Hanover Ins. Co. v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 23160

• Citation: 301 S.C. 55,389 S.E.2d 657
• Decision Date: 09 January 1990
• Docket Number: No. 23160,23160
• Parties: HANOVER INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. HORACE MANN INSURANCE COMPANY, Kelley D. Parker, a minor, and Hugh A. Parker, Jr., individually and as Parent and Guardian ad Litem for Kelly Parker, a minor, of whom Horace Mann Insurance Company is Respondent. . Heard
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina

Page 657

389 S.E.2d 657

301 S.C. 55

HANOVER INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. HORACE MANN INSURANCE COMPANY, Kelley D. Parker, a minor, and Hugh A. Parker, Jr., individually and as Parent and Guardian ad Litem for Kelly Parker, a minor, of whom Horace

Mann Insurance Company is Respondent.

No. 23160.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard Jan. 9, 1990.

Decided Feb. 20, 1990.

James D. Brice, of Rainey, Britton, Gibbes & Clarkson, P.A., Greenville, for petitioner.

Stephen K. Haigler and Floyd Matlock Elliott, both of Haynsworth, Marion, McKay & Guerard, Greenville, for defendants.

G. Dewey Oxner, Jr., of Haynsworth, Marion, McKay & Guerard, Greenville, for respondent.

GREGORY, Chief Justice:

This case is before us on a writ of certiorari to review the memorandum decision of the Court of Appeals holding the trial judge erred in granting petitioner's (Hanover's) motion for directed verdict. We reverse.

Kelley Parker, a passenger in a car owned by Daniel Loftis, sustained injuries when Loftis's car was struck by an underinsured motorist. Loftis was insured by respondent (Horace Mann) and had no underinsured motorist coverage. Parker was insured by Hanover and her policy included underinsured motorist coverage. Hanover brought this action to determine whether Loftis's policy with Horace Mann should be construed to provide primary underinsured motorist coverage for the benefit of Kelley Parker in the amount of Loftis's liability limits.

The trial judge granted Hanover's motion for directed verdict on the ground Horace Mann failed to make an effective offer of underinsured motorist coverage to Loftis and was therefore deemed to provide the contested coverage. ¹ The Court of Appeals reversed finding the sufficiency of Horace Mann's offer was a jury issue.

The only issue before us is whether Horace Mann's offer was insufficient as a matter of law. It is undisputed that if Horace Mann's agent offered the coverage, the offer was to purchase coverage only in an amount equal to Loftis's liability limits. Horace Mann's agent testified that if an insured requested coverage in an amount less than his liability coverage, the agency would not issue a policy.

S.C.Code Ann. § 38-77-160 (1989) ² provides that an automobile insurance carrier must offer, at the option of the insured, underinsured motorist coverage "up to the limits of the insured liability coverage." In Garris v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 280 S.C. 149, 311 S.E.2d 723 (1984), this Court construed this statute to require an offer of underinsured motorist coverage "in any amount up to" the insured's liability coverage. We find the statutory language clear: had the legislature intended coverage only in an amount equal to the insured's liability limits, it would have specified coverage be offered "at" rather than "up to" that limit.

Because Horace...