Hannah v. State
| Decision Date | 14 March 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 19185,19185 |
| Citation | 212 Ga. 313,92 S.E.2d 89 |
| Parties | Julia HANNAH v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
The trial court erred in refusing to grant a new trial, for the reasons stated in divisions 3, 5, and 6 of the opinion.
Julia Hannah was jointly indicted with her son, William Hannah, Robert Evans, and James Banks, in the Superior Court of Rockdale County, for the murder of the husband of the defendant, Cecil Hannah. The defendants elected to sever. Upon the trial of Julia Hannah, certain testimony, including that of Robert Evans (previously convicted) and James Banks (who pleaded guilty) is undisputed, and is in substance: The defendant and her husband were lying on a bed in the bedroom of their home, when the defendant's son, William, entered through a side door, leading Evans and Banks. The defendant's son had previously armed Evans and Banks with a hammer and a blackjack. The deceased never moved or awakened, but the defendant got up and went either to the doorway or into another room. Evans and Banks, with the hammer and blackjack, hit the deceased in the head a number of times and killed him. William Hannah and the two Negroes placed the body of the deceased in the trunk of the Hannah car, together with the bed quilt, sheet, some bloodstained clothing, and the weapons. They got into the car and drove some distance into Walton County (the defendant following them in a taxicab, which she had called after the murder), and left the car in some woods on the side of an old road, where the body of the deceased was found several days later. The defendant's son and the two Negroes got in the taxicab with the defendant and drove to an old abandoned well, where the clothing and weapons were hidden. After the discovery of the body, Evans revealed to the officers where the clothing and weapons were hidden.
In addition to this undisputed evidence, Evans testified that the defendant had previously offered him money to kill the deceased, that she told him she expected him 'tonight' (the night of the murder), and that she was a witness to the homicide. Banks, on the other hand, testified that the defendant had never approached him, that she was not in the room when the killing took place, and that 'she was only interested in getting William [her son] home,' after he took the body out in the car to dispose of it. Leon Johnson, the taxicab driver, testified that he had come in answer to a call from the defendant; that she was dressed in a bath robe; that she told him to go down the old highway, and there would be a car waiting; that they followed the car until William motioned them alongside and told them to wait at the foot of the hill; that they waited about 20 minutes; that the defendant told him, 'We killed my old man tonight,' and then explained that the deceased 'started to jump on her,' and that William had let the Negroes in and 'one of them hit him with the hammer and the other one with the blackjack.'
The defendant offered no evidence, but in her statement contended that she and her son had been consistently ill-treated by her husband; that Banks and Evans had killed the deceased at William's instigation; that she had no previous knowledge of the intention to kill the deceased, but had helped in disposing of the body and other evidence to assist her son in his efforts at concealing the crime.
The defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to be electrocuted. She filed a motion for new trial on the general grounds, which was later amended by the addition of 13 special grounds. Error is assigned on the judgment denying her motion for new trial as amended.
Wm. T. Dean, Conyers, for plaintiff in error.
Roy Leathers, Sol. Gen., Decatur, Eugene Cook, Atty. Gen., Rubye G. Jackson, Atlanta, for defendant in error.
1. The general grounds of the motion for new trial, and special grounds 8 through 14, have been abandoned by the defendant.
2. Error is assigned in special ground 4 because Roy Leathers, Solicitor-General of the Stone Mountain Circuit, stated that his physical condition would not permit him to continue with the trial of the case, and that he had decided to turn the actual trial over to Marshall Pollock, Solicitor-General of the Western Circuit. The court allowed Mr. Pollock to proceed with the interrogation of witnesses, but did not, himself, under the provisions of Code, § 24-2913 'appoint a competent attorney of the circuit to act in his place, or * * * command the services of a solicitor general.'
The granting of the motion of the Solicitor-General of the Stone Mountain Circuit to utilize the services of the Solicitor-General of the Western Circuit was the equivalent of the court 'commanding' the services of the latter. A solicitor-general of another circuit may, at the request of the prosecution, appear and assist in the trial although not requisitioned by the judge, even though the solicitor-general of the trial circuit is not indisposed. Floyd v. State, 182 Ga. 549, 186 S.E. 556. Also, the solicitor-general may retain counsel to assist him in the trial of the case. Vernon v. State, 146 Ga. 709, 92 S.E. 76; Jackson v. State, 156 Ga. 842, 844(7), 120 S.E. 535. This ground is without merit.
3. Grounds 5 and 6 assign error on the charge of the court on the contentions of the defendant as follows: This charge is assigned as error on the ground that the court erroneously stated the contentions of the defendant, and for a number of other reasons. This ground sets out the statement of the defendant with reference to her participation in the homicide as follows:
It further appears from the record that the defendant did not deny that she did certain acts in an effort to conceal the crime, which acts are relied upon, in part, by the State to secure her conviction. The defendant called a taxicab and went to the place where her son and the two Negroes, jointly indicted with her, were to conceal the car containing the body of the deceased, for the purpose of returning her son and the Negroes from that place to their home; she helped to conceal the clothing worn by the deceased and the weapons used in the commission of the homicide; and she paid the taxicab driver and furnished money to one of the Negroes after the commission of the crime. It is contended by counsel for the defendant that all of the acts related are consistent with the sole defense of the defendant, that she was not guilty of murder, but guilty as an accessory after the fact of murder.
'When the court undertook to state to the jury the contention of defendant, the defendant had the right to have it submitted correctly; and when the court deprived defendant of this right, reversible error was committed.' Smiley v. State, 156 Ga. 60, 63(7-a), 118 S.E. 713, 715, and citations; Durham v. State, 177 Ga. 744, 171 S.E. 265; Jones v. State, 207 Ga. 379, 62 S.E.2d 187. The charge of the court that the jury could acquit the defendant only if they found 'the only thing she did was to assist in removing the body,' unduly restricted the defendant's defense, by excluding other acts performed by her as an accessory after the fact of murder, and requires the grant of a new trial.
4. Grounds 7 and 7-A assign error on the charge of the court relating to admissions by silence or acquiescence, with reference to certain testimony admitted without objection. It is contended that no statements were made in the presence of the defendant which required an answer by her; there was no evidence that the defendant remained silent; the judge did not state under what circumstances the defendant would or would not be required to answer the statements made in her presence; the court failed to instruct the jury as to what constituted incriminating statements; the charge given was not sound as an abstract principle of law; and error is otherwise assigned for a number of reasons which need not be set forth.
It appears that the defendant and her son, while in custody of the officers, had a conversation, and that the son made a number of incrimination statements, probably the strongest being: 'We're all in this thing together, not any of us is going to get out of it.' To which the defendant replied:
As shown in the previous division of this opinion, the defendant admitted her participation in the homicide as an accessory after the fact. If the defendant understood her son's remarks to relate to the homicide as having been committed by the other defendants and her acts as an accessory after the fact, in her attempt to conceal the crime, the defendant would be 'in this thing' and could not reasonably anticipate that she was 'going to get out' of punishment for the crime actually committed by her as an accessory after the fact. It therefore appears that complete silence by the defendant, if she understood her son's remarks to refer to her participation only as an accessory after the fact, could not properly be construed as an admission by her of participation in the principal crime charged.
Silence can be taken as an implied admission only where the circumstances are such as to demand a reply. Ware v....
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