Hanner v. Glenn
Decision Date | 11 March 1953 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 1621. |
Citation | 111 F. Supp. 52 |
Parties | HANNER v. GLENN, Collector of Internal Revenue. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
Middleton, Seelbach, Wolford, Willis & Cochran, Louisville, Ky., for plaintiff.
Ellis N. Slack, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Andrew D. Sharpe, Henry L. Spencer, Sp. Assts. to the Atty. Gen., David C. Walls, U. S. Atty., Chas. F. Wood, Asst. U. S. Atty., Louisville, Ky., for defendant.
The plaintiff, Sue F. Hanner, is the surviving widow and beneficiary under the will of her deceased husband Robert A. Hanner. She filed this action March 11, 1949 seeking to recover $1,651.87 deficiency in estate taxes assessed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and interest thereon in the amount of $140.23.
The Commissioner had determined that an amount of $10,831.88, paid to the plaintiff in her individual capacity as beneficiary under a deed of trust between Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation and the Guaranty Trust Company of New York, should have been included in the gross estate of the decedent in accordance with the provisions of Section 811(a), Section 811(c) 811(d) or Section 811(f) of the Internal Revenue Code.
Including the sum of $10,831.88 in the estate, the Commissioner assessed a tax of $1,651.87 and interest thereon of $140.23, making $1,792.10, which was paid by plaintiff as executrix on September 19, 1946.
On November 21, 1946, Sue F. Hanner, as executrix, filed a claim for refund of the deficiency assessment and interest and that claim was on March 17, 1947, in the manner provided by Statute, rejected.
Sue F. Hanner instituted this action against the Collector of Internal Revenue for Kentucky, to whom the deficiency assessment was paid.
There is no dispute with respect to the facts and the parties have filed a written stipulation, which in substance provides—
The decedent, Robert A. Hanner, died January 21, 1944 testate. By the terms of his will, his wife, Sue F. Hanner was devised all of his estate remaining after the payment of his debts and funeral expenses. The will was duly probated and Sue F. Hanner qualified as executrix.
Robert A. Hanner was forty-six years of age at the time of his death and had been for some time, an employee of the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation and was one of the employee-beneficiaries of a deed of trust between Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation and the Guaranty Trust Company of New York dated March 25, 1936 and amended January 13, 1939. The trust indenture, as amended, provided for a fund contributed entirely by the employer to which the employee-beneficiaries contributed nothing, the primary purpose of which was to provide additional compensation for the employee and the members of his immediate family, in the event of his death, for meritorious services acknowledged to have been rendered by a number of employees, including the decedent Hanner.
The death of Robert A. Hanner occurred fifteen years prior to his reaching the age of sixty-one years of age and while he was an employee of the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, and by his will he had exercised the limited power of appointment given to him by the terms of the trust indenture and had designated his wife, the plaintiff Sue F. Hanner, as the person to whom his share of the trust fund should be paid. The Trustee accordingly paid to Sue F. Hanner $10,831.88 and this amount paid to her individually was not included by her in her return of the gross estate of the deceased for tax purposes. This sum was determined by the Commissioner to be properly includable in the gross estate and his assessment was based thereon.
It is stipulated that the plaintiff complied with the requirements of the Internal Revenue Code with respect to the timely filing of her claim for refund.
Her contentions now are that the decedent had no interest at the time of his death in the trust property requiring its value to be includable in his gross estate within the meaning of Section 811(a) of the Internal Revenue Code because Section 811(a) brings within the gross estate the value of decedent's interest in property at the time of his death and excludes an interest in property which terminated at death and which was contingent upon events which had not occurred; that the interest of the decedent was a mere expectancy (as distinguished from a vested interest) contingent upon either of two events, neither of which had occurred at the time of his death — that is he had not attained the age of sixty-one years and had not ceased to be an employee of the Corporation.
She also contends that decedent possessed only a limited testamentary power of appointment under Section 811(f) of the Internal Revenue Code, — which limited power of appointment, — that is the power to appoint within the limited class of surviving widow and descendants, constituted an exception under the terms of the statute.
The third contention was that the decedent had made no inter vivos transfer of the trust property taxable at his death within the contemplation of Section 811(c) and Section 811(d) of the Internal Revenue Code.
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Estate of Porter v. CIR
...of fact that the benefit was a mere gratuity bestowed by the employer, for which the employee gave no consideration, Hanner v. Glenn, 111 F.Supp. 52, 57 (W.D.Ky.1953), aff'd, 212 F.2d 483 (6th Cir. 1954); Estate of Saxton v. CIR, 12 T.C. 569, 575 (1949). A gratuity would pass directly from ......
-
Fried v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue (In re Estate of Fried)
...procurement for valuable consideration by the decedent of the transfer of property to his beneficiary by another. See Hanner v. Glenn, 111 F.Supp. 52 (W.D. Ky. 1953), and the cases there cited, affd. 212 F.2d 483 (C.A. 6, 1954). Since under the provision of the contract if there was no wido......
-
Boatmen's Nat'l Bank of St.Louis v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue (In re Estate of Fusz), Docket No. 3622-64.
...affirming 15 T.C. 939 (1950); Higgs' Estate v. Commissioner, 184 F. 2d 427 (C.A. 3, 1950), reversing 12 T.C. 280 (1949); Hanner v. Glenn, 111 F.Supp. 52 (D. Ky. 1953), affirmed per curiam 212 F.2d 483 (C.A. 6, 1954); Estate of William S. Miller, 14 T.C. 657 (1950); Estate of Eugene F. Saxto......
-
McCobb v. All
...Dimock in spite of the recommendation in G.C.M. 27242, 1952-51 Cum.Bull. 160 that it should not be followed.6 See also Hanner v. Glenn, D.C.W.D.Ky., 1953, 111 F.Supp. 52, aff'd. 6 Cir., 212 F.2d 483. There must also be an actual transfer, see e. g. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Twogoo......