Hanley v. Donoghue

• Decision Date: 19 January 1883
• Citation: 59 Md. 239
• Parties: MICHAEL HANLEY and WILLIAM F. WELCH v. CHARLES DONOGHUE.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

59 Md. 239

MICHAEL HANLEY and WILLIAM F. WELCH v. CHARLES DONOGHUE.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

January 19, 1883

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.

This was an action of debt on a judgment rendered in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County, Pennsylvania. The declaration contained three counts--the first declaring on a normal and regularly obtained judgment against Charles and John Donoghue; the second declaring on a judgment obtained in "a certain other action," which, as there described, is shown to have been in some respects irregular and the third setting forth also "a certain other" irregular action in much the same way as the second count. The defendant demurred to all the counts. The Circuit Court sustained the demurrer, and gave judgment for the defendant for costs. The plaintiffs appealed.

The cause was argued before ALVEY, ROBINSON, IRVING, and RITCHIE J.

Frederick J. Brown, for the appellants.

The demurrer to the first count should have been overruled because--when a judgment has been rendered against two (or more,) they are jointly and severally bound by it, and either of them can be sued on the judgment. The question is simply this: Does a judgment bind each of those against whom it is rendered, or does it only bind them all together? A careful consideration will, it is submitted, lead us to the view that the judgment binds each of them--that it is the several obligation of each, as well as the joint obligation of all. Hill vs. Snyder, 7 La. Ann., 557; Martin vs. Branch Bank, 15 Ala., 587; Blake vs. Burley, 9 Iowa, 592; Judd, &c. Co. vs. Hubbell, 76 N. Y., 543; Wells vs. Ghiselin, 1 H. & McH., 91.

When a judgment has been rendered jointly against two defendants, one of whom was not summoned, and it is allowed to stand unreversed, it is not void, but only voidable, that is to say valid, as against the summoned defendant, and he can be sued on it in another State. 19 Am. Law Register, N. S., 673; 32 American Decisions--note (by A. C. Freeman) to the case of St. John vs. Holmes, 20 Wend., 609, and authorities cited in said note and in the Law Register's article; Reed vs. Pratt, 2 Hill, 64; Gray vs. Stuart, 33 Grattan, 351; Bacon vs. McBean, 3 Upper Canada, Q. B., 305.

The summoned defendant in the irregularly rendered judgment, may be sued alone in another State, and the plaintiff may declare upon the judgment as upon a judgment binding him alone. See Bacon vs. McBean, 3 Upper Canada, Q. B. 305, and 19 Am. Law Register, cited above.

Edward C. Eichelberger, and John I. Yellott, for the appellee.

The jurisdiction of the Court over the person or thing against whom or which its judgment or decree is pronounced, is a pre-requisite to the validity of such judgment or decree; and the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County, Pennsylvania, rendered on the 4th of June, 1877, against John Donoghue, upon a joint obligation of John and Charles Donoghue, was utterly null and void, for the reason that the Court did not possess jurisdiction over John, who was never summoned, and never appeared in person or by attorney. Koechlept vs. Hook's Lessee, 10 Md., 174, 179; D'Arcy vs. Ketchum, 11 Howard, 165, 174, 176; Hall vs. Williams, 6 Pick., 232; Starbuck vs. Murray, 5 Wendell, 148-158; Shumway vs. Stillman, 6 Wendell, 452; Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 720, 728, 730 to 733; Thompson vs. Whitman, 18 Wall., 457; Weaver vs. Boggs, 38 Md., 261, 263; Gilman vs. Gilman, 126 Mass., 26.

