Hanneman v. Myers, (SC S47456)
Decision Date | 02 June 2000 |
Docket Number | (SC S47456) |
Citation | 330 Or. 345,999 P.2d 1141 |
Parties | Craig HANNEMAN and Greg Miller, Petitioners, v. Hardy MYERS, Attorney General for the State of Oregon, Respondent. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
John A. DiLorenzo, Jr., of Hagen, Dye, Hirschy & DiLorenzo, P.C., Portland, argued the cause and filed the petition for petitioners.
David F. Coursen, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the answering memorandum for respondent. With him on the answering memorandum were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
This ballot title review proceeding brought under ORS 250.085(2) concerns the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 163 (2000). Petitioners are electors who timely submitted written comments to the Secretary of State concerning the content of the Attorney General's draft ballot title and who therefore are entitled to seek review in this court. See ORS 250.085(2) ( that requirement). We review the Attorney General's certified ballot title to determine whether it substantially complies with the requirements of ORS 250.035(2) to (6) (1997).1 ORS 250.085(5).
The proposed measure, denominated by its proponents as the "Timber Tax Equity and Accountability Act," would enact new timber taxation provisions. Section I contains findings that purport to justify the substantive sections of the measure. Section II contains a declaration of policy. Section III, which is the substantive part of the measure, contains seven subsections. Of those subsections, the most important are subsection (A) ( ); subsection (B) ( ); subsection (C) ( ); and subsection (E) ( ). Section IV of the proposed measure contains definitions for the measure.
The Attorney General certified the following ballot title for the proposed measure:
Petitioners attack all three parts of the Attorney General's certified ballot title on various grounds. We find their criticisms of the result statements and the summary to be well taken.
Petitioners assert that the Attorney General's result statements fail to comply substantially with the requirements of ORS 250.035(2)(b) and (c) (1997) in that they are misleading in their use of the word "proceeds" to describe what is taxed. The pertinent part of the "yes" result statement states that the measure "taxes * * * minimum harvest proceeds." That statement is erroneous, petitioners assert, because it implies that the tax imposed would be on the revenues received from harvesting trees, rather than on the board feet harvested. Petitioners are correct. Although the exemption in section III(C) of the proposed measure is stated in terms of "harvest proceeds," the tax will be imposed without regard to the amount of proceeds (if any) that are generated by the particular harvest. We resolve that problem with the Attorney General's "yes" result statement by removing the phrase, "minimum harvest proceeds," from the statement.
Petitioners assert that the "no" result statement is deficient for the same reason that the "yes" statement is deficient. We agree. There are two ways in which that problem could be remedied. The first way would be to strike the words "minimum proceeds" from the "no" result statement. The second way would be to abandon the Attorney General's parallel construction of the two result statements and to substitute a statement that a "no" vote would leave in place the present taxing scheme applicable to timber harvesting. As our discussion of the Attorney General's summary, post, makes clear, we believe that the latter approach would provide the voters with more information. Accordingly, we substitute the following "no" result statement: "`No' vote retains present system of taxation of timber harvests."
Finally, petitioners assert that the Attorney General's summary is deficient under ORS 250.035(2)(d) (1997), because it fails to state that the taxes imposed by the measure would be in addition to any other tax imposed on timber harvesting. Petitioners argue that if the first sentence of the Attorney General's summary—which uses 14 words...
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