Hansen v. Lowe

• Decision Date: 01 February 1940
• Docket Number: 6716
• Citation: 100 P.2d 51,61 Idaho 138
• Parties: MARY HANSEN, Appellant, v. Dr. CHARLES R. LOWE, ASSOCIATED INDEMNITY CORPORATION, a Corporation, and NEW YORK CASUALTY COMPANY, a Corporation, Respondents
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

100 P.2d 51

61 Idaho 138

MARY HANSEN, Appellant, v. Dr. CHARLES R. LOWE, ASSOCIATED INDEMNITY CORPORATION, a Corporation, and NEW YORK CASUALTY COMPANY, a Corporation, Respondents

No. 6716

Supreme Court of Idaho

February 1, 1940

FALSE IMPRISONMENT-INSANE PERSON-COMMITMENT, SUFFICIENCY OF.

1. Where decisive question of whether order of commitment justified medical superintendent of state insane asylum in holding patient beyond certain date, thereby absolving him from charge of false imprisonment, was before Supreme Court on appeal from order granting new trial after verdict in favor of patient, patient was not prejudiced by granting of new trial before denial of motion for judgment non obstante veredicto.

2. Where order granting new trial was not entered until after oral argument and submission of written briefs, plaintiff was not prejudiced because court granted new trial before denying motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, notwithstanding that she was allegedly taken by surprise.

3. A ministerial officer sued for false imprisonment is protected by process fair on its face, issued by a court having such jurisdiction of person and subject matter as to justify its ordering the confinement of the person on the charge, which was, or intended to be, or was attempted to be, stated in the process.

4. Process which, though defective, irregular, or imperfect, if not void but merely voidable, and issued by a court having jurisdiction, will protect against a suit for damages for false imprisonment.

5. A ministerial officer need not look behind process which comes to him, to avoid charge of false imprisonment.

6. Whatever irregularity or lack or difference appeared in order of commitment in so far as it recited charge on which patient had been ordered to district court by justice of peace for examination would not bind medical superintendent of state insane asylum, so as to subject him to charge of false imprisonment for holding patient beyond certain period. (I C. A., secs. 64-201 to 64-210, 64-216.)

7. The district court has jurisdiction to commit for insanity or a disordered mind. (I. C. A., secs. 64-201 to 64-210, 64-216.)

8. On a charge of false imprisonment, the sufficiency of the commitment is not to be tested with same strictness as on an appeal or habeas corpus, and the mere fact that in such proceedings, or any other, commitment might be held bad would not militate against its efficacy as protection from liability in suit for false imprisonment.

9. Medical superintendent of state insane asylum upon receiving patient at hospital was under duty to patient, as well as to the public, to determine from face of commitment what patient was committed for, and for what mental condition and length of time he should retain her in his custody.

10. An order of commitment which recited that examination was for inebriety, but which showed that subject of examination was represented by an attorney and stated that court found her to be so far disordered in mind as to be dangerous to health persons, or property, though ambiguous, was capable of being reasonably construed to authorize holding the one committed as a person disordered in mind, and hence medical superintendent of state insane asylum and his bondsmen were not liable for false imprisonment, for holding of patient after expiration of maximum period authorized for confinement of inebriates. (I. C. A., secs. 64-201 to 64-210, 64-216.)

APPEAL from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, for Bingham County. Hon. Guy Stevens, Judge.

Appellant sued respondents for damages for false imprisonment. Trial by jury resulted in a verdict for appellant and she appeals from an order granting a new trial. Affirmed.

Affirmed. Costs awarded to respondent.

A. S. Dickinson and Ariel L. Crowley, for Appellant.

A commitment which expresses no term of detention, where expression of a term is required by express statute, is not regular on its face, and affords no protection. (Lee Lim v. Davis, 75 Utah 245, 284 P. 323, 76 A. L. R. 460; annotation, 76 A. L. R. 460; 76 A. L. R. 507; 8 R. C. L. 259 et seq.; Ex parte Cox, 3 Idaho 330, 32 P. 197, 95 Am. St. 29; Phillips v. Morrow, 213 Ala. 139, 104 So. 260, 40 A. L. R. 285.)

The time of detention, to make process regular in inebriety cases, must be expressed, in the interests of liberty, and not as a term of imprisonment or confinement as a punishment. The rule is much more liberal in favor of individual rights in case of inebriety, since there is no conviction of an offense, but mere paternalistic protection and treatment contemplated.

