Hannigan v. Wright

• Court: Delaware Superior Court
• Writing for the Court: PENNEWILL, J.
• Citation: Hannigan v. Wright, 63 A. 234, 21 Del. 537 (Del. Super. 1905)
• Decision Date: 13 December 1905
• Parties: ELIZABETH HANNIGAN v. HUGHES B. WRIGHT

63 A. 234

21 Del. 537

ELIZABETH HANNIGAN v. HUGHES B. WRIGHT

Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County

December 13, 1905

Superior Court, New Castle County, November Term, 1905.

ACTION ON THE CASE (No. 157, May Term, 1905), to recover for personal injuries to plaintiff by being knocked down and run over by an automobile, alleged to have been owned by and operated under the control and direction of the defendant, at Ninth and Market Streets in the city of Wilmington, about five o'clock in the afternoon of March 29, 1905. (See further facts in charge to jury.)

At the trial, the plaintiff was asked by her counsel what was the condition of her memory and her nerves as a result of the accident. Whiteman, for defendant, objected, on the ground that the narr failed to allege any injuries as to plaintiff's memory or nerves; the allegation in the narr being simply that by reason of the wounds and bruises received, "the said plaintiff became and was sick, sore lame and disordered, and so remained," etc.

Verdict for plaintiff for $ 200.00.

Horace G. Knowles for plaintiff.

J Harvey Whiteman for defendant.

LORE C. J., and PENNEWILL, J., sitting.

OPINION

PENNEWILL, J.

We think the allegation in the narr is sufficiently broad to cover this question, and that the question is admissible.

PENNEWILL, J. (charging the jury):

Gentlemen of the jury:--In this action Elizabeth Hannigan, the plaintiff, seeks to recover from Hughes B. Wright, the defendant, damages for personal injuries which she alleges were caused by the defendant's negligence.

The plaintiff claims that on March 29th last, about five o'clock in the afternoon, while she was in the act of crossing Market Street in this city at or near the southerly line of Ninth Street, and when she had almost reached the pavement on the west side of Market Street, she was struck with such great force by a heavy, two-seated automobile owned or controlled by the defendant, that she was thrown to the ground, run over and held down by the weight of the machine; and being about fifty-nine years of age, was so bruised, shocked and injured that she is no longer able to make a living or do work as she was previously accustomed to do. She alleges that the automobile, at the time of the accident, was under the control of the defendant, operated by a chauffeur, who was the servant of the defendant or under his control, in a negligent and careless manner, at an excessive and dangerous rate of speed, and by reason thereof she sustained the injuries for which she seeks to recover in this action. She also claims that she was exercising all the care and caution that were reasonably required under the circumstances and conditions existing at the time and place of the accident.

The defendant, on the other hand, holds that he is not liable to the plaintiff in this action because he was not guilty of any negligence which resulted in her injury. He claims that he was neither the owner of the automobile which struck the plaintiff, nor did he in any manner have the direction and control of it or of the person operating it at the time of the accident. And he insists moreover that the plaintiff was herself guilty of some negligence which contributed proximately to the injury, and for that reason she cannot recover.

We say to you that while the thing that caused the injury complained of is comparatively new in its use, and novel in its construction, operation and movement, there is nothing new or exceptional in the principles of law that apply to its use upon the public highway. The owner of an automobile has the same right as the owner of other vehicles to use the highways or streets of a city, and like them he must exercise reasonable care and caution for the safety of others.

The acts of the chauffeur, in operating an automobile, within the authority of his employment, are the acts of a servant. The relation of master and servant exists between the chauffeur and his employer, and the rules of law applicable to that relation apply.

A traveler on foot has the same right to the use of the public streets of a city as a vehicle of any kind. In using any parts of the streets all persons are bound to the exercise of reasonable care to prevent collisions and accidents. Such care must be in proportion to the danger or the peculiar risks in each case. It is the duty of the person operating an automobile, or any other vehicle, upon the public streets of a city to use ordinary care in its operation, to move it at a reasonable rate of speed, and cause it to slow up or stop if need be, where danger is imminent and could, by the exercise of reasonable care, be seen or known in time to avoid accident. Greater caution is required at street...