Hannay v. Dep't of Transp. Hunter
| Decision Date | 19 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | 147335.,7.,Docket Nos. 146763,Calendar Nos. 3 |
| Citation | 497 Mich. 45,860 N.W.2d 67 |
| Parties | HANNAY v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION. Hunter v. Sisco. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Mark Granzotto, PC, Royal Oak (by Mark Granzotto), and Gursten, Koltonow, Gursten, Christensen & Raitt, PC (by David E. Christensen, Southfield), for Heather L. Hannay.
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Matthew Schneider, Chief Legal Counsel, and John P. Mack, Assistant Attorney General, for the Department of Transportation.
Cummings, McClorey, Davis & Acho, PLC, Livonia (by Karen M. Daley ), for the Michigan Municipal Risk Management Authority.
Johnson Law, PLC (by Christopher P. Desmond), for the State Bar of Michigan Negligence Law Section.
Henn Lesperance PLC (by William L. Henn ) for the Michigan County Road Commission Self–Insurance Pool.
Kopka, Pinkus, Dolin & Eads, PLC, Farmington Hills (by Kevin J. Plagens and Valerie Henning Mock ), for the Insurance Institute of Michigan.
Lacey & Jones, LLP (by Carson J. Tucker, Farmington Hills), for the Michigan Townships Association, Macomb County, Oakland County, and Wayne County.
Law Offices of Robert June, PC, Ypsilanti (by Robert B. June ), for the Michigan Association for Justice.
Plunkett Cooney (by Mary Massaron Ross, Bloomfield Hills and Hilary A. Ballentine, Detroit) for the Michigan Municipal League.
Allan Falk, PC, Okemos (by Allan Falk), and Law Office of Cy Weiner, PC (by Cyril V. Weiner, Southfield and Nicholas M. Marchenia), for Harold Hunter, Jr.
Crystal Olmstead and Anthony Chubb for the city of Flint Transportation Department.
Plunkett Cooney (by Mary Massaron Ross, Bloomfield Hills and Hilary A. Ballentine, Detroit) for the Michigan Municipal League.
Speaker Law Firm, PLLC (by Liisa R. Speaker, Kalamazoo), and Sinas Dramis Brake Boughton & McIntyre PC, Lansing (by George T. Sinas ) for the Coalition Protecting Auto No–Fault, the Brain Injury Association of Michigan, and the Michigan Brain Injury Provider Council.
Barbara H. Goldman, Detroit for the Michigan Association for Justice.
In these cases, we are called upon to interpret a provision of the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq., commonly referred to as the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1405. The statute provides, in relevant part, that “[g]overnmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury ... resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner....”1 Specifically, we must address whether the phrase “liable for bodily injury” allows for recovery of economic damages, such as work-loss damages, and noneconomic damages, such as pain and suffering or emotional distress damages. The Court of Appeals in Hannay v. Dep't of Transp. concluded that economic damages are compensable under the motor vehicle exception,2 while the Court of Appeals in Hunter v. Sisco concluded that noneconomic damages are not compensable under this exception.3
We conclude that the phrase “liable for bodily injury” contained in the motor vehicle exception means legally responsible for damages flowing from a physical or corporeal injury to the body. More simply, “bodily injury” is merely the category of harm for which governmental immunity from tort liability is waived under MCL 691.1405 and for which damages that naturally flow are compensable. Moreover, the restrictions on damages recoverable in third-party tort actions involving motor vehicle accidents set forth in MCL 500.3135 of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., apply to cases permitted by the waiver of governmental immunity provided for in the motor vehicle exception. We therefore hold that a plaintiff may bring a third-party tort action for economic damages, such as work-loss damages, and noneconomic damages, such as pain and suffering or emotional distress damages, against a governmental entity if the requirements of MCL 500.3135 have been met.
