Hansen v. America Online, Inc.

• Decision Date: 20 July 2004
• Docket Number: No. 20020288.,20020288.
• Citation: 2004 UT 62,96 P.3d 950
• Parties: Luke HANSEN, Paul Carlson, and Jason Melling, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. AMERICA ONLINE, INC., Sarah McElwee, Ric Waters, and John Does IX, Defendants and Appellees.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

96 P.3d 950

2004 UT 62

Luke HANSEN, Paul Carlson, and Jason Melling, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. AMERICA ONLINE, INC., Sarah McElwee, Ric Waters, and John Does IX, Defendants and Appellees.

No. 20020288.

Supreme Court of Utah.

July 20, 2004.

James D. Vilos, Centerville, Robert B. Sykes, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs.

Gregory W. Stevens, Salt Lake City, for defendants.

Janet H. Smith, Paul C. Burke, Salt Lake City, for amicus Utah Manufacturers Assoc.

Calvin L. Rampton, Michael P. O'Brien, Marci B. Rechtenbach, Salt Lake City, for amicus Utah SHRM.

NEHRING, Justice:

¶ 1 Luke Hansen, Jason Melling, and Paul Carlson appeal the trial court's summary determination that the "public policy" exception to Utah's at-will employment doctrine did not apply to the circumstances surrounding the termination of their employment by America Online. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Messrs. Hansen, Melling and Carlson, whom for convenience we will refer to as "the employees," were employed by America Online ("AOL") at its call center in Ogden, Utah. The Ogden call center is located in a strip mall. AOL leased, and reserved for its exclusive use, up to 350 parking stalls from the strip mall's larger public parking lot.¹

¶ 3 AOL's company policy prohibited employees at the Ogden Call Center from carrying or possessing a firearm of any type at the call center or in its exclusive parking lot.² Printed notice of the policy was displayed in the entrance lobby to the Ogden Call Center. The employees admitted that they each had seen this policy displayed and knew the terms of AOL's Workplace Violence Prevention Policy at the time they brought firearms onto the AOL parking lot.

¶ 4 On September 14, 2000, the three employees, all of whom were off-duty at the time, met in the lot where their cars were parked. Each had a firearm in his car, and they planned to go target shooting at a local gun range. An AOL security camera recorded Messrs. Melling and Carlson transferring their guns to Mr. Hansen's car in the parking lot. Four days later, AOL discharged the employees. Although each employee was an at-will employee and could be terminated without cause, AOL acknowledged that the men were discharged because they violated AOL's Workplace Violence Prevention Policy.³

¶ 5 The employees then filed a lawsuit alleging wrongful termination. They alleged that, the AOL Workplace Violence Prevention Policy notwithstanding, AOL was liable for their wrongful discharge because their possession of firearms on the AOL parking lot was protected by a clear and substantial public policy. Both the employees and AOL filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court issued a memorandum decision denying the employees' motion and granting AOL's motion. The employees appeal. We affirm.

¶ 6 Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment is a question of law that we review for correctness, granting no deference to the lower court's legal conclusions. Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel, Inc., 2002 UT 62, ¶ 14, 52 P.3d 1179.

ANALYSIS

¶ Utah's employment law presumes that all employment relationships entered into for an indefinite period of time are at-will, where the employer or the employee may terminate the employment for any reason (or no reason) except where prohibited by law. Rackley v. Fairview Care Ctrs., Inc., 2001 UT 32, ¶ 12, 23 P.3d 1022 (citing Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 400 (Utah 1998)) (further citations omitted). The presumption of validity given to an employer's decision to discharge an employee may be overcome by demonstrating that

(1) there is an implied or express agreement that the employment may be terminated only for cause or upon satisfaction of [some] agreed-upon condition; (2) a statute or regulation restricts the right of an employer to terminate an employee under certain conditions; or (3) the termination of employment constitutes a violation of a clear and substantial public policy.

Fox v. MCI Communications Corp., 931 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted). An employee's discharge for a reason that contravenes a clear and substantial public policy gives rise to a cause of action in tort. Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Utah 1992).

