Hannoy v. State
Decision Date | 10 June 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 49A05-0206-CR-282.,49A05-0206-CR-282. |
Citation | 789 N.E.2d 977 |
Parties | Eli S. HANNOY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
J.J. Paul, III, Voyles Zahn Paul Hogan & Merriman, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Ellen J. Meilaender, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Eli Hannoy appeals his two convictions for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content of .10 percent or greater and causing death, which is a Class C felony. We reverse and remand.
The dispositive issue is whether the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence the results of a blood test that indicated he was intoxicated obtained after police ordered Hannoy's blood to be drawn without probable cause and without requesting his consent. For purposes of a potential retrial, we also address the admissibility of the results of a second blood test conducted by the hospital where Hannoy was treated.
On the night of August 11, 2000, Hannoy drove his minivan across the centerline of Fall Creek Road in Indianapolis and collided head-on with a car driven by John Wells and also occupied by Flora Wells. Flora was pronounced dead at the scene, and John died as a result of his injuries several days later. Pursuant to the standard policy of the Marion County Sheriff's Department, Deputy Brian Dixon was dispatched to Community North Hospital, where Hannoy had been transported, to request hospital staff to draw Hannoy's blood for purposes of testing it for alcohol. Deputy Dixon did not ask for Hannoy's consent before a nurse performed the draw; nor did any law enforcement officer have probable cause to believe Hannoy was intoxicated at the time the draw was made. The Sheriff Department's policy also provided that a blood sample of a driver involved in an accident resulting in serious bodily injury or death would be obtained by force, if necessary. App. p. 662.
Testing of the blood obtained at Deputy Dixon's request indicated that Hannoy had a blood alcohol content between .194 and.206 percent. The hospital performed a second blood draw on Hannoy for its own purposes approximately one hour after the draw requested by Deputy Dixon. Testing of this blood sample indicated a blood alcohol content of between .182 and .193 percent.
The State charged Hannoy with two counts of operating a vehicle while intoxicated resulting in death, two counts of operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol content above .10 percent resulting in death, and two counts of reckless homicide, all Class C felonies, and two counts of operating a vehicle while intoxicated resulting in serious bodily injury, Class D felonies. Hannoy moved to suppress the results of both blood tests; the trial court denied the motions. On March 25, 2002, the case proceeded to a bench trial, but only on the operating with a blood alcohol content above .10 percent resulting in death charges. The State dismissed the other charges. The trial court found Hannoy guilty on both counts, and he now appeals.
Hannoy challenges the trial court's admission of the blood alcohol content test results from the blood sample obtained at Community North Hospital at Deputy Dixon's request. Hannoy moved to suppress these results and also renewed his objection to them at trial. We review a trial court's determination as to the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion and will reverse only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Smith v. State, 754 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind.2001). Additionally, the trial court here entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon when it denied Hannoy's motion to suppress and it later overruled his objection to the evidence "for the reasons previously stated in the record." App. pp. 1520-21. In reviewing a decision entered with findings and conclusions, we must first determine whether the evidence supports the findings and second, whether the findings support the judgment. E & L Rental Equip., Inc. v. Wade Const., Inc., 752 N.E.2d 655, 658 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). Findings of fact are clearly erroneous only when the record lacks any evidence to support them. Id. We review questions of law under a de novo standard, however, and owe no deference to a trial court's legal conclusions. Wayne Metal Prod. Co. v. Indiana Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt., 721 N.E.2d 316, 317 (Ind. Ct.App.1999), trans. denied.
Hannoy does not challenge the trial court's factual findings on this issue. The key facts for our review are that the trial court found, inter alia, that "Deputy Dixon had not developed probable cause to believe defendant was intoxicated at the time he ordered [the] blood draw," and that "Deputy Dixon did not discuss or request Mr. Hannoy's consent prior to the blood draw." App. pp. 304-05. Hannoy does vigorously assert that the trial court's legal conclusions with respect to Indiana's implied consent statutes and the constitutionality of the search at issue are incorrect. We review these legal conclusions de novo.
