Hansen v. Hansen, 13985

• Decision Date: 25 June 1975
• Docket Number: No. 13985,13985
• Citation: 537 P.2d 491
• Parties: Raymond C. HANSEN, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Mary J. HANSEN, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 491

537 P.2d 491

Raymond C. HANSEN, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Mary J. HANSEN, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 13985.

Supreme Court of Utah.

June 25, 1975.

Richard M. Taylor, Spanish Fork, for defendant-appellant.

Allen K. Young of Stott & Young, Provo, for plaintiff-respondent.

MAUGHAN, Justice:

An appeal from a decree granting a divorce to the plaintiff husband raises two points for our consideration, viz., that the findings of fact are insufficient to support a decree of divorce, the court abused its discretion in the amount of alimony awarded. The determination of these points is made in that order.

The foundation for the first assignment of error is that the acts of defendant, against plaintiff, (which the findings set forth as cruel conduct causing plaintiff great mental distress and suffering), are not sufficient to sustain a decree of divorce. Defendant claims this is so, because acts constituting cruel conduct sufficient to cause great mental distress and suffering must be aggravated and more severe when directed toward the husband than when directed toward the wife.

Hyrup v. Hyrup ¹ is cited as authority for that claim. In that opinion the court cited Doe v. Doe, ² wherein it was said:

'The adjudged cases show that courts, on the ground of cruelty, grant the wife a decree on much less evidence than they do the husband. That rests on sound principles, for acts and conduct on the part of a husband may well constitute cruelty to the wife causing her great mental distress, when similar acts and conduct on her part may not constitute cruelty to him, or cause him great mental distress. Before a decree is granted the husband on such ground, it ought to be a somewhat aggravated case.'

Commenting further: 'Measured by such standard we think the evidence in the case at bar wholly insufficient to justify a decree of divorce upon the grounds of cruelty.'

The concept expressed by Hyrup is that of another era, and is no longer in accord with our law. Our society has changed a great deal in the last fifty years, and our legislatures responding to these societal changes have modified our divorce laws several times, and in ways which render Hyrup and others like it anachronisms. Further, 30--3--2, U.C.A.1953, as amended, provides:

The husband may in all cases obtain a divorce from his wife for the same causes and in the same manner as the wife may obtain a divorce from her husband. (Emphasis added.)

The court below found that the cruel conduct consisted of defendant harassing plaintiff on numerous occasions, causing arguments over income tax payments, the repair of defendant's property, the sale of the California property and other matters, all of which caused plaintiff great mental distress and suffering; and all of which occurred since a decree of separate maintenance was entered on the 29th day of August, 1972. Plaintiff presented expert medical testimony, which indicated that plaintiff suffered mental anguish as a reaction to this marital discord.

This court has held that whether the conduct complained of constitutes mental cruelty must be ascertained from the facts of each case. The conduct and the resulting mental distress must be evaluated in light of the sensibilities of the individual party, against whom the conduct is directed; for it will vary according to the individual's intelligence, refinement, and delicacy of health. The ultimate determination must realistically depend upon the effect of the conduct upon the complaining party. ³

The instant record discloses no basis upon which it could be said that the facts adduced...