Hanna v. Ishee

Decision Date19 November 2012
Docket NumberNo. 09–3360.,09–3360.
Citation694 F.3d 596
PartiesJames HANNA, Petitioner–Appellant, v. Todd ISHEE, Warden, Respondent–Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

ARGUED: Tyson L. Fleming, Office of the Ohio Public Defender, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Thomas E. Madden, Office of the Ohio Attorney General, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Tyson L. Fleming, Rachel Troutman, Office of the Ohio Public Defender, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Thomas E. Madden, Office of the Ohio Attorney General, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.

Before: SILER, CLAY, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

CLAY, Circuit Judge.

Petitioner James Hanna was convicted of aggravated murder by an Ohio jury and sentenced to death. He appeals an order by the district court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the district court's judgment denying the petition.

BACKGROUND
I. The Crime

The facts underlying Petitioner's conviction, as derived from the Ohio Supreme Court's decision denying Petitioner's direct appeal, are not in dispute:

In the late summer of 1997, Petitioner was an Ohio state inmate housed at the Lebanon Correctional Institution (LCI), located in Lebanon, Ohio. Petitioner was nineteen years into a life sentence for murder and aggravated murder when, around August 18, 1997, he was assigned a new cellmate, Peter Copas. The two had been cellmates for only four days when Petitioner brutally attacked Copas in his sleep. Although Copas initially survived the attack, he developed an infection and succumbed to his injuries several days later.

From the outset of the rooming arrangement, the relationship between Petitioner and Copas was strained. Petitioner was upset with prison officials for moving Copas into his cell without prior notification. His displeasure only mounted after Copas proved to be a less than ideal cellmate, using Petitioner's belongings without permission, unilaterally rearranging their cell, breaking Petitioner's TV set, and leaving the cell door open, resulting in the theft of some of Petitioner's property. The pair had words over these events and within two days of moving in together, Copas filed a formal transfer request, stating that he and Petitioner were “unable to co-exist.”

On the evening of August 21, 1997, Copas returned to their cell drunk, crawled onto his top bunk, and vomited. According to Petitioner's later statements, at that point he decided he had “had enough.” Around 4:00 or 5:00 a.m. that morning, Petitioner sharpened the tip of a paintbrush handle and lit it with matches to stiffen it into a shank. He then removed a padlock from Copas' lock box and placed it inside the end of a sock to create an additional weapon. As Copas slept, Petitioner stood up from his bunk, approached his cellmate, and thrust the paintbrush deep into Copas' closed eyesocket.

Copas awoke and demanded, “Why the hell did you do that?” Petitioner responded by bludgeoning his victim with his fists and the padlock, beating Copas into unconsciousness. Petitioner then flushed the paintbrush handle and the sock down the toilet, replaced Copas' lock, and returned to his own bed to smoke a cigarette.

Around 6:00 a.m., Copas regained consciousness and ran to the cell door, screaming, “My celly's trying to kill me!” A corrections officer discovered Copas bleeding profusely at the door of the cell. Copas was taken to the prison infirmary, and Petitioner was handcuffed. When a guard asked what happened, Petitioner responded, “I told them not to put him in here with me.”

Copas was transferred to the Middletown Regional Hospital for treatment of his injuries. The emergency room physician, however, did not realize that Copas had been stabbed, because the prison infirmary did not report such an injury, and Copas apparently did not notify anyone either. The physician saw no indication of a foreign object, and x-rays taken of Copas' face and skull were negative. The emergency room physician did not order a CAT scan.

Copas was treated at the hospital for superficial injuries and returned to the prison. Once there, however, LCI's medical director became concerned that Copas might have suffered a concussion during the attack. Four days later, a CAT scan was taken which revealed five inches of the wooden paintbrush handle lodged in Copas' skull, just behind his severely swollen right eye. Doctors immediately performed surgery, and Copas appeared to recover quickly. However, on September 5, 1997, Copas developed a post-surgical infection. His condition rapidly deteriorated, and he lapsed into a coma. He died on September 10, 1997, nineteen days after the attack.

