Hannigan v. State
| Decision Date | 13 February 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. V--210,V--210 |
| Citation | 307 So.2d 850 |
| Parties | Kenneth Bernard HANNIGAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Richard W. Ervin, III, Public Defender, and David J. Busch, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Michael M. Corin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
This case concerns one of the most blatant, inexcusable instances of the violation of a citizen's Fourth Amendment rights ever presented before this Court.
The facts are clear. Undercover vice-squad officers Taylor and Bowen of the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office effectuated a substantial drug 'bust' involving many subjects on the night of December 6, 1973. One of those arrested for selling illicit drugs to the officers was David Dill who, as the middleman in a transaction, offered to take the officers to the home of an alleged distributor of the drugs, whom Dill knew only as Ken. According to the officers, they went to the appellant's home to recover the marked money used to purchase the drugs and to effectuate the appellant's arrest for 'conspiracy and violation of the drug laws.' They did not at that time have any cause to believe that any drugs would be found and they did not claim to be looking for any.
According to the appellant and his wife, they were awakened on the morning of December 7 at 3:00 a.m. by a knock at the door. When appellant's wife went to the door, turned on the light, and asked who was there, one of the men asked if the appellant was at home. After replying 'Just a minute', appellant's wife attempted to shut the door and then proceed to get her husband out of bed. The officers, however, pushed the door open and came into the house, at which point they identified themselves as officers of the Sheriff's Department. Although the officers testified that they identified themselves as Sheriff's officers from the outset, the record is clear that the officers entered the house without the consent of either the appellant or his wife. As a result of a general search, the officers discovered two cellophane bags of tablets which later turned out to be amphetamine and phencyclidine in the pockets of appellant's jacket which was present in the living room. At this point, the appellant was arrested.
The appellant challenged the search by a motion to suppress the evidence which the lower court denied after a hearing. The appellant thereupon withdrew his not guilty plea and tendered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of possession of amphetamine, preserving the search issue for appeal. He now appeals his five year prison sentence on the basis of an alleged illegal search.
At the outset this Court wishes to acknowledge a prevalent lay criticism of this country's judicial system. It is the common belief among some segments of the public that judges are irresponsibly releasing hardened criminals on the streets on the basis of mere 'technicalities'. The belief, unfortunately, is partially correct: Courts are sometimes forced to overturn the conviction of persons who are obviously guilty. Such occurrences are always frustrating and the source of no satisfaction. But it is not correct to say that such releases are based on 'mere technicalities'. They are instead based upon the Law. The constitution and statutes are, indeed, nothing more than compilations of technicalities.
The Fourth Amendment right against warrantless searches and seizures is no more a technicality than the First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of religion. Any time a court ignores the constitutional rights of a person, no matter how guilty that person appears to be, the whole system is destroyed. Were courts to ignore the constitutional rights of 'guilty' persons, then the chances of an 'innocent' person's constitutional rights being violated become infinitely greater. We must forever bear in mind the precious counterstone of the American system of jurisprudence, The presumption of innocence. No person is guilty under our system until proven so. Once the constitutional rights of the 'guilty' are ignored, the constitutional rights of the 'innocent' no longer exist. However distasteful the process of releasing a criminal may be, safeguarding the constitutional rights of...
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...344 So.2d 326 (Fla.1977); Shepard v. State, 319 So.2d 127 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 328 So.2d 845 (Fla.1975); Hannigan v. State, 307 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 315 So.2d 195 (Fla.1975).11 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 858......
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...378 (1921); Britton v. State, 336 So.2d 663 (Fla.1st DCA 1976); Shepard v. State, 319 So.2d 127 (Fla.1st DCA 1975); Hannigan v. State, 307 So.2d 850 (Fla.1st DCA 1975). "( O)ne of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search th......
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...So.2d 663 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Shepard v. State, 319 So.2d 127 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 328 So.2d 845 (Fla.1975); Hannigan v. State, 307 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 315 So.2d 195 The law is equally well-settled that electronic eavesdropping constitutes a search and seizure ......
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Phuagnong v. State
...other evidence against the defendant not subject to the motion to suppress. There was other evidence, to be sure. Cf. Hannigan v. State, 307 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). But the issue on which jurisdiction depends is whether denial of the motion to suppress was "dispositive" within the me......