¶ 8 The general rule that the employer-employee relationship is presumed to be at-will is fully integrated into our common law. See Fox, 931 P.2d at 859

; Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 53-54 (Utah 1991); Berube v. Fashion Ctr., Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989); Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 1979). By contrast, the public policy exception is a relatively recent offspring of the at-will doctrine. Remarking on the immature developmental state of our public policy exception jurisprudence, we have stated:

While the term "clear and substantial" adds little by way of specific guidance, a more precise definition of the term must await the time when this Court has had sufficient experience with a number of cases so that we can deduce from our experience more precise standards that give specific content to the term "public policy."

Fox, 931 P.2d at 860.

¶ 9 Owing to the stability and predictability afforded employers and employees by the at-will rule, we have been justifiably wary of brushing broad public policy landscapes on the canvas of these cases, electing instead to limit the horizon of these cases by their facts. We have, however, outlined four categories of public policies eligible for consideration under the exception. These are:

(i) refusing to commit an illegal or wrongful act, such as refusing to violate the antitrust laws; (ii) performing a public obligation, such as accepting jury duty; (iii) exercising a legal right or privilege, such as filing a workers' compensation claim; or (iv) reporting to a public authority criminal activity of the employer.

Ryan, 972 P.2d at 408 (citations omitted).

¶ 10 The third category of conduct, exercising a legal right or privilege, poses analytical challenges different from, and generally greater than, the others. An employer owes a duty to an employee, independent of any duty imposed by the contract of employment, not to exploit the employment relationship by demanding that an employee choose between continued employment and violating a law or failing to perform a public obligation of clear and substantial public import. Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1284.⁴ The employer's legal duty emanates from the recognition that the extortionate use of termination to coerce an employee to commit unlawful acts or avoid public obligations serves no legitimate economic objective and corrodes civil society.

¶ 11 By contrast, an employer's insistence that an employee relinquish a legal right or privilege, even a right or privilege which carries strong public policy credentials, will not expose the employee to possible criminal penalties or other legal sanctions. In most cases, such demands by an employer will not thrust the employee between conflicting imperatives of wage earning and responsible citizenship. The analysis of whether the public policy exception applies to a particular legal right or privilege will frequently require a balancing of competing legitimate interests: the interests of the employer to regulate the workplace environment to promote productivity, security, and similar lawful business objectives, and the interests of the employees to maximize access to their statutory and constitutional rights within the workplace. When an employee, like the employees here, seeks protection within the exercise of a legal right or privilege category of the public policy exception, both the employer and the employee may appeal to public policy in aid of their cause.

¶ 12 "Public policy" is the label we attach to those shared expectations and standards of conduct which have acquired both widespread and deeply held allegiance among the citizenry generally. Public policy emanates from, and is shaped by, many forces, including, for example, religious doctrines, political ideologies, scientific discoveries, demographic shifts, and the ever-expanding pace and power of communication. We confer the elevated status of a public policy on a right that we have deemed essential to our way of life, the architecture of the institutions of government, or the distribution of governmental power. Our most fundamental and least ephemeral expressions of public policy are found in the Utah Constitution.

¶ 13 Accordingly, those who claim, like the employees in this case, that the right to keep and bear arms is a clear and substantial public policy can point to the right's impressive constitutional and statutory pedigree. Article I, section 6 of the Utah Constitution states: "The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms." Utah Const. art. I, § 6.

¶ 14 The legislature has exercised its article I, section 6 power to enact numerous statutes defining the scope of the lawful use and possession of firearms.⁵ One statutory provision among the corps of firearms laws offers more than ample evidence that, despite its muscular claim to be one of our state's clear and substantial public policies, the right of an employee to keep and bear arms cannot supplant the right of an employer to regulate the possession of firearms by employees within the workplace environment.⁶ ¶ 15 During its 2004 annual general session, the legislature enacted a chapter of the Utah Code known as the "Uniform Firearms Laws." Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-98-101, -102 (2004).⁷ This statute states:

(1) The individual right to keep and bear arms being a constitutionally protected right under Article I, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution, the Legislature finds the need to provide uniform civil and criminal firearm laws throughout the

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