Hansen v. Roberts

• Decision Date: 16 April 2013
• Docket Number: No. 38904.,38904.
• Citation: 299 P.3d 781,154 Idaho 469
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: Larry HANSEN, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Matthew ROBERTS, Defendant–Respondent.

154 Idaho 469

299 P.3d 781

Larry HANSEN, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Matthew ROBERTS, Defendant–Respondent.

No. 38904.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, January 2013 Term.

April 16, 2013.

Gordon Law Firm, Inc., Idaho Falls, for appellant. Brent Gordon argued.

Powers, Tolman, PLLC, Twin Falls, for respondent. Jennifer K. Brizee argued.

BURDICK, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from the Bonneville County district court by Larry Hansen (Hansen). Hansen was involved in an automobile accident with the respondent Matthew Roberts (Roberts). At trial, Hansen sought to recover damages for his injuries and Roberts sought to recover property damage for his vehicle. The jury found Hansen to be 90% at fault and awarded Roberts damages for his vehicle. Hansen now appeals the Bonneville County district court's decision to allow Roberts's experts, an accident reconstructionist and a biomechanical engineer, to testify. Hansen also appeals the district court's ruling that he waived his objections to Roberts's deposition testimony. Finally, Hansen appeals the district court's decision to grant Roberts's motion in limine so far as it limited him from asking whether prospective jurors or one of their family members were or had ever been employed by an insurance carrier.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Hansen and Roberts were in a car crash that caused injuries to Hansen and property damage to Roberts's vehicle. Hansen was making a right hand turn into a business parking stall when Roberts hit the passenger side of his vehicle while attempting to pass Hansen on the right.

On May 26, 2009, Hansen filed a complaint against Roberts to recover damages for the injuries he sustained in the car accident. Three months later Roberts filed a small claims complaint for the damage to his car. Pursuant to a stipulation between the parties, these two matters were consolidated into one case.

A jury trial was held on October 19, 2010. Hansen was able to present his entire case on this first day of trial. After the conclusion of the first day of trial, Roberts received news that a matching liver had been found for him. The court continued the trial and the second day of trial was held on December 15, 2010. Because of Roberts's condition following the transplant, he was not able to appear in court and the parties arranged to have his trial testimony videotaped. Both parties made objections during Roberts's testimony, which were included on the video with the understanding that the court would rule on these objections before trial. On the second day of trial, Hansen moved to raise the objections he made in Roberts's deposition testimony before the video was played for the jury. The court concluded that Hansen had waived these objections by not presenting them at the pretrial conference when the court addressed Roberts's objections. Hansen also sought to exclude Roberts's expert testimony from Scott Kimbrough, an accident reconstructionist, and John Droge, a biomechanical engineer, as untimely and insufficient. The court heard argument from both parties and ruled that the experts would be allowed to testify.

Following trial, the jury returned a verdict finding both parties at fault and attributing 90% of the negligence to Hansen and 10% of the negligence to Roberts. The trial court then entered a judgment awarding Roberts $3,399.14 in damages.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Roberts to introduce expert testimony from an accident reconstructionist and a biomechanical engineer.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that Hansen waived the right to object at trial to the introduction of portions of Roberts's deposition.

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by partially granting Hansen's motion in limine to limit references to insurance during voir dire and trial.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"When reviewing the trial court's evidentiary rulings, this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard." Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 871, 136 P.3d 338, 342 (2006). "These include trial court decisions admitting or excluding expert witness testimony, and excluding evidence on the basis that it is more prejudicial than probative." Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 50–51, 995 P.2d 816, 820–21 (2000) (internal citation omitted). The scope of voir dire examinations is also within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Bitz, 93 Idaho 239, 244, 460 P.2d 374, 379 (1969). To determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion, this Court considers whether the district court: (1) perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion consistent with applicable legal standards; and (3) reached its decision through the exercise of reason. Chapman v. Chapman, 147 Idaho 756, 760, 215 P.3d 476, 480 (2009). Even where a trial court's evidentiary ruling is an abuse of its discretion, the ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless the admission or exclusion of evidence affected a substantial right of the party. I.R.C.P. 61.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Roberts to introduce expert testimony from an accident reconstructionist and a biomechanical engineer.

