Hanna v. Read

• Decision Date: 28 March 1882
• Citation: 40 Am.Rep. 608,102 Ill. 596,1882 WL 10265
• Parties: SARAH O. HANNA et al.v.SUSANNAH M. READ et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

102 Ill. 596

1882 WL 10265 (Ill.)

40 Am.Rep. 608

SARAH O. HANNA et al.

v.SUSANNAH M. READ et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed at Ottawa Mar. 28, 1882.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. WILLIAM H. BARNUM, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. WALKER & CARTER, for the plaintiffs in error:

The judgment of a court of a sister State is entitled to the same force and effect as in the State where it was rendered. Sec. 1, art. 4, Constitution of United States; Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 481; Andrews v. Montgomery et al. 19 Johns. 162; Baker v. Palmer, 83 Ill. 568.

Every judgment is conclusive between parties and privies as to such facts in issue upon which a judgment is, on its face, conditioned, as were actually decided by the court. Freeman on Judgments, sec. 252.

That a decision upon any material point is conclusive, though the subject matter of the two suits be different: Freeman on Judgments, sec. 253; Spencer v. Dearth, 43 Vt. 98; Betts v. Starr, 5 Conn. 550; Doty v. Brown, 4 N. Y. 71; Williams v. Fitzhugh, 44 Barb. 321; Walker v. Chase, 53 Me. 258; Davis v. Brown, 4 Otto, 423.

A judgment is conclusive not only as to the subject matter in suit, but as to all other suits, which, though concerning other subject matter, involve the questions in controversy. Freeman on Judgments, sec. 253; Gardner v. Buckbee, 3 Cow. 120; Bouchaud v. Dias, 3 Denio, 238; Babcock v. Campbell, 12 Ohio St. 11; Sawyer v. Woodbury, 7 Gray, 449; Merriam v. Whittemore, 5 Id. 316; Caperton v. Schmidt, 26 Cal. 479; Eastman v. Cooper, 15 Pick. 276; Sage v. McAlpin, 11 Cush. 165; Beloit v. Morgan, 7 Wall. 619; San Antonio v. Lane, 32 Tex. 411.

If the same evidence will support both actions, a judgment in the one is conclusive upon the same issue in the second suit, though the cause of action be different. Doty v. Brown, 4 Comst. (N. Y.) 71; Taylor v. Castle, 42 Cal. 371; Cannon v. Brame, 45 Ala. 262; Percy v. Foote, 36 Conn. 102; Gunn v. Howell, 27 Ala. 663.

As to the effect which the courts in Indiana would give the judgment offered and excluded, see 24 Ind. 156; 57 Id. 56; 1 Blackf. 360; 55 Ind. 584; 51 Id. 329; 46 Id. 350; 45 Id. 489.

As to the question how far the contravening or subsisting insanity of a judgment defendant affects the judgment when it comes up collaterally, we assert that it does not affect it at all, and cite Freeman on Judgments, sec. 152; 63 Pa. St. 320; 50 Md. 214; 1 Gill, (Md.) 347; 31 Ohio St. 247.

Messrs. WILSON, MARTIN & COOK, for the defendants in error:

To make a matter decided res judicata, there must be a concurrence of the following four conditions: Identity in the thing sued for, identity in the cause of action, and identity of persons and of parties. Bouvier's Law Dic. 467; Miller v. McMannis, 57 Ill. 126; Gray v. Gillilan, 15 Id. 456; Van Alstyne v. Ind., Pitts. and Cleav. R. R. Co. 34 Barb. 28; Mersereau v. Pearsall, 19 N. Y. 108.

A former decree is neither conclusive nor admissible, unless both suits are between the same parties. 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, secs. 522, 524; Maule v. Brice 2 C. P. Cooper, (Temp. Cott.) 215; Baring v. Fanning, 1 Paine, 549; Duchess of Kingston's case, 20 How. St. Trials, 369; Thomas' Trustees v. Brashear, 4 T. B. Mon. 65; Owings v. Hull, 9 Pet. 607; Cates v. Woodson, 2 Dana, 454.

The former case was not fairly tried on its merits. Where this happens from the sudden incapacity of the defendant, he is not concluded by the former judgment. 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 530.

It is competent to show the state of facts which existed on this point at the trial. Cromwell v. Sac County, 4 Otto, 356.