Because we conclude that work-loss damages are compensable under the motor vehicle exception, we must also address a second issue presented in Hannay : whether the facts as found were sufficient to satisfy the statutory language defining work-loss damages with respect to plaintiff's claim of work loss as a dental hygienist. Plaintiff, a 22–year–old employed in a dental office, aspired to be a dental hygienist.4 Plaintiff had previously applied for admission to a dental hygienist program at Lansing Community College (LCC), but she was not admitted to the program. Plaintiff intended to enhance her application and reapply to the program, but she had not been accepted at the time of her injury. Her employer and his wife, a hygienist in his office, testified that plaintiff would have gained admission to the program and that they would have employed plaintiff as a hygienist after she completed her education and obtained her license. Notwithstanding this testimony, we conclude that it is simply too tenuous a proposition to conclude that the work-loss damages in dispute were a legal and natural consequence of the tortious conduct. Instead, these damages are contingent and speculative, rendering plaintiff's claim for work-loss damages barred under Michigan law to the extent that her claim is based on potential wages as a dental hygienist.
In Hannay we affirm the Court of Appeals' holding with respect to the type of damages recoverable for bodily injury under the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1405, but we reverse the Court of Appeals' holding that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to support her claim for work-loss damages as a dental hygienist. In Hunter we reverse the Court of Appeals' holding with respect to the type of damages recoverable for bodily injury under the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1405. We remand both cases to the respective trial courts for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
This matter arises from a February 13, 2007 motor vehicle accident involving a vehicle driven by plaintiff Heather Hannay and a salt truck owned by defendant Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) and driven by MDOT's employee, Brian Silcox. Silcox failed to stop at a stop sign, and the salt truck collided with plaintiff's vehicle. Plaintiff alleged that Silcox5 and MDOT, as Silcox's employer and the owner of the salt truck, were liable for damages caused by Silcox's negligence. Plaintiff alleged injuries to her shoulders, neck, spine, back, head, chest, arms, knees, and other internal and external injuries to her body. Plaintiff claimed all economic damages compensable under the no-fault act, but specifically alleged allowable expenses and work loss in excess of the statutory limitations.6 MDOT raised governmental immunity as an affirmative defense.
Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that MDOT was liable for work-loss damages exceeding the statutory limitations under the no-fault act and that plaintiff was entitled to work-loss damages as a dental hygienist earning $28 per hour.7 In reaching its conclusion, the court found that it was “more likely than not” that plaintiff would “have been admitted into the Dental Hygienist program at LCC,” that it was “more likely than not [that she would] have successfully completed the program,” and that plaintiff had proven part-time, but not full-time, employment of three days a week.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court did not err by awarding plaintiff economic damages and that the trial court's factual findings supported the calculation of plaintiff's work-loss award.8 Regarding the trial court's conclusion that work-loss damages were recoverable against a governmental entity in light of the motor vehicle exception, the Court of Appeals held that “the bodily injury that must be incurred to maintain an action against a governmental entity and the items of damages recoverable from those injuries are separate and distinct from one another.”9 Thus, the panel concluded that “work-loss benefits ... that exceed the statutory personal protection insurance benefit maximum pursuant to MCL 500.3135(3) are awardable against governmental entities....”10 The panel characterized work-loss damages as “items of damages that arise from the bodily injuries suffered by plaintiff,” and explained that “[t]o hold otherwise would conflate the actual bodily-injury requirement for maintaining a motor vehicle cause of action against a governmental entity with the types of damages recoverable as a result of the bodily injury.”11
This matter arises from a July 20, 2009 motor vehicle accident involving plaintiff Harold Hunter, Jr., and a dump truck owned by defendant City of Flint Transportation Department (Flint) and driven by Flint's employee, defendant David Sisco.12 Flint's vehicle sideswiped plaintiff's vehicle.
Plaintiff sued Flint as the employer of Sisco and owner of the dump truck and independently for negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle. Plaintiff alleged that the injuries he suffered amounted to a serious impairment of a bodily function, a permanent and serious disfigurement, and a serious neurological defect (closed-head injury). According to plaintiff, he suffered injuries to his spine as a result of the accident. Plaintiff alleged noneconomic damages, namely, pain and suffering, as well as shock and emotional damages.13 Flint raised governmental immunity as an affirmative defense.
Flint filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (10), asserting that plaintiff could not succeed in a claim against Flint because the damages he sought were not compensable under the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity and that plaintiff failed to establish that he suffered a threshold injury under the no-fault act. Flint's position was that...
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