Hansen challenges the trial court's admission of Roberts's expert testimony in three ways: (1) Roberts's pretrial expert disclosures were untimely and insufficient; (2) the testimony invaded the province of the jury; and (3) there was a lack of foundation to support the opinions because they were not scientifically reliable.

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting expert testimony disclosed after the court's scheduling deadline.

Hansen claims that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Roberts to introduce testimony from expert witnesses when Roberts violated the trial court's scheduling order and failed to make timely and sufficient pretrial disclosures pursuant to discovery requests.

In this case, the district court issued an order requiring disclosure of expert witnesses at least 90 days before trial (or by July 21, 2010) and that discovery should be completed 70 days before trial (or by August 9, 2010). However, the court included the following footnote with respect to these deadlines:

The disclosure cut-off date, discovery completion date and motion dates are for the benefit of the Court in managing this case. They will be enforced at the Court's discretion. The disclosure date should not be relied on for discovery purposes. The disclosure, discovery and motion dates will not be modified by the Court without a hearing and assurance from parties that the modification will not necessitate continuance of the trial.

Therefore, the court recognized and established from the outset that enforcement of these deadlines was within its discretion and that these deadlines were put in place for the benefit of the court, not the parties.

Both parties present substantial argument in their briefs as to why their disclosures were timely and the other party's disclosures were untimely. Looking at the record, both parties produced somewhat untimely disclosures and discovery. Hansen argues that Roberts's disclosures were untimely and insufficient as to Scott Kimbrough, an accident reconstructionist, and John Droge, a biomechanical engineer. He points out that Roberts's responses to his Rule 26(b)(4) disclosure requests were submitted past the deadline the court set in its scheduling hearing and that Roberts did not disclose Droge until a few weeks before trial. Hansen is correct that some of Roberts's disclosures were made just weeks before trial began on October 19, 2010, but he ignores the fact that some of his own disclosures came just weeks before trial began. Roberts presented his entire case on October 19, 2010, and then the trial was delayed until December 15, 2010. Thus, Hansen had significantly more time to prepare for Roberts's experts than Roberts had to prepare for Hansen's experts.

Moreover, Hansen did not raise the issue of untimely disclosures until the second day of trial, which was almost two months after the trial began. When Hansen sought exclusion of the expert testimony based on untimely disclosures, he had actually been in possession of the disclosures for well over two months. Consequently, Hansen had significant time to prepare for Roberts's experts during the recess of trial. Because the trial court explicitly stated in its scheduling order that disclosure and discovery deadlines would be enforced at its discretion, both parties produced disclosures past this deadline, and Hansen had significant time to prepare for Roberts's experts, the trial court was within the bounds of its discretion when it ruled that Roberts's experts could testify.

2. Hansen did not preserve his objections to Kimbrough's testimony.

Hansen next argues that the court erred in allowing Kimbrough to testify because his testimony invaded the province of the jury. Hansen argues that Kimbrough invaded the province of the jury because he "did nothing beyond review the evidence that was presented to the jurors to reach his conclusions." Hansen also argues that Kimbrough invaded the province of the jury in the specific instance when he stated "that this accident was precipitated by a careless right-hand turn by [Hansen]." Roberts responds that Kimbrough did not invade the province of the jury because he provided information not known to the jury and not within the jury's common knowledge. Roberts further contends that Hansen waived his objections to Kimbrough's testimony because he failed to object to the questions asked during the testimony.

At the start of Kimbrough's testimony, Hansen asked the court if he could "make an objection to all of his testimony as to invading the province of the jury," but did not explain how Kimbrough's testimony invaded the province of the jury. The court noted Hansen's continuing objection and allowed...