Hanover Ins. Co. v. House Call Physicians of Ill.
| Decision Date | 19 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 15 C 3684 |
| Parties | THE HANOVER INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. HOUSE CALL PHYSICIANS OF ILLINOIS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff The Hanover Insurance Company's ("Hanover") Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 35]. Hanover filed this lawsuit against Housecall Physicians of Illinois, SC ("Housecall SC"), Housecall Physicians Group of Illinois, SC ("Housecall Group SC") and MD@Home Management, LLC ("MD@Home") (collectively, the "corporate Defendants") and Susan Beesely, Debra Lingelbach, Deborah Curtis, Gertrude Glaspie, Brenda Nelson, Marcie Holliman, Thelma Young, Judith Kohl and Raquel Brown (collectively, the "individual Defendants"), seeking a declaratory judgment that Hanover does not have a duty to defend or to indemnify the corporate Defendants in connection with the underlying lawsuits filed in state court by the individual Defendants. For the reasons discussed herein, Hanover's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 35] is granted.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also Lexington Ins. Co. v. Rugg & Knopp, Inc., 165 F.3d 1087, 1090 (7th Cir. 1999). A court must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable and justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). "The nonmoving party must offer something more than a 'scintilla' of evidence to overcome summary judgment . . . and must do more than 'simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'" Roger Whitmore's Auto. Servs. v. Lake County, 424 F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
"Rule 56 demands something more specific than the bald assertion of the general truth of a particular matter, rather it requires affidavits that cite specific concrete facts establishing the existence of the truth of the matter asserted." Hadley v. County of Du Page, 715 F.2d 1238, 1243 (7th Cir. 1983). Conclusory allegations will not defeat a motion for summary judgment. Thomas v. Christ Hosp. and Medical Center, 328 F.3d 890, 893-94 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888-89 (1990)). Unsupported speculation also will not defeat a summary judgment motion; and an affidavit that includes general opinions and beliefs does not create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Cleveland v. Porco Co., 38 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 1994). Importantly, when considering whether summary judgment is appropriate, the court must rely upon the statements of facts and responses thereto submitted by the parties. To that end, the parties must comply with Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 56.1 of the Local Rules of the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
Local Rule 56.1 requires a party moving for summary judgment to submit a statement of material facts with "specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon to support the facts . . . ." Local Rule 56.1(a). The nonmoving party opposing the motion for summary judgment then must file a response to this statement, as well as its own statement of additional facts if necessary. See Local Rule 56.1(b)(3). The moving party then has an opportunity to admit or deny the nonmoving party's statement of additional facts. See Local Rule 56.1(a) ( ).
The purpose of the Local Rule 56.1 statement of facts is to identify the relevant evidence supporting the material facts that the moving party contends are undisputed, not to make factual or legal argument. Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 2006). A party's obligation to support its facts with evidence is mandatory, and the Seventh Circuit repeatedly has held that the district court is within its discretion to enforce strict compliance with the requirements of Local Rule 56.1. See Yancick v. Hanna Steel Corp., 653 F.3d 532, 537 (7th Cir. 2011); Patterson v. Indiana Newspapers, Inc., 589 F.3d 357, 359 (7th Cir. 2009); Bordelon v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trustees, 233 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 2000).
Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) requires the nonmovant to file a "concise response to the movant's statement that shall contain . . . a response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement, including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon." Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B). Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) also "requires specifically that a litigant seeking to oppose a motion for summary judgment file a response that contains a separate 'statement . . . of any additional facts that require the denial of summary judgment.'" Cichon v. Exelon Generation Co., L.L.C., 401 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C)).
In responding to Hanover's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 35], both the corporate Defendants and the individual Defendants failed to file any response to Hanover's Statement of Facts [ECF No. 36] pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B). Nor did they file any statement of additional facts pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C). The failure of a nonmoving party to abide by the requirements of Local Rule 56.1 carries significant consequences. Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) mandates that "[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement required of the moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement of the opposing party." Local Rule 56.1(b)(3); see also Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003) (). "This rule may be the most important litigation rule outside statutes of limitation because the consequences of failing to satisfy its requirements are so dire." Malec v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D. 581, 584 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
As stated above and repeated here for emphasis, the Seventh Circuit repeatedly has held that the district court is within its discretion to enforce strict compliance with the requirements of Local Rule 56.1. See Yancick, 653 F.3d at 537; Patterson, 589 F.3d at 359; Bordelon, 233 F.3d at 527. Accordingly, because Defendants failed to file any Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) responses, the facts set forth in Hanover's Statement of Facts are deemed admitted.
The following is a brief summary of the material undisputed facts taken from Hanover's Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts. See [ECF No. 36]. Hanover issued a commercial general liability policy to Housecall SC for the policy period May 23, 2013 to May 23, 2015. [ECF No. 36], at 1119. MD@Home is listed as an additional named insured on the policy. [ECF No. 36], at ¶19. Charles DeHaan was employed by the corporate Defendants as a medical doctor. [ECF No. 36], at ¶20. Charles DeHaan was not employed by any of the corporate Defendants after January 14, 2013. [ECF No. 36], at ¶20.
The individuals Defendants Susan Beesely, Debra Lingelbach, Deborah Curtis, Gertrude Glaspie, Brenda Nelson, Marcie Holliman, Thelma Young, Judith Kohl and Raquel Brown filed lawsuits in state court alleging that Charles DeHaan sexually assaulted them when he visited their homes to treat them. [ECF No. 36], at ¶¶21-32. Specifically, the individual Defendants asserted assault and battery claims against Charles DeHaan as agent and employee of the corporate Defendants and negligent hiring and retention of DeHaan against the corporate Defendants. [ECF No. 36], at ¶32.
As a threshold matter, the parties do not dispute that Illinois law applies to determine Hanover's duties and obligations under the insurance policy at issue in the underlying lawsuits. Illinois law treats the interpretation of an insurance policy as a question of law that can be resolved on summary judgment. See Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Accident & Cas. Co. of Winterhur, 317 Ill. App. 3d 737, 744, 739 N.E.2d 1049 (1st Dist. 2000); Connecticut Indent. Co. v. DER Travel Serv. Inc., 328 F.3d 347, 349 (7th Cir. 2003). A court's primary objective in construing the language of an insurance policy is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties as expressed in their agreement. Crum & Forster Managers Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 156 Ill. 2d 384, 391, 620 N.E.2d 1073 (Ill. 1993). When the language of an insurance policy is clear and unambiguous, it must be afforded its plain and ordinary meaning. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 108 (1992).
Under Illinois law, an insurer's duty to defend an insured turns primarily on the allegations of the underlying complaint. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co., 144 Ill. 2d 64, 73, 578 N.E.2d 926, 930 (Ill. 1991). If the underlying complaint alleges facts even potentially within policy coverage, the insurer is obliged to defend its insured. Id. When the underlying complaint alleges several theories of recovery, the duty to defend arises even if only one such theory is within the potential coverage of the policy. Id. In addition, if an insurer has a duty to...
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