Hanna v. State
| Citation | 726 N.E.2d 384 |
| Decision Date | 11 April 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 33A01-9910-CR-344.,33A01-9910-CR-344. |
| Parties | Dale R. HANNA, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
Tommy L. Strunk, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.
Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, J.T. Whitehead, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.
Dale R. Hanna brings an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained by a warrantless search of a residence.
We reverse.
Hanna raises one issue for our review, which we restate as: whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained by a warrantless search of a residence where Hanna was an invited overnight guest.
On July 26, 1997, at approximately 12:57 a.m., Middletown Police Officer David K. Angell responded to a loud music complaint at 186 N. 5th Street. Upon arrival, Officer Angell determined that the loud music was emanating from a ground floor apartment leased by Kevin Hunt. Thereafter, Officer Angell forcefully knocked on the door of Hunt's apartment several times, receiving no response from within. Officer Angell then proceeded to the side of the building and attempted to look into the windows of the apartment, but his view was obstructed by drawn curtains and window blinds. Officer Angell returned to the front door of the apartment and continued to forcefully knock until he broke both the trim around the door and the security chain. From his vantage point outside the now open door, Officer Angell could see no one inside the apartment. Officer Angell then proceeded into and through the residence to the bedroom, where he saw Hunt and Hanna with a white powdery substance, later determined to be cocaine.
Subsequently, the State charged Hanna with possession of cocaine, a Class D felony,1 possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor,2 and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor.3 Thereafter, Hanna filed a motion to suppress the evidence gathered during the warrantless search of Hunt's apartment. After a hearing was held on the motion, the trial court denied Hanna's motion to suppress on May 28, 1998. Soon afterward, Hanna filed a motion to reconsider the trial court's order denying the motion to suppress, which the court denied on August 24, 1999. The trial court certified this case for interlocutory appeal on October 1, 1999. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
When ruling on the admissibility of evidence, the trial court is afforded broad discretion, and Indiana appellate courts will only reverse the ruling upon a showing of abuse of discretion. Smoote v. State, 708 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind.1999). An abuse of discretion involves a decision that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Stone v. State, 536 N.E.2d 534, 538 (Ind. Ct.App.1989), trans. denied. When reviewing the trial court's ruling on the validity of the search, we consider the evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling and any uncontradicted evidence to the contrary to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the ruling. Rook v. State, 679 N.E.2d 997, 999 (Ind.Ct. App.1997) (citing Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528, 532 (Ind.1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1078, 118 S.Ct. 858, 139 L.Ed.2d 757 (1998)).
Hanna contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress because the warrantless search of the apartment in which Hanna was an overnight guest was in violation of his constitutional rights as set forth in the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11, of the Indiana State Constitution. The State contends that the evidence is admissible because Officer Angell's initial entry was justified by exigent circumstances and because upon entry, the contraband fell under the plain view doctrine. The State concedes that Hanna has standing to challenge the evidence gathered during the warrantless search.4 Brief of Appellee at 5. We hold that the trial court erred in denying Hanna's motion to suppress evidence because the warrantless search was clearly illegal.
Hanna contends that the warrantless search of the apartment was illegal. Initially, we note our standard of review when reviewing a trial court's ruling on the validity of a search and seizure: we consider the evidence most favorable to the ruling and any uncontradicted evidence to the contrary to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the ruling. Rook, 679 N.E.2d at 999. If the evidence is conflicting, we consider only the evidence favorable to the ruling and will affirm if the ruling is supported by substantial probative evidence. Id.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects both privacy and possessory interests by prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. Sloane v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied, (citing Culpepper v. State, 662 N.E.2d 670, 675 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied). Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless search can only be justified by probable cause and one of the few, well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirements, and the State carries the burden of proving that the action fell within one of the exceptions. Lomax v. State, 510 N.E.2d 215, 220 (Ind.Ct.App.1987). Although an exception may justify proceeding without a warrant, it does not eliminate the need for probable cause. Culpepper, 662 N.E.2d at 675.
Hanna first argues that the State failed to prove that Officer Angell had probable cause to engage in a warrantless search of Hunt's apartment. In response, the State asserts that Officer Angell had probable cause to enter Hunt's apartment because of the possibility that a crime was being committed due to the volume of the noise emitting from the apartment, and the apparent absence of residents inside the dwelling which could indicate that the occupants were either hurt or injured. However, Officer Angell testified at the suppression hearing that, before entering the apartment, he did not believe or suspect that the occupants of the apartment were committing any type of criminal activity, besides violating the noise ordinance of the town of Middletown. R. 74. Thus, it is clearly evident that Officer Angell did not have facts upon which he could reasonably conclude that the occupants were engaging in or were the victims of criminal activity.
Second, the State argues that Officer Angell had probable cause to enter the residence because he "entered the premises in order to investigate and abate the noise disturbance, and the disturbance was a potential violation of Indiana Code § 35-45-1-3." Brief of Appellee at 5. Officer Angell testified at the suppression hearing that the loud noise emitting from Hunt's apartment violated the Middletown noise ordinance. R. 71. He further testified that a violation of the civil ordinance resulted in a fine of ten or fifteen dollars, but that a warning normally sufficed to reduce the noise. Id.
The State, however, does not argue the municipal noise ordinance on appeal, but rather asserts that the disorderly conduct statute, codified at Indiana Code section 35-45-1-3, gave Officer Angell probable cause to enter the apartment. However, the disorderly conduct statute is violated only after a person continues to make unreasonable noise "after being asked to stop." Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 967 (Ind.1993). This warning requirement provides special protection to persons unaware that their noise level has become unreasonable. Id. Officer Angell did not confront the occupants until after he had entered the inner sanctum of the apartment. Thus, we cannot envision any articulable facts which would provide Officer Angell probable cause to enter Hunt's apartment without a warrant.5
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