Hannum v. Borough of West Chester

• Decision Date: 31 January 1870
• Citation: 63 Pa. 475
• Parties: Hannum <I>versus</I> The Borough of West Chester.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

63 Pa. 475

Hannum versus The Borough of West Chester.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

January 17, 1870.

January 31, 1870.

January 17th 1870.

Before THOMPSON, C. J., SHARSWOOD and WILLIAMS, JJ. AGNEW, J., at Nisi Prius. READ, J., absent.

Error to the Common Pleas of Chester county: No 152, to July Term 1869.

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J. Smith Futhey and P. Frazer Smith (with whom was Geo. F. Smith), for plaintiffs in error, as to the rejection of evidence, cited Western Pa. Railroad v. Hill, 6 P. F. Smith 460; Wilmington & Reading Railroad v. Stauffer, 10 Id. 374. As to the Statute of Limitations: Western Pa. Railroad v. Johnson, 9 P. F. Smith 290; Del., Lack. and Western Railroad v. Burson, 11 Id. 369.

W. Mac Veagh and W. Darlington, for defendant in error, cited Wadhams v. L. & B. Railroad, 6 Wright 310; Angell on Limitations 24; Hoveden v. Lord Annesley, 2 Sch. & Lef. 329; 2 Story's Eq. § 1520; Farnam v. Brooks, 9 Pick. 242; McCrea v. Purmont, 16 Wend. 460; People v. Everest, 4 Hill 71; Humbert v. Trinity Church, 24 Wend. 594; Bank v. Daniels, 12 Pet. 56; Foster v. Railroad, 11 Harris 371; Del., L. & W. Railroad v. Burson, supra.

The opinion of the court was delivered, January 31st 1870, by SHARSWOOD, J.

The Act of March 27th 1713, 1 Smith 76, for limitation of actions, copied from 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, includes in its enumeration all forms of personal actions in use, but it provided that the time should be reckoned from the cause of action or suit, and not after. Hence most probably the construction, which has been uniformly received, that it is not the form, but the cause of action which is to be considered: and it may be stated as a general rule that wherever the cause of action is such as would be subject to the bar if prosecuted under any of these forms, then the statute is applicable: otherwise not. "It is the nature of the cause of action," says Mr. Justice Agnew, "such as a legacy, a foreign judgment, a widow's interest, an award at common law or a distributive share, rather than the form of action, which determines the applicability of the statute:" De Haven v. Bartholomew, 7 P. F. Smith 129. Accordingly it has been uniformly held to apply to proceedings in other courts, and before other tribunals than those of the common law, though the words of the statute are evidently confined to the latter: and this not merely by analogy as has been sometimes inaccurately stated, but because the true spirit and intent of the statute requires that the rule should be uniform. "It is said," remarks Lord Redesdale, "that courts of equity are not within the statutes of limitation. This is true in one respect: they are not within the words of the statutes, because the words apply to particular legal remedies: but they are within the spirit and meaning of the statutes, and have been always so considered. I think it is a mistake in point of language to say that courts of equity act merely by analogy to the statutes; they act in obedience to them:" Hoveden v. Lord Annesley, 2 Schoale & Lefroy 629. The justice of this observation has been always since acknowledged: 2 Story's Eq. 1520; Bank v. Daniels, 12 Peters 56; Humbert v. Trinity Church, 24 Wend. 594. "I do not say," remarks Sir William Scott, "that the Statute of Limitations extends to prize causes; it certainly does not: but every man must see that the equity of the principle of that statute in some degree reaches the proceedings of this court:" The Mentor, 1 Rob. 180. It follows that the bar of the statute is applicable, though the legislature may provide new and special proceedings in cases, which before were remedied in the common-law forms: for it cannot be supposed that a virtual repeal of the statute was intended: Farnam v. Brooks, 9 Pick. 242. The inquiry must then be what would have been the form of action at common law, if the special tribunal and proceeding had not been provided. If in such form there would have been a bar, it will still continue.

It is not necessary to consider the case of an actual taking of property by a corporation in virtue of the right of eminent domain, under an authority granted by the sovereign. The Act of April 17th 1866, Pamph. L. 106, has enacted "that no suit or action shall be brought against any railroad company, incorporated by the laws of this Commonwealth, for damages, for right of way or use and occupancy of any lands by said company, for the use of their railroad, unless such suit or action shall be commenced within five years after said lands shall have been entered upon, for the purpose of constructing said road, and within three years after said road shall be in operation." As to how far the construction of this act is to be affected by the fourth section of art. vii. of the constitution I say nothing. In regard, however, to any actual taking by other than railroad companies, it rather seems to me that under this constitutional provision no title to the land or an easement over it is gained without payment of or security for the damages. An occupation or use must be regarded as a continuing trespass, for which ejectment, trespass or case would lie unaffected by the bar of the statute as far as the right is concerned. It would operate only to limit the period for which damages could be recovered to six years before the commencement of the action. Nothing but adverse possession or user for twenty-one years would bar...