Hannon v. State, 78,678

• Decision Date: 02 June 1994
• Docket Number: No. 78,678,78,678
• Citation: 638 So.2d 39
• Parties: 19 Fla. L. Weekly S295 Patrick C. HANNON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 39

638 So.2d 39

19 Fla. L. Weekly S295

Patrick C. HANNON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 78,678.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 2, 1994.

As Revised on Denial of Rehearing Sept. 8, 1994.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Robert F. Moeller, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Candance M. Sunderland, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Patrick C. Hannon appeals his conviction of two counts of first-degree murder and corresponding sentences of death. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution.

Around Christmas 1990, Brandon Snider, a resident of Tampa, went to Indiana to visit relatives. While there, he went to the home of Toni Acker, a former girlfriend, and vandalized her bedroom. On January 9, 1991, Snider returned to Tampa.

On January 10, 1991, Hannon, Ron Richardson, and Jim Acker went to the apartment where Snider and Robert Carter lived. Snider opened the door and was immediately attacked by Acker, who is Toni Acker's brother. Acker stabbed Snider multiple times. When Acker was finished, Hannon cut Snider's throat. During the attack, Snider's screams drew the attention of his neighbors. They also drew the attention of Carter, who was upstairs. Hearing the screams, Carter came downstairs and saw what was happening. He then went back upstairs and hid under his bed. Hannon and Acker followed Carter upstairs. Then Hannon shot Carter six times, killing him.

In July 1991, Hannon was brought to trial for the murders of Snider and Carter. ¹ During the trial, Richardson reached an agreement with the State. He pled guilty to being an accessory after the fact and testified against Hannon. Hannon was found guilty of both murders. After a penalty proceeding, the jury unanimously recommended death. The trial court found the following aggravating circumstances applicable to both murders: (1) previous conviction of a violent felony (the contemporaneous killings); (2) the murders were committed during the commission of a burglary; and (3) the murders were heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Sec. 921.141(5)(a), (d), and (h), Fla.Stat. (1991). As to Carter, the court found the additional aggravating factor that the murder was committed to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest. Sec. 921.141(5)(e), Fla.Stat. (1991). In mitigation, ² the court considered testimony from Hannon's mother and father that Hannon was not a violent person. Also, the court considered the fact that Hannon's original co-defendant, Richardson, was no longer facing the death penalty. The trial court found that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors and followed the jury's recommendation, imposing separate death sentences on Hannon for the murders of Snider and Carter.

As his first issue on appeal, Hannon claims that the trial court erred in striking prospective jurors Ling and Troxler for cause. The judge struck the jurors based on their answers to questions regarding their ability to impose the death penalty in an appropriate case. Hannon argues that the questioning did not show that Ling and Troxler were irrevocably committed to vote against the death penalty, and that their views on capital punishment would not substantially impair the performance of their jury duties.

The inability to be impartial about the death penalty is a valid reason to remove a prospective juror for cause. Johnson v. State, 608 So.2d 4, 8 (Fla.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2366, 124 L.Ed.2d 273 (1993); Lara v. State, 464 So.2d 1173, 1178-79 (Fla.1985). A prospective juror's views regarding capital punishment need not be made "unmistakably clear." Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). Despite a lack of clarity in the printed record, "there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law.... [T]his is why deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror." Id. at 425-26, 105 S.Ct. at 853. To prevail on this issue, a defendant must show that the trial court, in excusing the prospective juror for cause, abused its discretion. See Johnson, 608 So.2d at 8; Mitchell v. State, 527 So.2d 179, 180-81 (Fla.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 960, 109 S.Ct. 404, 102 L.Ed.2d 392 (1988).

The record in the instant case supports the trial court's findings. During voir dire, the prosecutor asked prospective juror Troxler, "In an appropriate case, do you think you could recommend the imposition of a death penalty?" Troxler answered, "No." While prospective juror Ling's answers were not as certain, he vacillated on the question of whether he could impose the death penalty, and he was clearly uncomfortable with the issue. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in removing prospective jurors Ling and Troxler for cause.

