Hanley v. Most
| Decision Date | 17 July 1941 |
| Docket Number | 28159. |
| Citation | 9 Wn.2d 429,115 P.2d 933 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | HANLEY v. MOST et al. |
Action by Elizabeth H. Hanley against Joe E. Most and others for injunction against husband's disposing of property of marital community and against inducing husband to commit such acts, to set aside voting trust agreements, to compel accounting and for appointment of receiver. From a decree dismissing the action, plaintiff appeals.
Case remanded as against respondent E. B. Hanley, Sr., and judgment affirmed as to other respondents.
Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Malcolm Douglas, judge.
Preston Thorgrimson & Turner and Colvin & Rhodes, all of Seattle, for appellant.
McMicken Rupp & Schweppe and J. Gordon Gose, all of Seattle, for respondents.
Plaintiff, Elizabeth H. Hanley, brought this action seeking (1) to enjoin her husband, defendant E. B. Hanley, Sr., from giving away, or otherwise disposing of, any of the property of their marital community, and to enjoin the other individual defendants, Joe E. Most, E. G. Most, and A. C. Bevan, from inducing defendant husband to commit any of such acts; (2) to set aside two voting trust agreements wherein defendant husband empowered defendant Joe E. Most, as trustee, to receive, hold, and vote certain capital stock of defendant corporations, The Copper River Packing Company and Pleasant Creek Mining Company, which stock was alleged to belong to the marital community; (3) to compel defendants Joe E. Most and A. C. Bevan to account for and return certain personal property alleged to have been unlawfully procured by them from defendant husband; and (4) to secure the appointment of a receiver for the liquid assets of the marital community.
Upon filing her complaint, plaintiff obtained an order temporarily restraining the disposition by defendant E. B. Hanley, Sr., and the acceptance by the other individual defendants, of any of the assets of the marital community, and also temporarily restraining the defendants from further exercising or recognizing any power under the voting trust agreements.
All of the defendants, with the exception of A. C. Bevan, were duly served, and appeared in the action. By stipulation of the parties appearing, the temporary restraining order was continued and converted into a temporary injunction as to defendants E. B. Hanley, Sr., and Joe E. Most, to remain in force until further order of the court.
The cause came on duly for trial Before the court, without a jury, and at the conclusion thereof the court filed a memorandum decision in favor of defendants, and, in conformity therewith, entered a decree dismissing the action and dissolving the temporary restraining order and injunction.
Plaintiff appealed from the entire decree, and gave bond to supersede so much of the decree as dissolved certain portions of the injunctive order relating to the disposition, by defendant E. B. Hanley, Sr., and to the acceptance, by defendant Joe E. Most, of any of the assets of the marital community.
After the appeal had been perfected, and shortly Before the first argument thereon was had in this court on January 22, 1941, defendant E. B. Hanley, Sr., filed herein, in propria persona, a lengthy instrument entitled, and purporting to be, a 'confession on appeal' by him. Thereupon, counsel who had formerly represented all of the defendants except A. C. Bevan withdrew their appearance for E. B. Hanley, Sr., in this court, and other counsel were substituted as his attorneys of record. Joe E. Most, through the attorneys who had formerly represented all the defendants appearing, including both himself and E. B. Hanley, Sr., then moved to strike the confession on appeal, upon two grounds. Although the confession was argued in connection with the merits of the case on appeal, the motion to strike was not formally argued until the regular motion day following the hearing of the case on its merits.
Shortly after E. B. Hanley, Sr., had filed his confession on appeal, appellant, Elizabeth H. Hanley, applied for, and obtained from this court, an order directing respondents Joe E. Most and E. B. Hanley, Sr., to show cause why an order should not be entered commanding them forthwith to dissolve and cancel two contracts for the sale of certain capital stock in the respondent corporations, which contracts had been entered into by and between E. B. Hanley, Sr., and Joe E. Most after this appeal had been taken, and further directing respondent Joe E. Most to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of this court because of his violation of the injunctive orders issued by the trial court upon the commencement of the action.
In response to the show cause order, E. B. Hanley, Sr., filed an answer, in propria persona, expressing his willingness to cancel those contracts and to execute any documents which this court might direct to that end. At the argument, he was represented by his substituted attorneys of record. Respondent Joe E. Most, by additional counsel, and in response to the show cause order, filed an affidavit alleging that the execution of the two contracts just mentioned was not in violation of the injunctive orders, and that the sale and purchase of the capital stock covered by those contracts were for valid consideration and were in all respects regular. The contempt matter was argued at the same time that argument was had on the motion to strike E. B. Hanley, Sr.'s, confession on appeal, but was assigned for a separate opinion.
Thereafter, this court called for a rehearing of all matters involved in the controversy, and on May 27, 1941, argument was had, Before the court sitting en banc, upon all the various issues which had theretofore been presented. This opinion does not dispose of the contempt proceedings, but is confined to the matter of the appeal taken from the decree of the trial court, and to the matter of the subsequent 'confession on appeal' by E. B. Hanley, Sr.
