Hannigan v. Novak

Decision Date20 December 2016
Docket Number48501-0-II
CourtWashington Court of Appeals
PartiesWESLEY R. HANNIGAN, Respondent, v. VIT NOVAK and ZDENKA NOVAK, husband and wife, Appellants.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Maxa A.C.J.

Vit and Zdenka Novak (collectively "Novak") appeal from the trial court's judgment in favor of their neighbor Wesley Hannigan in Hannigan's suit to quiet title and for ejectment. After a bench trial, the trial court quieted title to a 20-foot easement running through Novak's property for the benefit of Hannigan and ejected Novak from the easement.

We hold that (1) substantial evidence supported the trial court's ruling that a 20-foot easement existed for Hannigan's ingress and egress and that Novak blocked the easement, and (2) Novak's myriad other arguments alleging procedural errors are without merit. However, we hold that the trial court erred in awarding Hannigan attorney fees.

Accordingly we affirm the trial court's judgment in favor of Hannigan except for the trial court's award of attorney fees to Hannigan, which we reverse.

FACTS The Properties

Novak and Hannigan live on neighboring lots in the Maple View Acres subdivision in Washougal. Hannigan purchased his property (lot 8) in 1992. Novak purchased his property (lot 9) in 1993. Both properties are at the end of Wildlife Drive. Novak's lot runs south of the road and continues past the end of the road to the west. Hannigan's lot is north of both the end of the road and the portion of Novak's lot that extends to the west of the road.

Novak's real estate contract described three different easements (referred to by the parties as the 20-foot, 30-foot, and 60-foot easements) encumbering lot 9. The contract specifically described the 20-foot easement, stating that the lot was subject to a "20 foot non-exclusive easement for ingress, egress, and utilities." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 30.

The 20-foot easement extends to the northwest from the end of Wildlife Drive, across a small corner of Novak's lot. Hannigan built a gravel driveway along the 20-foot easement to allow him to drive between his lot and Wildlife Drive.

Turnaround Construction

In 2007, the fire department informed Hannigan that Wildlife Drive did not contain a turnaround large enough for their equipment, which could potentially affect the fire department's ability to fight fires in the neighborhood. The neighborhood roadway association decided that a turnaround needed to be built at the end of Wildlife Drive that could accommodate the fire department's equipment. Hannigan and Novak disagreed about what kind of turnaround to build and whether it should be built entirely within the 60-foot easement on Novak's lot or partially on Hannigan's lot.

In 2010, Novak began building what he thought would be the best turnaround. In the course of construction, Novak created various berms that blocked the 20-foot easement Hannigan used to access his lot.

Disorderly Conduct Charge

On June 28, 2010, Hannigan used a bulldozer and attempted to smooth over the berms that were blocking his access to the 20-foot easement. Novak and Hannigan yelled at one another, and Hannigan allegedly threatened Novak with the bulldozer. Novak called the police, who cited Hannigan for disorderly conduct.

On September 9, Hannigan entered a stipulated motion and order for stay of proceedings and stipulation to facts on the disorderly conduct charge. Hannigan stipulated "to the admissibility of the facts contained in the police reports upon which the charge" of disorderly conduct was based. CP at 385. The record is unclear how the charge was resolved but Hannigan was not convicted.

The Present Case

On September 10, Hannigan filed suit against Novak seeking to (1) quiet title to the easement, (2) eject Novak from the easement, and (3) recover damages for costs related to repairing the easement. In his complaint Hannigan alleges among other things, that Novak tampered with survey markers after Hannigan hired a surveyor to mark the easements. Hannigan also stated that Novak's grading of the soil blocked the 20-foot easement and made it impossible for Hannigan to access his property with his motor home.

Although Novak initially had counsel, he eventually represented himself. He took various positions throughout the case including alleging defects in Hannigan's service of filings; filing a CR 11 motion seeking sanctions against Hannigan for bringing a frivolous lawsuit; alleging ex parte communication between the judge and Hannigan's attorney; and objecting to action taken by the court in setting the case for trial.

