney, who was the wife of the intestate, Haney, against the administrator of his estate and his heirs at law, to enforce a resulting trust in a certain piece of land therein described. The bill was amended by the substitution of another, and it is the averments of the latter upon demurrer we are to review on this appeal. The case as made by the amended bill is this Complainant and the intestate were intermarried in 1863, and so continued in this relation until his death in 1895. Prior to her marriage she became entitled to certain moneys by inheritance and as legatee, which were collected by her husband and used by him in the purchase of this land in 1866. That she and her husband went into the possession of the land, residing on it with their children until his death, since which time she has been, and is now, in the possession of it. During the entire period of their married life the husband disclaimed any ownership of the land, affirming at all times that it was purchased with her money and was her property. The deed to the land, as shown by a certified copy thereof, made an exhibit to the bill, was executed on the 13th day of December, 1876, and was recorded October 15, 1880, and conveys the title to the land to the husband. The complainant avers her ignorance of the fact that her husband had taken the title in his own name, and alleges that this fact did not come to her knowledge until shortly before or just after his death; that as her husband had always declared that the land was hers, and not his, she supposed that the title was in her name.

At the date of the alleged use of complainant's money by her husband in the purchase of the land, it was hers, and not his. He was her trustee, and as such had the right to collect it and to invest it for her benefit (Code 1852, § 1983); and the relation of trustee and cestui que trust continued, under our statutory system, until the adoption of the act of February 28, 1887. Acts 1886-87, p. 80; Code 1876, § 2704 et seq.; Rev. Code, § 2370 et seq. It is not, however, to be supposed, simply because of the existence of this relation and the use of the money of the cestui que trust by the trustee, where the conveyance taken makes no mention of the trust, that an express trust arises; nor is the principle here involved entirely analogous to the one applicable to cases where no trust relation exists between the parties,-as, for example, where A. furnishes the funds to B., who purchases and takes title in his own name instead of in A.'s. In that class of cases a resulting trust has its origin solely in the facts that the purchase money of land is paid or advanced by one person at the time of the purchase, and the title is taken in the name of another. It is founded on the presumption that he who pays the purchase money intends to become the owner of the land, and therefore presupposes the authorized use of the money of him who asserts the trust, and is implied independent of any fraud or of any fiduciary relation between the person who pays the money and him in whose name the title is taken, although the mere existence of such relation will not prevent the implication of such a trust. But the presumption of such intent does not arise unless the purchase money was paid before or at the time of the purchase, and hence it is universally held that the trust must have been coeval with and result from the original transaction, or it cannot exist at all. If the payment is not made before or at the time of the purchase, no equity is conferred upon him whose money is used to have a trust of this character declared in his favor. Preston v. McMillan, 58 Ala. 84; Lehman v. Lewis, 62 Ala. 129; Tilford v. Torrey, 53 Ala. 120. Where, however, a trustee, as was the case here, employs the money of his cestui que trust in the purchase of lands, taking title in his own name, in violation of his trust, such a trust originates in the right to pursue the trust fund through its various transmutations into a new investment; and it is immaterial whether the money of the cestui que trust was used at the time of or before the purchase, or subsequently thereto. If the cestui que trust authorizes the transaction, or subsequently ratifies and adopts it, the incidents of the trust, and the facts necessary in law to create it, do not differ in any respect from those of a simple resulting trust. Thames v. Herbert, 61 Ala. 340; Whaley v. Whaley, 71 Ala. 159; Long v. King, 117 Ala. 423, 23 So. 534. It is...