Mr. JUSTICE MULKEY delivered the opinion of the Court:

Ezra B. Read, on the 26th day of April, 1877, was the owner in fee of a large amount of real estate, situate in Vigo county, Indiana, where he then resided with his family. He was also, at the same time, the owner of other valuable real property in Chicago, this State, being the same now in controversy. On the day above mentioned, at his residence in Vigo county, he executed two deeds, embracing the whole of his estate, by one of which he conveyed directly to his wife, Susannah M. Read, the Indiana lands, and by the other, under the advice of counsel, he conveyed the Chicago property to Marvin M. Hickox, who thereupon, in pursuance of a previous understanding between the parties to that effect, conveyed the same property to Read's wife, so that by means of the three deeds she became clothed with the apparent legal title to all her husband's lands.

On the 10th of the following month Read died intestate, leaving the said Susannah M. Read, his widow, and Sarah O. Hanna, Jonathan T., Kenton C., Broady, and Parke Read, his children and only heirs at law. The first three of the children above mentioned were by his first wife, and the other two, Broady and Parke, by his second wife. Shortly after the death of Read his children by his first wife, the present plaintiffs in error, commenced a suit in the circuit court of Vigo county, against the widow and her two children, Broady and Parke, for the purpose of having Read's deed to his wife of the Indiana lands set aside and canceled, on the alleged ground that at the time of making the conveyances above mentioned he was insane, and on the further ground that said conveyances were obtained through the fraud and undue influence of the grantee.

The defendants, having been duly served with process, appeared in court, and by their answer distinctly denied the charges of insanity and undue influence, and upon the issues thus formed the cause was heard and determined upon the merits at the November term, 1877, of the Vigo county circuit court, resulting in a judgment and decree setting aside the deed to the Indiana lands. As a basis of that decree the court specifically found that Ezra B. Read executed the deed because of the undue influence and fraudulent conduct of the said Susannah M. Read, and that at the time he so executed these deeds, on the 26th of April, 1877, “ he was of unsound mind, and incapable of making said instruments.” The decree and specific findings of the circuit court of Vigo county are still in full force and effect.

Plaintiffs in error, assuming the adjudication in the Indiana court was conclusive upon the question of Read's mental condition at the time of making the deeds in question, filed the present bill against the defendants in error, alleging, as was done in the former case, the insanity of Read and the undue influence and fraud of his wife, and also setting up the proceedings in the Vigo county circuit court, including the decree and findings in said cause as heretofore stated, and relied upon the transcript of the record of that case as evidence to sustain the bill in the present case. The circuit court, however, refused to admit the transcript in evidence, and plaintiffs in error not offering any other or further evidence with respect to the insanity of Reed or the undue influence and fraud of his wife, the court entered a decree dismissing the bill, to reverse which the complainants in the bill bring the case to this court by writ of error.

The immediate question presented by the record for our determination is, whether the court below erred in excluding from its consideration as evidence the transcript of the proceedings in the Vigo county circuit court, and the solution of this question of course depends upon what, if any, effect must be given to the record of those proceedings as an instrument of evidence in the present suit for the purpose of establishing the alleged insanity of Read, or the fraud and undue influence of his wife. Since the proof of either of these facts would fully warrant the relief sought by the bill,--and it is clear if the record be competent evidence to establish the one, it is the other,--it will only be necessary to consider the question so far as it relates to the mental capacity of Read at the time of executing the deeds.

On the one hand, it is insisted by defendants in error that all the conditions essential to the admissibility of such evidence are wanting,--that there is neither identity in the thing sued for, in the cause of action, nor of the parties in the two actions, and hence they conclude the evidence was properly excluded. On the other hand, plaintiffs in error maintain that in the former suit the mental capacity of Read at the time of the execution of these deeds was directly put in issue by the pleadings, fully considered, and expressly determined by the court, as appears from the pleadings and decree in that cause; that within the meaning of the law relating to a former adjudication, when operating as an estoppel, the parties to the present and former actions are the same, and hence, although there is a want of identity in the thing sought to be recovered and the cause of action in the two suits, the record of the decree in the former suit, which specifically finds that Read at the time in question was insane and incapable of making a conveyance, was not only competent evidence to establish that fact in the present suit, but was absolutely conclusive of it,--and in this position we are of opinion plaintiffs in error are sustained by the decided weight of authority.

The contention of defendants in error that before an adjudication in a former suit can be made available as an estoppel, it must appear that the thing sought to be recovered and the cause of action in both suits are the same, is not universally true. A careful examination of the subject will show there is a diversity in the cases in this respect which, if kept in view, will satisfactorily explain what would otherwise appear to be irreconcilable statements of different courts of the highest respectability in discussing the law of estoppel by judgment or verdict. Where the former adjudication is relied on as an answer and bar to the whole cause of action, or, in other words, where it is claimed to be an answer to all the...