In order to construe the process to be regular, where the term is not expressed in the commitment, the statutory maximum should be read into the mittimus. (In re Setters, 23 Idaho 270, 128 P. 1111; State v. Lottridge, 29 Idaho 822, 162 P. 672; St. Louis v. Karr, 85 Mo.App. 608.)

J. H. Andersen and S. T. Lowe, for Respondents.

A process which is substantially in the prescribed form and issued by a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the person is fair on its face and provides protection to the officer who executes it. (Marks v. Sullivan, 9 Utah, 12, 33 P. 224, 20 L. R. A. 590; Erskine v. Hohnbach, 14 Wall. 613, 614, 20 L.Ed. 745; Pankewicz v. Jess, 27 Cal.App. 340, 149 P. 997; Phillips v. Morrow, 213 Ala. 139, 104 So. 260, 40 A. L. R. 285, and annotations; Jennings v. Thompson, 54 N.J.L. 55, 22 A. 1008.)

A sheriff or other ministerial officer is justified in the execution of and must execute all processes and orders, regular on their face and issued by competent authority, whatever may be the defect upon which they were issued. (I. C. A., sec. 30-1713; Hill v. Joseph, 58 Idaho 267, 72 P.2d 283; Peterson v. Merritt, 24 Idaho 324, 137 P. 526.)

GIVENS, J. Morgan and Holden, JJ., concur. AILSHIE, C. J., Budge, J., Dissenting.

OPINION

GIVENS, J.

April 29, 1931, appellant was committed to the insane asylum at Blackfoot (officially known as State Hospital South, sec. 64-201, I. C. A.) by a judge of the district court for Ada county. Appellant was held at the institution until October 3, 1937. At the time she was committed respondent, Dr. Charles R. Lowe, was medical superintendent of said hospital, and so continued until June 13, 1937.

May 31, 1938, appellant sued herein Lewis Williams as Commissioner of Public Health in charge of said hospital during the period of her incarceration, his bondsmen, Dr. Lowe as medical superintendent, his bondsmen, and Mary G. Holland, matron at the institution during such period, for false imprisonment. January 5, 1939, when the case was called for trial, on plaintiff's motion the action was dismissed as against Lewis Williams, his bondsmen, and Mary G. Holland.

Upon trial of the cause the jury returned a verdict in favor of appellant and against respondent Lowe for $ 3,000, against his sureties, the Associated Indemnity Corporation for $ 2,640 and the New York Casualty Company for $ 360.

Judgment was entered January 7, 1939, and January 14, 1939, respondents served and filed motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, notice of intention to move for a new trial, and motion for a new trial, the latter as follows:

"Come now the defendants, and each of them, and move the Court to set aside the verdict rendered in the above entitled action and the judgment entered thereon and to grant a new trial in the above entitled cause, in the event that the Court refuses to grant a judgment on behalf of the defendants notwithstanding the verdict, for the reasons and upon the grounds stated and set forth in the Notice of Intention to Move for a new Trial filed herein.

"This Motion is based upon the minutes of the Court, the pleadings, records and files in said action, and the Reporter's notes of all of the proceedings had and taken at the trial of said Cause.

"Dated this 14th day of January, 1939."

April 1, 1939, after final submission of the motions by both parties, the trial court granted a new trial and April 10, denied the motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, thus:

"This cause having been heretofore submitted to the court upon the motion of the defendants and each of them for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and having been briefed and argued verbally by respective counsel, and submitted to the court, and the court being fully advised in the premises, and the court having heretofore and on the 1st day of April, 1939, entered order granting a new trial in this case,

"IT IS ORDERED BY THE COURT that the motions of the defendants Charles R. Lowe, Associated Indemnity Corporation, a corporation, and New York Casualty Company, a corporation, be, and the same are severally denied.

"DATED April 10th, 1939.

"GUY STEVENS,

"District Judge."

Appellant's first assignment of error is that because the court granted the new trial before denying the motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, she was thus prejudiced:

"1. If the judgment non obstante had been granted, a new trial would be obviated, and even if an appeal were taken, it would be on the merits, eliminating the expense of retrial and of two appeals.

"2. If the order granting a new trial was properly entered, the motion for judgment non obstante still remains undetermined, as appears probable, by exhaustion of the jurisdiction of the court.

"3. The appellant is taken off her guard and by surprise, having never been informed by any notice, order or intimation, that the court proposed to pass upon the motion for a new trial without the consent of counsel for either side, before determination of the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict."

Irrespective of when, with relation to each other, the motion for judgment notwithstanding the...