Hansen v. Barrett

• Decision Date: 26 May 1960
• Docket Number: No. 5-60-Civ-15.,5-60-Civ-15.
• Parties: Thorwald HANSEN, Plaintiff, v. Susan BARRETT, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

183 F. Supp. 831

Thorwald HANSEN, Plaintiff, v. Susan BARRETT, Defendant.

No. 5-60-Civ-15.

United States District Court D. Minnesota, Fifth Division.

May 26, 1960.

Paul J. Louisell, Duluth, Minn., for plaintiff.

Reavill, Jenswold, Neimeyer & Johnson, by John D. Jenswold, Duluth, Minn., for defendant.

DEVITT, Chief Judge.

The defendant has moved for summary judgment in this action for wrongfully inducing a breach of contract. The determinative issue, however, as conceded by the defendant, is whether the complaint states a claim for relief. The complaint alleges:

"Plaintiff, during the life of one Clara E. Pastoret, entered into an agreement with her whereby she retained plaintiff as her attorney during her life to assist her in legal and business matters and, inter alia, made said agreement binding upon the executors of her estate and also executed her Will wherein plaintiff was appointed contingent Co-Executor and sole attorney for her estate.

"Plaintiff accepted said retainer and performed his duties under said contract until defendant being informed and knowing of said contract, wrongfully, illegally, wilfully and maliciously coerced, persuaded and induced said Clara E. Pastoret to breach said contract and to prevent plaintiff from carrying out his duties thereunder and to retain new counsel.

"On May 28, 1956, said Clara E. Pastoret died and left an estate. * * * The primary executor in the Will of decedent hereinabove referred to predeceased plaintiff.

"Solely as a result of defendant's wrongful conduct said other counsel acted as attorney for said decedent during her life after her breach of said contract and as attorney for her estate, instead of plaintiff, and plaintiff was not appointed as Co-Executor of said estate."

The complaint then asks as damages the reasonable charge for probating the estate and protecting it in litigation of $27,000, the reasonable fee as coexecutor of $5,500, and the reasonable value of necessary legal services required by decedent during her remaining life of $5,000. The plaintiff also asks for $15,000 as exemplary damages.

The defendant's main argument is that contract between the plaintiff and the decedent is void as against public policy, and that no tort action can be maintained for inducing the breach of such a contract. The plaintiff's position is that the validity of the contract is immaterial because the "plaintiff's recovery is predicated exclusively upon defendant's wrongful interference with his business relationship with decedent which * * * would have continued regardless of formal contract status."

The contract here is not incorporated in the complaint except by way of summary in the first paragraph. Plaintiff, however, has supplied us with a copy of the contract, which in pertinent part reads:

"Agreement for Retainer

* * * * * *

"Now, Therefore, First party hereby retains second party as her attorney, and second party agrees to act as such attorney in consideration of an annual retainer of Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00); it being contemplated that this agreement shall continue for a period of, at least, three years, and ultimately for the lifetime of first party.

"In consideration of said retainer, it is agreed that second party shall prepare first party's Income Tax Returns and shall advise first party as to conventional and routine legal matters.

"It is agreed that this retainer shall not cover unusual or extraordinary services. If such services are desired and performed, additional compensation shall be paid to second party. And second party, on his part, agrees that Frank Wade, brother of first party, shall have the right to determine the value of such additional services, if any, and to determine the amount of the fee to be paid therefor.

* * * * * *

"It is the purpose and intention of first party that this agreement shall be binding upon the Executors of the estate of first party * * *."

The agreement then goes on to recite "for the information of the Court," that she has executed a will naming certain executors of her choice and that certain beneficiaries have been intentionally excluded, and that

"It is the purpose of this agreement that first party receive legal guidance to avoid loss and litigation during her lifetime, and the retention of second party as attorney for her estate is to insure that the Executors be guided by counsel with

...