Hanlon v. Davis

• Decision Date: 03 January 1923
• Docket Number: 209
• Citation: 276 Pa. 113,119 A. 822
• Parties: Hanlon v. Davis, Director General of Railroads, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

119 A. 822

276 Pa. 113

Hanlon v. Davis, Director General of Railroads, Appellant

No. 209

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

January 3, 1923

Argued October 13, 1922

Appeal, No. 209, Oct. T., 1922, by defendant, from judgment of C.P. Allegheny Co., Oct. T., 1918, No. 1555, on verdict for plaintiff, in case of Michael J. Hanlon v. James C Davis, Director General of Railroads, agent. Affirmed.

Trespass for personal injuries. Before CARNAHAN, J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Motion to allow amendment. Amendment allowed in opinion by SHAFER P.J.

Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $4,250. Defendant appealed.

Error assigned, inter alia, was in allowing amendment, quoting record.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed.

Carl E. Glock, with him Patterson, Crawford & Miller, for appellant. -- Plaintiff has no right, after the termination of federal control, to substitute James C. Davis, Director General of Railroads, Agent, as party defendant, in place of the Pennsylvania Railroad Co.: Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Ault, 256 U.S. 554; Pullman v. Sweeney, 269 F. 764; Goldstein v. Hines, 183 N.Y.S. 518; Bryson v. Ry., 203 P. 529; Tutsch v. Director Gen. of Railroads, 199 P. 861.

Meredith R. Marshall and Rody P. Marshall, for appellee, were not heard.

Before WALLING, SIMPSON, KEPHART, SADLER and SCHAFFER, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE SIMPSON:

On December 26, 1917, under authority of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, chap. 218 (39 Stat. at L. 619, 645), the President appointed a director general of railroads, and required him to take possession of, control and operate various railroad systems, among them being that of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, the original defendant in this case. The proclamation further specified that "suits may be brought by and against said carriers and judgments rendered as hitherto, until and except so far as said director may by general or special orders otherwise determine."

By section 10 of the Federal Control Act of March 21, 1918, chap. 25 (40 Stat. at L. 451), it is provided: "That carriers while under federal control shall be subject to all laws and liabilities as common carriers, whether arising under state or federal laws, or at common law, except in so far as may be inconsistent with the provisions of this act or any other act applicable to such federal control or with any order of the President. Actions at law or suits in equity may be brought by and against such carriers and judgments rendered as now provided by law; and in any action at law or suit in equity against the carrier, no defense shall be made thereto upon the ground that the carrier is an instrumentality or agency of the federal government. . . . But no process, mesne or final, shall be levied against any property under such federal control."

Under section 12 of the same act (as pointed out in a footnote to Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Ault, 256 U.S. 554, 560), "receipts from the operation of each carrier are the property of the United States and unless otherwise directed by the President are to be kept . . . and accounted for in the same way as before federal control. . . [and] judgments for damages are chargeable to the operation of the railroad and payable out of the general receipts."

On April 18, 1918, plaintiff in this case, while a passenger, was injured in one of the railroad stations belonging to defendant, but in the possession and control of the director general of railroads; and to recover damages therefor he brought this suit against the railroad company on September 11, 1918.

Much difference of opinion existed at that time, in the various courts throughout the country, as to whether or not it was proper, under either the proclamation of December 26, 1917, or the Act of March 21, 1918, each above quoted, to bring suit against the carrier itself, for damages arising during federal control; but this matter was finally settled in Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Ault, supra, where it is said: "It is urged that since section 10 [of the said act] continues the liability of 'carriers under federal control,' and permits suit against them, it should be construed as subjecting the companies to liability for acts or omissions of the Railroad Administration although they are deprived of all power over the properties and the personnel. . . . Such a radical departure from the established concepts of legal liability at least approaches the verge of constitutional power. . . . If the cause of action arose while the government It should not be made in the absence of compelling language. . . If the cause of action arose while the government was operating the system, the carrier while under federal control was, nevertheless, to be liable and suable. This means, as a matter of law, that the government or its agency for operation could be sued, for under the existing law the legal person in control of the carrier was responsible for its acts. . . . The title by which suit should be brought -- the person who should be named as defendant -- was not designated in the act. In the absence of explicit direction, it was perhaps natural that those wishing to sue the carrier should have named the company as defendant when they sought to hold the government liable. . . . [However] all doubt as to how suit should be brought was cleared away by general order No. 50, which required that it be against the director general by name."

It is clear, therefore, that this suit was improperly...