Hanselmann v. McCardle

• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: NESS; LEWIS, C. J., LITTLEJOHN and GREGORY, JJ., and DAVID W. HARWELL
• Citation: Hanselmann v. McCardle, 275 S.C. 46, 267 S.E.2d 531 (S.C. 1980)
• Decision Date: 02 June 1980
• Docket Number: No. 21192,21192
• Parties: Charles F. HANSELMANN, as Administrator of the Estate of Sommai Hanselmann, Appellant, v. Dr. Robert J. McCARDLE, Dr. Charles S. Bryan, Carmelisa Edwards, Flonnie Brooks, Dr. Hoke F. Henderson, The Columbia Clinic, P. A., and The Columbia Surgical Associates, P.A., Respondents, and Dr. Charles S. Bryan and The Columbia Clinic, P. A., Respondents-Appellants.

Page 531

267 S.E.2d 531

275 S.C. 46

Charles F. HANSELMANN, as Administrator of the Estate of Sommai Hanselmann, Appellant, v. Dr. Robert J. McCARDLE, Dr. Charles S. Bryan, Carmelisa Edwards, Flonnie Brooks, Dr. Hoke F. Henderson The Columbia Clinic, P. A., and The Columbia Surgical Associates P.A., Respondents and Dr. Charles S. Bryan and The Columbia Clinic, P. A. Respondents-Appellants.

No. 21192.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

June 2, 1980.

W. Ralph Garris, of Garris & Garris, Columbia, for appellant.

McKay, Sherrill, Walker & Townsend, Columbia, for respondents McCardle, et al.

A. Camden Lewis, of Barnes, Austin & Lightsey, Columbia, for respondents Brooks, et al.

Robinson, McFadden, Moore & Pope, Columbia, for respondent Henderson.

Richardson, Plowden, Grier & Howser, and Whaley, McCutchen & Blanton, Columbia, for respondents-appellants.

Joel D. Bailey, Beaufort, for S. C. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, amicus curiae.

NESS, Justice:

This is an action for malpractice instituted by the husband of Sommai Hanselmann, deceased, as administrator against the surgeon, Dr. Robert J. McCardle, internist, Dr. Charles S. Bryan, pathologist, Dr. Hoke F. Henderson, lab technician, Carmelisa Edwards, and lab assistant, Flonnie Brooks. The trial court granted an involuntary nonsuit as to all respondents. We affirm.

On May 25, 1978, Mrs. Hanselmann was admitted to Richland Memorial Hospital under Dr. McCardle's care. Numerous tests were performed, but no positive diagnosis of the cause of Mrs. Hanselmann's hemoptysis was made at that time. When her coughing subsided, she was released from the hospital and referred to Dr. Bryan.

She suffered a relapse in mid-June, but failed to return to the hospital or contact Dr. Bryan. On July 1, the lab technician observed a positive sputum culture indicative of tuberculosis and reported this to Dr. McCardle's office. Neither Dr. McCardle nor any other member of his professional association received the message.

On July 22, Mrs. Hanselmann went to Dr. Bryan's office where additional x-rays were taken. Two days later she was re-admitted to Richland Memorial. While there, she suffered cardiac arrest and died on July 29.

Appellant asserts the trial court erred in granting respondent's motion for involuntary nonsuit. We disagree.

The effect of a motion for nonsuit admits the truth of the evidence of the party against whom the challenge is made and all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom and requires that the evidence must be interpreted most strongly against the challenger and in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Fielding Home for Funerals v. Public Savings Life Ins. Co., 271 S.C. 117, 245 S.E.2d 238 (1978).

Assuming without deciding respondents or their agents were negligent in failing to properly communicate or act upon the results of the sputum culture, we find no evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer "but for" ¹ that error Mrs. Hanselmann's disease could have been properly diagnosed and treated and her death averted. It is incumbent on the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action to establish proximate cause as well as negligence. Armstrong v. Weiland, 267 S.C. 12, 225 S.E.2d 851 (1976); Bessinger v. DeLoach, 230 S.C. 1, 94 S.E.2d 3 (1956). 1 ALR 2d, Medical Malpractice, Cases and Annotations, § 28, p. 137. "Negligence is not actionable unless it is a proximate cause of the injuries, and it may be deemed a proximate cause only when without such negligence the injury would not have occurred or could have been avoided." Hughes v. The Children's Clinic, P.A., 269 S.C. 389, 398, 237 S.E.2d 753, 757 (1977); Gunnels v. Roach, 243 S.C. 248, 133 S.E.2d 757 (1963).

A plaintiff must plead and prove not only that he has been injured and the defendant's fault, but also the causal connection between the two. 1 ALR 2 d, Medical Malpractice, Cases and Annotations, § 1, p. 46. We hold there is no evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer respondent's negligence was the proximate cause of Mrs. Hanselmann's death. The appellant failed to sustain his required burden of proof and respondents' motions for involuntary nonsuit were properly granted. Kemmerlin v. Wingate, S.C., 261 S.E.2d 50 (1979); Albright v. Powell, 113 Ga.App. 363, 147 S.E.2d 848 (1966); Grier v. Phillips, 230 N.C. 672, 55 S.E.2d 485 (1949).

Appellant also asserts the trial court erred in...