Hannon next argues that the trial court erred in admitting certain statements by a prosecution witness, over defense objection. At trial, the State called Toni Acker as a witness. On cross examination, defense counsel showed Acker a composite drawing of Hannon, made by individuals who had seen Hannon flee the scene of the murders, and asked her if the composite resembled Hannon. Acker answered that it did not. On redirect, Acker denied having previously told Detective Mozell Linton that the composite resembled or looked like Hannon. The prosecutor then asked Acker the following questions and received the following responses:

Q. After you learned about the murder of Mr. Snider and Mr. Carter, did you have occasion to ask your brother, Jim Acker, about the possibility of Hannon's involvement?

A. No, I did not.

Q. At that interview that we've already talked about ... did you tell Detective Mozell Linton that you had asked your brother Jim about Hannon possibly being involved?

A. No, I did not.

On recross, Acker stated that she told Detective Linton that Hannon would not have done something like that.

Subsequently, the State called Detective Linton to impeach Acker's testimony. On direct examination, the prosecutor asked Detective Linton the following questions, and received the following answers:

Q. Detective Linton, when you showed Toni Acker the composite photograph, what did she say about it?

A. She said after looking at it, she thought it looked like a person known to her as Patrick Hannon that lived in Tampa.

....

Q. Did she make any statement about having asked her brother, Jim, about Hannon possibly being involved?

A. Yes.

Q. And what did she say?

A. She told me that she had had a conversation with her brother over the phone, that she had called down to Tampa after thinking about this case and asked her brother, Jim Acker, if he thought Patrick Hannon had been involved in killing Brandon and Robbie.

Hannon contends that through the questioning of Acker the State prejudiced the defense by suggesting that Acker thought Hannon was involved in the murder. Hannon points out that Acker had no personal knowledge relating to who murdered Snider and Carter and the fact that Acker may have believed Hannon was involved was irrelevant. Hannon also argues that the testimony elicited from Detective Linton to impeach Acker aggravated the error in admitting her testimony. We disagree.

Acker's initial testimony regarding the composite and the conversation with Detective Linton was elicited by defense counsel. During the defense questioning, Acker stated that the composite did not look like Hannon. The State then asked whether she had previously told Detective Linton that the composite did, in fact, resemble Hannon. The testimony of Detective Linton, regarding Acker's statement that the composite looked like Hannon, was proper impeachment of Acker's testimony. Sec. 90.608, Fla.Stat. (1991). Whether Acker had inquired of her brother concerning Hannon's involvement would ordinarily be irrelevant. However, in light of her efforts to exonerate Hannon, and her subsequent statement that he would not do anything like that, we cannot say that the trial judge erred in permitting the evidence to be introduced. Even if it could be said that any of Acker's impeachment was improper, this was only a minimal part of the entire trial, and the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. Thus, if error occurred, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986).

As his third issue on appeal, Hannon contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the bloody shorts and shirt worn by Snider when he was murdered, and the testimony of Judith Bunker, a forensic consultant in the field of blood stain pattern analysis and crime scene reconstruction. Hannon argues that the evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial. In response, the State argues that the evidence was relevant and admissible, and that its probative value clearly outweighed any possible prejudice.

Bunker's testimony relating to the blood splatter evidence was presented to assist the jury in understanding the facts before it. The clothing was admitted into evidence and used by Bunker to explain how the murders occurred. The splatter evidence was consistent and tied in with other evidence detailing the manner of commission of the crime. See Castro v. State, 547 So.2d 111, 114 (Fla.1989). On appeal, a trial court's ruling regarding the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Blanco v. State, 452 So.2d 520, 523 (Fla.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1181, 105 S.Ct. 940, 83 L.Ed.2d 953 (1985). Here, there was no such abuse.

Hannon next argues that the instruction given to the jury on the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague. The instruction given in this case was identical to the one declared invalid in Espinosa v. Florida, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2926, 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992)....