According to statements Petitioner later made to authorities and in letters he wrote to a fellow inmate, Petitioner admitted the attack and provided some insight into his underlying motivations. Petitioner explained that he chose to stab Copas in the eye because “the ear is too hard. You would use an ice pick in the ear. The eye is much softer.” Petitioner also bragged that he “stabbed one of [Copas'] eyeballs up out of its socket.” Petitioner explained that he “didn't mean for the [paintbrush] to break,” and that he “wanted it to go further in than what it did, but it broke off.” Petitioner told his friend that “those idiots of the administration there wouldn't move [Copas] the hell out of my cell, so I took him out of his misery.” Petitioner described “beat [ing] all on his stupid-ass-head off-and-on for two hours.” Petitioner also allegedly told another LCI inmate that he tried to “bash the motherfucker's brains in” because Copas “had turned his TV off on him.” See State v. Hanna, 95 Ohio St.3d 285, 767 N.E.2d 678, 686–89 (2002).

II. The Guilt Phase of Trial

On January 26, 1998, a Warren County, Ohio grand jury issued a two-count indictment against Petitioner for (1) aggravated murder with prior calculation and design, in violation of Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2903.01; and (2) possession of a deadly weapon while under detention, in violation of Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2923.131(B). The murder charge was designated a capital crime pursuant to three aggravating specifications: (1) commission of the offense while in a detention facility, under Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2929.04(A)(4); (2) being a repeat offender of an offense including as an essential element the purposeful killing or intent to kill another, under Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2929.04(A)(5); and (3) being a repeat violent offender under Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2929.01. The possession of a deadly weapon charge was also subject to a repeat offender specification under Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2941.149.

Petitioner was appointed counsel and proceeded to a fifteen-day jury trial in the Warren County Court of Common Pleas. The state's case against Petitioner consisted primarily of medical records, the testimony of prison officials and medical personnel, statements made by Petitioner to prison authorities following the attack, and letters Petitioner wrote to his friend, an inmate housed at another correctional institution.

Petitioner's defense dealt almost exclusively with his intent during the attack. He argued that he did not intend to kill Copas when he attacked him. Although trial counsel suggested that Copas' death was at least partially attributable to errors committed in his medical treatment, Petitioner did not formally pursue an intervening cause defense.

As evidence of Petitioner's intent, the state emphasized Petitioner's statements to authorities after the crime and the incriminating letters Petitioner wrote to his friend. The state also introduced the testimony of James Ertel, a trooper who interviewed all the inmates housed on the same cell block as Petitioner and Copas. Trooper Ertel prepared an incident report that provided some background about the animosity between the cellmates and the overall tenor of the cell block's environment. Significant to the arguments before us, the state also called Ricardo Lee, a fellow LCI inmate who was a friend of Copas and who claimed to have knowledge about the cellmates' deteriorating relationship prior to the crime.

Based on the above evidence, the jury found Petitioner guilty of aggravated murder and the § 2929.04(A)(4) specification. The trial judge separately found Petitioner guilty of the §§ 2929.04(A)(5) and 2929.01 specifications. The deadly weapon charge was dismissed on the state's motion.

III. The Penalty Phase of Trial

Following the guilty verdicts, the trial court held a separate penalty proceeding on November 9 and 10, 1998. At the penalty hearing, defense counsel presented testimony by a psychologist, Petitioner's sister, an Ohio state trooper, and a corrections employee. Petitioner also made an unsworn statement, expressing remorse for his actions and asking the jury to consider the fact that he would be confined to maximum security isolation if they returned a sentence of life imprisonment. After less than a day of deliberation, the jury recommended the death penalty. The trial court entered final judgment on November 20, 1998, sentencing Petitioner to death.

IV. Subsequent Proceedings

On December 22, 1999, Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief before the state trial court, pursuant to Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2953.21. The trial court denied relief without discovery or an evidentiary hearing on March 22, 2001. State v. Hanna, No. 98CR17677, 2001 WL 36043647 (Ohio Ct.Com.Pl. Mar. 22, 2001) (“ Hanna II ”). Petitioner appealed, asserting three assignments of error. The Twelfth Circuit District Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Hanna, No. CA2001–04–032, 2002 WL 4529 (Ohio Ct.App. Dec. 31, 2001) (“ Hanna III ”). The Supreme Court of Ohio denied a petition for review and a motion for reconsideration. State v. Hanna, 96 Ohio St.3d 1438, 770 N.E.2d 1048 (2002) (table); State v. Hanna, 96...

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    • United States
    • Georgetown Law Journal No. 110-Annual Review, August 2022
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    ...In evasion where juror failed to disclose deferred adjudication equivalent to pending charge because no evidence of bias); Hanna v. Ishee, 694 F.3d 596, 617 (6th Cir. 2012) (no new trial required where juror failed to disclose felony status because no evidence of “deliberate evasiveness” in......

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