The judgment as rendered by the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County, and as it now stands upon the records of said Court, and is declared upon in this case, is an entirety, and if void as to one defendant is void as to all, and if erroneous as to one is erroneous as to all. It was a joint judgment entered upon a joint obligation, and as an entirety, if void as to one must be void as to the other also. 2 Saunders, 101; Hall vs. Williams, 6 Pick., 232; Holbrook vs. Murray, 5 Wendell, 161; Donnelly vs. Graham, 77 Pa. St. Rep., 274 to 276; Shuford vs. Cain, 1 Abb. U.S. Circuit Ct. Rep., 302, 310; Benner vs. Welt, 45 Maine, 483; Ruffum vs. Ramsdell, 55 Maine, 252; Covenant Life Ins. Co. vs. Clover, 36 Mo., 392; Richard vs. Walton, 12 Johns., 434; Kitchens vs. Hutchins, 44 Geo., 620; Commercial Bank vs. Wilson, 14 Grant Ch., 431; Vorhis vs. Gamble, 6 Mo. App., 1; Van Ranseleear vs. Whiting, 12 Mich., 449; Jansen vs. Varmine, 89 Ill., 100; Johnson vs. Lough, 22 Minn., 203; Cole vs. Pennel, 2 Randolph, 174; Kelly vs. Bandini, 50 Cal., 530; Freeman on Judgments, secs. 43 and 136, (3 d Edition, last;) Rangley vs. Webster, 11 N. H. 290; Beckley vs. Newcomb, 24 N. H., 359.

The declaration filed in this cause sets forth as a cause of action a joint judgment against Charles Donoghue, together with a certain John Donoghue, recovered by the plaintiffs against the said defendants jointly, in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County, Pennsylvania, which judgment as set forth in said declaration, is a joint judgment, still in force, unreversed and unsatisfied in said Court; whereas, this suit is instituted against Charles Donoghue alone, being only one of the joint obligors in the judgment, and the non-joinder of John Donoghue, the other joint defendant is unaccounted for by any sufficient averment in the declaration. Revised Code, Art., 64, sec. 51; Merrick vs. Bank of The Metropolis, 8 Gill, 64; Kent vs. Holliday, 17 Md., 393; State vs. Magraw, 12 G. & J., 265; State vs. Wheeler, 14 Md., 108; Freeman on Judgments, sec. 43 (3 d Ed.)

ROBINSON J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

It appears from the pleadings in this case, that suit was brought in Pennsylvania against Charles and John Donoghue on a joint contract; that Charles was regularly summoned, but no process of any kind was issued against John, nor did he appear, in person or by attorney, to the suit. Judgment was however subsequently recovered against both defendants, and on this judgment, suit is brought in this State against Charles. In support of this action, it is contended, that the foreign judgment although void as to John is valid and binding on Charles, the party who was summoned.

At common law a judgment was regarded as an entire thing, and being an entirety it has been held repeatedly, that it could not be affirmed as to one or more defendants, and reversed as to others. It must either be affirmed as a whole or reversed as a whole. Cutting vs. Williams, 1 Salk., 24; Parker vs. Harris, 1 Ld. Rayd., 825; Lloyd vs. Pearse, Croke Jac., 425; 2 Saunds. Rep., 101; 2 Bac. Abr., 228, marg.

Thus in an action of trespass against two or more defendants, if one of them died pending the suit, and judgment was rendered against all, it was decided that the entire judgment must be reversed; and for the reason, that being an entirety it could not be affirmed in part and reversed in part. 2 Bac. Abr., Letter E, 228.

But conceding this to be the law where a judgment is affirmed or reversed on appeal or on a writ of error, the argument is that the rule does not apply to a suit brought upon a foreign judgment recovered against two or more defendants, only one of whom was summoned, and which judgment has been permitted to stand unreversed and unchallenged. In such a case, the appellant contends the judgment is valid and may be enforced against the party summoned in the original action, though void as to the parties against whom no process was issued. Now in determining this question, we must not lose sight of the distinction between void and voidable judgments. A judgment rendered by a Court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the person, is unquestionably conclusive and binding on the parties, unless reversed or set aside in some mode or manner prescribed by law. But it is essential to the validity of a judgment in personam, that the Court should have jurisdiction over the parties, and if rendered without such jurisdiction, it is a mere nullity. Such a judgment is not merely erroneous because of some irregularity in the mode of proceeding, or error on the part of the Court in the application of the law to the particular case, and for which the party aggrieved must seek a remedy by appeal or writ of error, but being a judgment, rendered without jurisdiction, it is absolutely void, and may be assailed at all times, and in all proceedings by which it is sought to be enforced.

If then a judgment could not at common law be affirmed in part and reversed in part, because of its entirety, for...