Hanna v. Stedman

Citation230 N.Y. 326,130 N.E. 566
PartiesHANNA v. STEDMAN.
Decision Date01 March 1921
CourtNew York Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Submission of controversy between William E. Hanna and Emory A. Stedman, as president of the Expressmen's Mutual Benefit Association. From a unanimous judgment of the Appellate Division for defendant (185 App. Div. 491,173 N. Y. Supp. 223), the plaintiff appeals by permission.

Judgment of Appellate Division reversed, and judgment directed in favor of plaintiff.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

Herman S. Hertwig, of New York City, and Richard S. Culbreth, of Baltimore, Md., for appellant.

Miles M. Dawson, of New York City, for respondent.

HISCOCK, C. J.

This appeal requires us to determine: First, which of two conflicting judgments rendered respectively by courts of the states of New York and Maryland was the superior and controlling adjudication upon rights here involved; and, secondly, if we should decide that the Maryland judgment was originally the controlling one, whether the right to enforce that judgment in this state has become barred by the statute of limitations.

The defendant is a voluntary, unincorporated fraternal beneficiary association which during all the times in question has maintained its principal office in the state of New York. It issued two membership certificates to one Ehrman under each of which it became bound upon his death to pay the sum of $1,000 to such person, if any, as he might have designated as beneficiary under the rules and regulations of the association. He duly designated his wife, but when she predeceased him he failed to designate another one as he might have done, and the result was that he soon died leaving no designation of a beneficiary other than that of his deceased wife.

At the dates of their respective deaths both Ehrman and his wife were residents of the state of Maryland, and thereafter by the courts of that state letters testamentary and of administration upon their respective estates were issued to persons who also were residents of the state.

By assessments duly levied upon its members the defendant collected the moneys with which to pay the amount due on and under its aforesaid certificates. The moneys thus collected were not kept in a fund by themselves, but were deposited in the general account of the defendant, which was known as the ‘beneficiary fund.’ Conflicting claims to the moneys payable under the certificates were made by the representatives of the estates of Ehrman and his wife and by various other people, including a son, and all of which claimants save the son were nonresidents of the state of New York.

The defendant as plaintiff filed in equity in the state of New York a bill of interpleader in which all of the claimants were named as parties and wherein judgment was demanded that the conflicting claimants be required to interplead concerning their claims, which were set forth, that some person be authorized to receive the moneys pending the litigation, and that upon delivery of the same to such person the plaintiff be discharged from all liability. The complaint was the ordinary one in which a debtor subjected to conflicting claims and uncertain which is the superior one seeks to compel the contestants to litigate their rights and prays that he be relieved on payment of his debt to the successful one. As a matter of fact the moneys due from the association were never brought into court pending the litigation. Service of the summons was made upon the representative of Mrs. Ehrman's estate, to whose rights the present plaintiff has succeeded, by publication without the state, but she never appeared in the action. Judgment was finally rendered that the son of the member was entitled to the moneys payable under the certificates and upon his consent it was directed that the same be paid to the representatives of Ehrman's estate, which was done.

After the foregoing action had been commenced, but before the attempted service of the summons therein upon her had been completed, the representative of Mrs. Ehrman's estate commenced an action in Maryland to recover from the association the moneys due under the said certificates. At this time the defendant had a division superintendent whose jurisdiction extended over various states, including the state of Maryland, and who had an office in that state. Personal service of the summons in the latter action was made through him upon the defendant, which duly appeared in said action and defended against the claim therein being made. By supplemental answer it set up the rendition of the judgment in the first or New York action. The Maryland court, however, decided that that court did not have jurisdiction to render a judgment binding upon the plaintiff in the Maryland action and rendered judgment in favor of such plaintiff, which was duly affirmed upon appeal. There is no question that both the New York and the Maryland courts were courts of general jurisdiction and competent to pass upon the questions presented to them if jurisdiction otherwise was obtained.

Soon after the commencement of the Maryland action and before judgment therein the association superseded its superintendent in that state by appointing in his place one having his office in another state, and thereafter it had neither representative nor property of any value within the former jurisdiction, but at the time this controversy was submitted did have therein a few individual members.

After the rendition of the Maryland judgment in favor of Mrs. Ehrman's estate it was assigned to plaintiff. He, after the lapse of 12 years, sought to enforce it in this state, with the resulting submission by agreement of this controversy, whereby is presented the question already outlined of superiority between the Maryland and New York judgments.

[1] The federal Constitution provides that full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the judicial proceedings of every other state. The meaning of this provision in the light of other provisions in the Constitution has been defined and limited by well-established principles prescribing certain conditions under which a judgment of one state must be rendered in order to secure the benefit and protection of this clause in another jurisdiction. Giving heed to these principles and passing consideration for the moment of the statute of limitations as a defense, we shall find that the question whether the courts of this state should give recognition and effect to the judgment secured by plaintiff's assignor against defendant in the Maryland court will be determined by answer to the basic query whether the original action brought in New York by defendant was one in rem.

The Maryland court which rendered in favor of plaintiff's assignor the judgment against defendant upon which this controversy is founded was a court of general jurisdiction with power to adjudicate such a cause of action as was then presented to it and it had jurisdiction of defendant by its personal appearance therein. Presumptively it had power to render a judgment defining the rights of the parties in respect of the certificates in controversy to which the courts of this state should give faith and credit as prescribed by the Constitution. But the Maryland court which rendered that judgment also was confronted with this same obligation imposed by the federal Constitution. There was pleaded as a defense to the action pending in it the judgment recovered by the present defendant in the first New York action wherein the Maryland plaintiff was named as a defendant and wherein a judgment had been rendered adverse to her claims to the moneys payable under the certificates. It was the duty of the Maryland court to give the full faith and credit required by the Constitution to this judgment, and, if it was indeed a binding adjudication upon the rights of the parties, the court was prohibited from considering anew the question whether the Maryland plaintiff was entitled to the moneys payable under the certificates. But, as has been stated, this obligation of the courts of one state to give faith and credit to a judgment rendered by the courts of another state is limited by certain principles defining the powers of the court rendering the first judgment. The fundamental and obvious limitation upon the power of the courts of one state to render a judgment binding upon those of another state is the one that the former shall have jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject-matter upon which they have pronounced an adjudication, and, as a necessary corollary to this, that the courts of the state in which the first judgment is pressed as a controlling adjudication shall have the right to investigate and ascertain whether the court rendering the judgment did have such jurisdiction. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565;Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. 269, 33 L. Ed. 538.

[2] In pursuance of this principle and of the right thus to examine, the Maryland courts inspecting the record of the New York judgment which was urged upon them as a controlling adjudication ascertained, as indeed is conceded at all points, that the only manner in which the New York court claimed to have obtained jurisdiction of the Maryland plaintiff was by service of the summons upon her by publication outside of the state of New York, she being a nonresident thereof. It is virtually admitted, as indeed it must be, that if the New York action was one in rem or one affecting specific personal property within the provisions of subdivision 5, § 438, Code of Civil Procedure, this manner of service was sufficient to give jurisdiction to determine the rights of all the claimants including the Maryland plaintif...

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