Hansen v. State

• Decision Date: 05 January 1965
• Citation: 26 Wis.2d 238,131 N.W.2d 837
• Parties: Henry E. HANSEN, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE of Wisconsin, Defendant in Error.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 837

131 N.W.2d 837

26 Wis.2d 238

Henry E. HANSEN, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE of Wisconsin, Defendant in Error.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Jan. 5, 1965.

Jack L. Goodsitt, Milwaukee, for plaintiff in error.

George Thompson, Atty. Gen., William A. Platz, Asst Atty. Gen., Betty R. Brown, Asst. Atty. Gen., Madison, William McCauley, Dist. Atty., Milwaukee, for defendant in error.

GORDON, Justice.

'But a state cannot be expected to move with the celerity of a private business man; it is enough if it proceeds, in the language of the English chancery, with all deliberate speed.' Holmes, J., Commonwealth of Virginia v. West Virginia (1911), 222 U.S. 17, 19, 32 S.Ct. 4, 6, 56 L.Ed. 71.

The recitation of facts preceding this opinion demonstrates that most of the early delay in the defendant's being brought to trial was occasioned by the defendant. Indeed, the defendant's present counsel does not contend that there was any abuse of Hansen's right to a speedy trial during the period of time between the issuance of the warrant (December 5, 1959) and the request for a prompt trial (March 17, 1961).

Although the defendant was subsequently returned to custody because of other alleged crimes, he was originally released on bail with reference to the instant charges. He was admitted to bail on December 7, 1959, and the record does not disclose the date when he was returned to custody.

The question before us is whether the delay from March 17, 1961, to July 11, 1961, constitutes a denial of the defendant's right to a speedy trial under the Sixth amendment of the United States constitution or under sec. 7, art. I of the Wisconsin constitution. We conclude it does not.

At the hearing in the circuit court on March 17, 1961, the judge stated that he had no trial space until July 11, 1961. The defendant's counsel then remarked, 'That will be all right.' Later, when the defendant's counsel spoke of his client's eagerness to have to matters 'tried as soon as possible,' the trial judge suggested that the attorney 'keep in touch with me occasionally about the situation and I would be glad to shift it to an earlier date. * * *'

Upon this appeal, the defendant urges that once an accused has demanded a prompt trial, there should be an established time span after which he may not constitutionally be tried. While a mandate of that kind would perhaps simplify the problems concerning speedy trials, we consider that it is not so wise a rule as presently prevails in this state; such rele has evolved from several decisions of this court which will hereafter be noted. Unless a series of exceptions were annexed, the rule proposed by the defendant would not provide any latitude in the event of a justifiable delay such as may be caused by the illness of the judge or by the belated filing of a demand for a change of venue.

In State v. Carli (1957), 2 Wis.2d 429, 439, 86 N.W.2d 434, 438, 87 N.W.2d 830, we quoted the following:

"One accused of crime is not entitled to a trial immediately on his arrest or accusation, he must wait until a regular term of the court having jurisdiction of the offense with which he is charged. * * * Further, his right is not infringed by continuances in the discretion of the presiding judge, unless such discretion is arbitrarily exercised."

In Kopacka v. State (1964), 22 Wis.2d 457, 460, 126 N.W.2d 78, 80, this court said:

'Each case involving the issue of denial of a speedy trial turns on its own facts, although the general rule is stated to be that the right to a speedy trial is a right to be tried as soon as is reasonably possible. A motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial will be denied where the accused is tried as soon as the orderly conduct of the business of the court permits.' (Emphasis added.)

Applying the foregoing standards to the instant case, it is clear...