Hannula v. Duluth & Iron Range Railroad Company

• Decision Date: 11 June 1915
• Docket Number: 19,162 - (131)
• Citation: 153 N.W. 250,130 Minn. 3
• Parties: JOHN M. HANNULA v. DULUTH & IRON RANGE RAILROAD COMPANY
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

153 N.W. 250

130 Minn. 3

JOHN M. HANNULA v. DULUTH & IRON RANGE RAILROAD COMPANY

Nos. 19,162 - (131)

Supreme Court of Minnesota

June 11, 1915

Action in the district court for St. Louis county to recover $30,000 for personal injury caused by the negligence of defendant's servants.The case was tried before Fesler J., and a jury which returned a verdict in favor of defendant.From an order denying his motion for a new trialplaintiff appealed.Affirmed.

SYLLABUS

Challenge for implied bias.

1.Under G.S. 1913, § 9233(R.L. 1905, § 5391, subd. 2), making the relation of master and servant between the defendant and the plaintiff a cause of challenge for implied bias, it is not a good cause of challenge to a proposed juror that he is in the employ of a corporation, the majority of the stock of which is controlled by another corporation, and so on down to a final holding corporation, which holding corporation in the same way controls the majority of the stock of the defendant corporation; such holding corporation not owning stock in either, and neither owning stock in the other.

Challenge for implied bias -- finding of trial court final.

2.Under G.S. 1913, § 9232(R.L. 1905, § 5390), the finding of the court that a proposed juror, situated as described in paragraph 1, was not subject to challenge for actual bias held final.

Wilful negligence.

3.The court did not err in withdrawing from the jury the charge of wilful negligence.

Evidence -- release.

4.The evidence was such as to justify a verdict that the defendant was not negligent, and that a release made by the plaintiff's father, the plaintiff being a minor, was fairly and understandingly made.

Contributory negligence.

5.The court did not err in submitting to the jury the question whether the plaintiff, injured when he was five years and three and one-half months old, was guilty of contributory negligence.

Parent and child -- settlement for personal injury.

6.Under G.S. 1913, § 7681(R.L. 1905, § 4060), prior to the amendment made by Laws 1907, c. 58, a father could settle for an injury to his child without suit brought.

J. W. Reynolds, for appellant.

Abbott, MacPherran, Lewis & Gilbert, for respondent.

OPINION

DIBELL, C.

Action to recover damages sustained by John M. Hannula, an infant, who was run over by an engine of the defendant; verdict for the defendant; plaintiff appeals from the order denying his motion for a new trial.

The boy, John Hannula, was injured on November 14, 1902.He was born on July 29, 1897, and at the time of his injury was five years and three and one half months old.On February 6, 1903, something like three months after the accident, the plaintiff's father settled with the defendant, receiving $100 for himself and $600 for the boy.This action was commenced in February, 1914, eleven years and three months after the accident, and was tried in June, 1914, some eleven years and seven months after the accident.

The assignments will be considered as near as may be in the order in which they are presented.

1.Three jurors, employees of the Oliver Iron Mining Co., were challenged for implied bias.The ground of the challenge was that they stood in the relation of master and servant to the defendantIron Range company.G.S. 1913, § 9232 (R.L. 1905, § 5390).The challenges were disallowed and error is alleged in their disallowance.

The Oliver company is a Minnesota corporation.It owns no stock in the Iron Range company and the Iron Range owns no stock in the Oliver.A majority of the stock of the Oliver is controlled by another corporation, a majority of whose stock is likewise controlled by another corporation, and so on to a last corporation, the majority of whose stock is controlled by the United States Steel Corporation.In a similar way a majority of the stock of the Iron Range is controlled by another corporation, a majority of whose stock is controlled by another, and so on down to a last corporation the majority of whose stock is controlled by the steel company.The steel company owns no stock in either the Oliver or the Iron Range and has such indirect control as is indicated.It is clear enough that the statute gives no ground of implied bias by reason of the facts stated; that is, from the facts stated it cannot be said that the relation of master and servant exists between the three men, employed by the Oliver company, and the defendant Iron Range company.Whether the statute should so provide is not for us.It does not.The ruling of the court was right.

2.The same jurors were challenged for actual bias.The court found the challenge not true.Error is claimed in this.The cause for a challenge for actual bias is as follows:

"For the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror, in reference to the case or to either party, which satisfies the triers, in the exercise of a sound discretion, that he cannot try the issue impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging, and known as actual bias."G.S. 1913, § 9232, subd. 2(R.L. 1905, § 5390, subd. 2).

The three jurors called testified with positiveness that the fact that they were employed by the Oliver company would not prevent them giving a fair consideration to the case against the Iron Range or returning a verdict upon the evidence.They were subjected to cross-examination.Additional evidence was taken.The company by which they were employed sustained the relation to the defendant company which we have stated.Each of the companies has the same legal department, and the same claim department, and they office in the same building.There are naturally mutual acquaintanceships, and a general feeling of friendliness between the employees of each.The court, after consideration of the evidence, was of the opinion that the jurors could try the issues impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the plaintiff.The challenge was upon the ground stated and the test was that defined by the statute.Upon a challenge upon the ground of actual bias the finding of the trial court is final.State v. Feldman,80 Minn. 314, 83 N.W. 182;Perry v. Miller,61 Minn. 412, 63 N.W. 1040;Hawkins v. Manston,57 Minn. 323, 59 N.W. 309.Every one connected with jury trials knows that the plaintiff in one case, or the defendant in another, may have jurors presented who, because of local surroundings and local connections, seem to him disqualified fairly to try the issues.Sometimes it happens, too, that one side or the other thinks he does not have a fair jury, unless it is largely composed of those whose natural prejudices are with him.To get impartial and unprejudiced jurors, in the various situations which arise, the statute puts upon the trial court the burden of determining whether proposed jurors are impartial and without prejudice between the litigants.In cases such as the one here presented a court should act with extreme caution, and with a careful appreciation of the peculiar situation of the defendant and the employers of the jurors.We doubt not the trial court did.None of the three jurors participated in the trial.

3.The complaint charges wilful negligence of the defendant.At the close of the testimony the court excluded this issue from the jury.Upon this error is based.

Substantially the only evidence at all bearing upon this issue is the testimony of the injured boy, who says that he was standing on the foot-board of the tank end of the pusher engine; that one of the trainmen helped couple a nearby engine to its train; that he came back to the engine, passing close to him; and that he then got upon the engine and it started in the backward movement.This happened on November 14, 1902, when the boy was five years three and one-half months old.His testimony to the event was given eleven years and seven months later.His testimony was improbable in the extreme, was without support on the vital point, and was directly denied by the trainmen.The testimony of this boy, so young at the time, given so many years later, in narrating an improbable story, was inherently so weak that the court was justified in refusing to submit the ground of wilful negligence to the jury.

4.The negligence charged against the defendant is that it allowed the boys to ride upon its pusher engine, stationed at Embarrass, going about and upon it whenever they pleased, and negligently started the engine when the boy was in a place of peril.The plaintiff cannot complain of a verdict for the defendant on the question of its negligence.The case against it upon the issue of negligence, if the evidence made any at all, was weak.

On February 6, 1903, just a few months after the accident, the boy's father and mother went to the defendant, and, after some negotiation, a release of the father's cause of action and of the boy's cause of action was made.The father received...