Hanley v. Mazda Motor Corp.

• Decision Date: 19 April 2000
• Docket Number: Docket No. 204499.
• Citation: Hanley v. Mazda Motor Corp., 609 N.W.2d 203, 239 Mich.App. 596 (Mich. App. 2000)
• Parties: Derek Robert HANLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MAZDA MOTOR CORPORATION and Mazda Motor Manufacturing (USA) Corporation, a/k/a Autoalliance International, Inc., Defendants-Appellees, and NII Tech Company, Ltd. and Mazda Motor of America, Inc., Defendants.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan

609 N.W.2d 203

239 Mich. App. 596

Derek Robert HANLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MAZDA MOTOR CORPORATION and Mazda Motor Manufacturing (USA) Corporation, a/k/a Autoalliance International, Inc., Defendants-Appellees, and NII Tech Company, Ltd. and Mazda Motor of America, Inc., Defendants.

Docket No. 204499.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted September 15, 1999, at Detroit.

Decided February 4, 2000, at 9:10 a.m.

Released for Publication April 19, 2000.

Still, Nemier, Landry, Mazzeo & Johnson, P.C. (by Craig L. Nemier), Farmington Hills, and Sommers, Schwartz, Silver & Schwartz, P.C. (by B.A. Tyler), Southfield, for the plaintiff.

Michael J. O'Reilly, Dearborn, Donald H. Dawson, Jr., Kathleen A. Clark, and John R. Prew, Detroit, for the defendants.

Before: WHITBECK, P.J., and SAAD and HOEKSTRA, JJ.

HOEKSTRA, J.

On the basis of alleged injuries sustained in an automobile accident, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants herein in August 1995. Approximately one year earlier, with regard to the same incident and resultant injuries, plaintiff had filed a complaint against Ford Motor Company. In that suit, Ford made an offer of judgment, the plaintiff accepted the offer of judgment, a judgment was entered, and Ford satisfied the judgment. In the instant case, the trial court granted summary disposition in favor of defendants Mazda Motor Corporation and AutoAlliance International, Inc. (collectively Mazda), concluding that under the unique facts in these suits, satisfaction of the previous judgment bars plaintiff from further recovery.¹ The question on appeal is whether satisfaction of a judgment entered pursuant to the offer of judgment rule, MCR 2.405, precludes a plaintiff from seeking from other tortfeasors additional damages arising from the same incident and injuries. We hold that a judgment entered pursuant to the acceptance of an offer of judgment under MCR 2.405 functions as a full and final adjudication on the merits, and, therefore, satisfaction of a judgment so entered precludes a plaintiff from further relief from other alleged joint tortfeasors.

I

In this products liability action, plaintiff sued the named defendants for injuries he suffered in an automobile accident. Plaintiff alleged that another vehicle struck his car, a 1989 Ford Probe, causing him to suffer injuries and, among other things, that his car was defective because, upon collision, an inadequate hinge mechanism allowed the hood to penetrate the plane of the windshield. Plaintiff's car was the product of a joint venture between Mazda and Ford. Mazda designed and manufactured the Ford Probe, and Ford marketed the car.²

Previously, plaintiff sued Ford with regard to this same incident and the resultant injuries. In that case, on September 6, 1995, plaintiff accepted Ford's offer of judgment in the amount of $200,000. The trial court entered the judgment on October 30, 1995. Thereafter, Ford satisfied the judgment. However, on August 11, 1995, just twenty-six days before accepting the offer of judgment, plaintiff initiated this action against Mazda, seeking further damages.

The trial court denied Mazda's initial motion for summary disposition, which claimed that the action was barred under the doctrine of res judicata. Nevertheless, the trial court allowed Mazda's subsequent motion to amend its affirmative defenses to include an argument that, under the contribution statute, M.C.L. § 600.2925c(5); MSA 27A.2925(3)(5), plaintiff was entitled to only one satisfaction of a judgment for his injuries. Thereafter, Mazda moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (10), arguing that on the basis of the satisfaction of the judgment against Ford in the previous suit, they, as joint tortfeasors with Ford, were discharged from liability. The trial court agreed, under the unique facts of these suits, and dismissed the case.³ This appeal follows.

II

We review a trial court's grant of summary disposition de novo. Spiek v. Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich. 331, 337, 572 N.W.2d 201 (1998); Russell v. Dep't of Corrections, 234 Mich.App. 135, 136, 592 N.W.2d 125 (1999). MCR 2.116(C)(7) permits summary disposition where the claim is barred because of, among other things, prior judgment. In reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7), this Court accepts as true the plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations, construing them in the plaintiff's favor. Abbott v. John E. Green Co., 233 Mich.App. 194, 198, 592 N.W.2d 96 (1998). We must consider affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence filed or submitted by the parties when determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. MCR 2.116(G)(5); Employers Mut. Casualty Co. v. Petroleum Equipment, Inc., 190 Mich.App. 57, 62, 475 N.W.2d 418 (1991).