Novak took particular issue with the allegations that he tampered with the survey markers. And he repeatedly referenced Hannigan's citation for disorderly conduct - arguing that Hannigan committed perjury by contradicting information from the disorderly conduct police report and arguing that Hannigan could not prevail because that would mean a criminal profited from his crime. Trial and Judgment

During a bench trial, Hannigan testified and also presented testimony from Greg Brown, the land surveyor he called to mark the easements after Novak began his construction of the turnaround, as well as Aaron Erickson, a contractor who looked at the property to estimate the cost of restoring the easement. Novak testified and also presented testimony from a witness who could confirm that Novak was out of town when someone allegedly tampered with the survey markers.

The trial court ruled that Hannigan was entitled to free and unobstructed use of the 20-foot, 30-foot, and 60-foot easements on Novak's property and ordered Novak to cease interfering with the easements and to pay the costs to restore the easements to their earlier condition. The trial court entered extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The amended judgment and order, which was entered after the trial court received documentation of Hannigan's actual costs, imposed a monetary judgment totaling $43, 008.97 against Novak. The judgment included $29, 176.86 in attorney fees. The trial court did not state a legal basis for the award of attorney fees.

Novak appeals the trial court's ruling, various procedural issues, and the trial court's award of attorney fees.

ANALYSIS
A. Trial Court ' s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Novak assigns error to the trial court's judgment and order and its denial of his response to Hannigan's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Because Novak makes arguments about certain findings of fact and conclusions of law, we interpret Novak's arguments as a challenge to those findings and conclusions. We reject Novak's arguments.

1. Standard of Revi ew

We review a trial court's decision following a bench trial by asking whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact and whether those findings support the trial court's conclusions of law. Viking Bank v. Firgrove Commons 3, LLC, 183 Wn.App. 706, 712, 334 P.3d 116 (2014). Substantial evidence is the quantum of evidence sufficient to persuade a rational, fair-minded person that the premise is true. Id. We treat unchallenged findings of fact as verities on appeal. Kitsap County v. Kitsap Rifle & Revolver Club, 184 Wn.App. 252, 267, 337 P.3d 328 (2014), review denied, 183 Wn.2d 1008 (2015).

2. Existence of the 20-foot Easement

Novak argues that substantial evidence did not support the trial court's conclusion of law that Hannigan had a 20-foot easement on Novak's property. We disagree.

Easements are interests in land and therefore must be conveyed by a deed complying with the statute of frauds. RCW 64.04.010; Gold Creek N. Ltd. P 'ship v. Gold Creek Umbrella Ass 'n, 143 Wn.App. 191, 200-01, 177 P.3d 201 (2008). Deeds must be (1) in writing, (2) signed by the party to be bound, and (3) acknowledged. RCW 64.04.020. No particular words are necessary to constitute a grant of easement. McPhaden v. Scott, 95 Wn.App. 431, 435, 975 P.2d 1033 (1999). The grant must clearly show the intention to give an easement and be sufficiently definite. Beebe v. Swerda, 58 Wn.App. 375, 379, 793 P.2d 442 (1990).

Here, the necessary elements to create an easement were present. Novak's real estate contract was in writing, signed by him, and acknowledged. The contract stated that the lot was subject to a "20 foot non-exclusive easement for ingress, egress, and utilities." CP at 30. The easement is described in metes and bounds and specifically references lot 8 (Hannigan's property). Further, Novak testified at trial that he read the contract and understood it to mean that the estate was burdened with a 20-foot easement.

Novak emphasizes that there is no mention of the 20-foot easement in Hannigan's deed. He argues that the plaintiff in an ejectment can recover only on the strength of his own title, citing Seymour v. Dufur, 53 Wash. 646, 650, 102 P. 756 (1909). But Seymour is distinguishable because in that case parties had a chain of title showing that they were the true owners of the property at issue. Mat 647-48. Here, there is no dispute over chain of title. And Novak cites no other authority for the proposition that the beneficiary of an easement cannot rely on the deed of the servient estate in establishing a lawful easement.

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in finding that Novak's property was subject to a 20-foot easement.

3. Blocking the 20-foot Easement

Novak argues that the trial court erred in finding that he blocked Hannigan's access to the road along the 20-foot easement because the officer who wrote the police report in the disorderly conduct case stated that he did not have difficulty driving through the area in his patrol car. However, sufficient evidence presented at trial supported the trial court's finding of...

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