In general, the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless searches. Edwards v. State, 762 N.E.2d 128, 132 (Ind. Ct.App.2002), trans. denied. If the search is conducted without a warrant, the burden is upon the State to prove that, at the time of the search, an exception to the warrant requirement existed. Id. Searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable subject to a few well-delineated exceptions. Johnson v. State, 766 N.E.2d 426, 432 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied. A warrantless search of one's person ordinarily must also be supported by probable cause. Conwell v. State, 714 N.E.2d 764, 766 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). A knowing and voluntary consent to search obviates the need for a warrant and probable cause, but unlike a probable cause or warrant search, a consent search allows for a suspect to limit or restrict the search as he or she chooses. See Krise v. State, 746 N.E.2d 957, 961, 964 (Ind.2001).
We initially address the application of Indiana's implied consent statutes to this case. Indiana Code Chapter 9-30-6 provides that an officer shall offer a chemical test when he or she has probable cause to believe a driver is intoxicated. Brown v. State, 744 N.E.2d 989, 993 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001). Failure to submit to an offered chemical test results in suspension of the driver's license. Ind.Code § 9-30-6-7. However, it is Indiana Code Chapter 9-30-7 that arguably applies in this case. For purposes of this chapter, police shall offer a chemical test to any driver whom the officer has probable cause to believe was involved in an accident resulting in serious bodily injury or death. Brown, 744 N.E.2d at 993. As under Chapter 9-30-6, drivers impliedly consent to such a test and, if they refuse to take an offered test, a penalty attaches. The civil penalty under Chapter 9-30-7 for refusing to submit to an offered chemical test is a Class C infraction and suspension of the driver's license for up to one year.1 I.C. § 9-30-7-5.
At the time of Hannoy's accident and trial, the Marion County Sheriff's Department had a standard policy assuming that in any motor vehicle accident resulting in serious bodily injury or death, the implied consent provisions of Chapter 9-30-7 automatically authorized obtaining the blood of the driver of each involved vehicle for testing purposes, by force if necessary. This policy applied regardless of whether consent from the driver was actually sought and obtained and whether there was probable cause that the blood would uncover evidence of alcohol or illegal substance consumption. There is no evidence in this case that Deputy Dixon "offered" a chemical test to Hannoy; he simply requested medical personnel to perform the blood draw. Hence, there was no compliance with the implied consent law itself.
Thirteen years ago, this court considered a factually similar case decided under the predecessor to current Indiana Code Chapter 9-30-6, the implied consent law applicable where police have probable cause that a driver is intoxicated. We held that where a police officer obtained a defendant's blood sample after the defendant was told of the implied consent law but refused to consent, the officer's conduct violated the guidelines contained in the implied consent laws and the seizure of the blood sample was unlawful. Justice v. State, 552 N.E.2d 844, 848 (Ind.Ct.App. 1990). We noted that the penalty for refusing to consent was suspension of the driver's license and nothing in the statutes at that time authorized police to obtain a blood sample if a person refused consent. Id. Here, Deputy Dixon never advised Hannoy of the implied consent law at all and never sought Hannoy's actual consent, certainly representing much less compliance with the implied consent law than the facts in the Justice case. Nothing in Indiana Code Chapter 9-30-7 authorizes an officer to forcibly take a blood sample if actual consent to a chemical test is not obtained. Rather, as with Chapter 9-30-6, there are civil penalties if the person refuses to submit. Therefore, following Justice, Deputy Dixon's failure to comply with the guidelines of the applicable implied consent laws means that those laws cannot be invoked to justify the drawing of Hannoy's blood.
Next, we address the constitutionality of the Marion County Sheriff Department's policy, followed in this case, of obtaining blood samples without probable cause from drivers involved in accidents resulting in serious bodily injury or death or obtaining consent to performing a chemical test. The State urges that we should hold this policy to be constitutional under the "special needs" exception to the usual probable cause prerequisite for a government search under the Fourth Amendment. We conclude we are constrained by clear...
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