III

In this issue of first impression in Michigan, we must determine the scope of finality of an accepted, entered, and satisfied offer of judgment. Specifically, the question before us is whether an accepted, entered, and satisfied offer of judgment in one cause of action precludes pursuit of a separate cause of action for damages arising from the same incident and injuries, but against other tortfeasors. We hold that it does.⁴

As a general rule, a plaintiff may pursue separate judgments against defendants that are jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff's damages, but the plaintiff may recover only one satisfaction for the losses. Grand Blanc Cement Products, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of North America, 225 Mich.App. 138, 144-145, 571 N.W.2d 221 (1997); see also Verhoeks v. Gillivan, 244 Mich. 367, 371, 221 N.W. 287 (1928) ("`[T]he injury being single, he may recover but one compensation,'" quoting 58 LRA 430.); Kaminski v. Newton, 176 Mich.App. 326, 328, 438 N.W.2d 915 (1989) ("At common law, where the conduct of two or more actors proximately causes a single injury to a plaintiff, while the plaintiff may pursue compensation for the injury from any or all of the defendants, the plaintiff is entitled to only one satisfaction."). Our Legislature codified this rule in Michigan's contribution statute, M.C.L. § 600.2925c(5); MSA 27A.2925(3)(5), which provides:

The recovery of a judgment for an injury or wrongful death against 1 tort-feasor does not of itself discharge the other tort-feasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless the judgment is satisfied. Satisfaction of the judgment does not impair any right of contribution. [Emphasis supplied.]

We have previously explained the policy considerations giving rise to the rule that satisfaction of a judgment extinguishes the claim:

The principle guiding enforcement of a satisfaction of judgment is the promotion of certainty and finality. A satisfaction of judgment extinguishes the claim, and, as discussed previously, may be reviewed on a very limited basis. Next, it is judicial policy to further the intent and expectations of the parties. The intent of any party entering into a satisfaction of judgment generally extends to the entire claim. [Becker v. Halliday, 218 Mich.App. 576, 579, 554 N.W.2d 67 (1996).]

Finality leads to, and public policy demands, conservation of judicial resources and the efficient administration of justice. See People v. Carpentier, 446 Mich. 19, 58, 521 N.W.2d 195 (1994) (Riley, J. concurring) ("[T]he orderly administration of justice is founded on finality of judgments and an interest in judicial economy."). "Inroads on the concept of finality tend to undermine confidence in the integrity of our procedures." United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184, n. 11, 99 S.Ct. 2235, 60 L.Ed.2d 805 (1979).

With this understanding of the rule and the policy considerations behind the rule, we now turn to an examination of the rule in the context of offers of judgment, which MCR 2.405 governs. When interpreting court rules, the same basic principles governing statutory interpretation apply. Kitchen v. Kitchen, 231 Mich.App. 15, 18, 585 N.W.2d 47 (1998). "A court rule should be construed in accordance with the ordinary and approved usage of its language in light of the purpose the rule seeks to accomplish." Bush v. Mobil Oil Corp., 223 Mich.App. 222, 226, 565 N.W.2d 921 (1997).

In pertinent part, MCR 2.405(B) provides that "[u]ntil 28 days before trial, a party may serve on the adverse party a written offer to stipulate to the entry of a judgment for the whole or part of the claim, including interest and costs then accrued." If accepted pursuant to the rule, "[t]he court shall enter a judgment according to the terms of the stipulation," MCR 2.405(C)(1), which occurred in the present case. Such a judgment lies upon the continuum for purposes of implicating the restriction of the contribution statute somewhere between the extremes of a judgment entered upon a verdict following a trial and a private party settlement.

We see our decision here hinging on an examination of the offer of judgment process with a view toward deciding whether the process is more akin to judgment after trial or private settlements. We certainly recognize that elements of both are involved. "The purpose of MCR 2.405 is `to encourage settlement and to deter protracted litigation.'" Luidens v. 63rd Dist. Court, 219 Mich.App. 24, 31, 555 N.W.2d 709 (1996), quoting Hamilton v. Becker Orthopedic Appliance Co., 214 Mich.App. 593, 596, 543 N.W.2d 60 (1995). However, although an offer judgment under MCR 2.405 is a tool to promote settlement of a cause of action, Luidens, supra, it is different from settlement negotiations. In Haberkorn v. Chrysler Corp., 210 Mich.App. 354, 378, 533 N.W.2d 373 (1995), we explained that an offer of judgment is distinct from an offer to settle:

An offer of judgment is not the same as an offer to settle. An agreement to settle does not necessarily result in a judgment. Although it usually results in a stipulated order of dismissal with prejudice, such an order does not constitute an adjudication on the merits. It merely "signifies the

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