The theory of appellant's complaint was that, as a result of a conspiracy on the part of respondents Most and defendant Bevan, respondent E. B. Hanley, Sr., by reason of his advanced age, his alleged impaired physical and mental condition brought about by serious illness, and by reason of the absolute trust and confidence reposed by him in respondent Joe E. Most, was inveigled and induced by respondents Most and defendant Bevan to do the following things: (1) To make numerous and sundry gifts of money and other personal property of the marital community to defendant Bevan; and (2) to give and transfer to respondent Joe E. Most, through the device of two voting trust agreements, large blocks of stock of the two corporate defendants, thereby enabling Most to secure complete control over the affairs of the two corporations.
It was alleged that the voting trust agreements were executed secretly, fraudulently, and without the knowledge or consent of appellant or of appellant's daughter, both of whom were stockholders in one of the two corporations; that such voting trust agreements were never filed in the offices of the respective corporations, but were kept secret until recently discovered by appellant; that respondents had deliberately withheld from appellant all knowledge of the affairs of the corporations; that respondent Joe E. Most, by reason of his influence over E. B. Hanley, Sr., had obtained possession and control over other properties and securities belonging to the marital community, the kind and nature of which were alleged to be unknown to appellant; that, for several years last past, respondent Joe E. Most had manifested a strong dislike for appellant, and had maintained an attitude of hostility toward her; that her interests and those of the community were jeopardized by the existing voting trust agreements; that, as the result of such fraudulent acts, appellant and the marital community had been prevented from exercising their rights with respect to the corporations mentioned, and had sustained serious detriment and injury; that respondent E. B. Hanley, Sr., being under the complete control of respondent Joe E. Most, had, in defiance of appellant's request, refused to cancel the voting trust agreements; and that respondent E. B. Hanley, Sr., acting under the influence of the parties charged with the conspiracy, would, unless prevented, dissipate the remaining assets of the marital community.
The evidence in the case covers a period of nearly forty years. The events which precipitated this lawsuit, however, are of comparatively recent origin. While there was considerable conflict in the testimony, we outline the facts here involved according to our determination of the weight of the evidence.
At the time of the commencement of the action, in June, 1939, respondent E. B. Hanley, Sr., was seventy-six years of age, appellant, Elizabeth H. Hanley, was approximately twenty years younger, and respondent Joe E. Most had arrived at the age of forty-six years. The Hanleys were married in 1903, and have been husband and wife ever since. They have a son, E. B. Hanley, Jr., who is a practicing attorney in the city of Seattle, and a daughter, Katheryn Heffernan. We will, from this point on, refer to respondent E. B. Hanley, Sr., simply as Mr. Hanley, or E. B. Hanley; to his son as E. B. Hanley, Jr., and to respondent Joe E. Most as Mr. Most, or Joe Most.
Since early manhood, Mr. Hanley has been engaged in a series of business enterprises and ventures such as cattle raising in Oregon, prior to his marriage, and, subsequently, freighting mining, fishing, and fish-packing in Alaska, as well as mining elsewhere. Some of his ventures have resulted in losses, but for the most part he has been...
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...respondent may not in the absence of a cross-appeal, urge consideration of the question of its right to a new trial. See Hanley v. Most, 9 Wash.2d 429, 115 P.2d 933. State v. Baird, 200 Wash. 227, 93 P.2d 409, we held that where evidence is excluded upon objection of appellant we will not c......
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...the community. Occasional small gifts of community property by the husband have been upheld under the rule of de minimus. Hanley v. Most, 9 Wash.2d 429, 115 P.2d 933. Respondent urges the application of that rule in this case, calling attention to the comparatively small amount of the premi......
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...of the marital community, and the authority of the husband is complete as long as he acts on behalf of the community. Hanley v. Most, 9 Wash.2d 429, 115 P.2d 933. The statutory authority exists in the husband in his representative capacity for the community. He is in the nature of a managin......
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Table of Cases
...3.3(1) Hamlin v. Merlino,44 Wn.2d 851, 272 P.2d 125 (1954): 3.1(5), 3.2(16), 3.3(1), 5.1(1), 5.1(2), 5.1(3), 5.2, 7.2(7) Hanley v. Most,9 Wn.2d 429, 115 P.2d 933 (1941): 4.3, 4.4, 4.6, 4.11 Hansen v.Hansen, 110 Wash. 276, 188 P. 460 (1920): 3.1(3) Hansen, In reEstate of, 77 Wn.App. 526, 892......
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§4.6 Management and Disposition of Community Personalty
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§4.4 Standards of Management
...fact that a decision is unwise does not constitute a basis for relief from its consequences if it was made in good faith. Hanley v. Most, 9 Wn.2d 429, 115 P.2d 933 (1941); see Elizabeth De Armond, It Takes Two: Remodeling the Management and Control Provisions of Community Property Law, 30 G......
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§4.11 Management After Death of A Spouse; Testamentary Powers
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