Hansen v. Utah State Retirement Bd.
| Decision Date | 27 August 1982 |
| Docket Number | 16560 and 16851,Nos. 16714,s. 16714 |
| Citation | 652 P.2d 1332 |
| Parties | Robert B. HANSEN, Attorney General, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD and Utah State Retirement Fund, et al., Defendants and Respondents. Robert B. HANSEN, Attorney General, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD and Utah State Retirement Fund; Utah State Industrial Commission and Utah State Insurance Fund; University of Utah, for and in behalf of the University of Utah Hospital for the University Medical Center; University Medical Center Trust Fund, First Security Bank of Utah, Trustee, Defendants and Respondents. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Bernard M. Tanner, William G. Gibbs, Richard L. Dewsnup, Asst. Attys. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.
William T. Evans, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Univ. of Utah.
Frank V. Nelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Industrial Com'n.
Mark A. Madsen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Retirement Bd.
James R. Black & Robert Moore, Salt Lake City, for State Ins. Fund.
Merlin Lybbert, Salt Lake City, for Medical Center.
The Utah Attorney General filed this suit seeking 1) a declaratory judgment that the Utah Constitution has conferred exclusive authority on him to act as legal adviser to the defendants, and 2) an injunction prohibiting defendants from employing counsel pursuant to various statutory provisions. The complaint alleges that the defendants are state agencies, state funds, quasi-state agencies, and trust and insurance funds. The Attorney General appeals adverse summary judgments.
The complaint characterizes the defendants as follows: Utah State Retirement Board, an independent state agency; Utah State Retirement Fund, a quasi-state agency fund; the Utah State Industrial Commission, a state agency; Utah State Insurance Fund, a quasi-state agency fund; the University of Utah Hospital, a state agency that established the Medical Center Trust Fund, which is administered by First Security Bank as Trustee, to provide medical malpractice insurance.
The Attorney General contends that he has exclusive constitutional authority to act as legal adviser to the defendants. The defendants contend to the contrary and assert that the Legislature has constitutionally authorized each agency to hire its own counsel. In addition, the Retirement Fund, Insurance Fund, and Medical Center Trust Fund affirmatively contend that they are in effect private trusts administering private trust funds, not public monies.
The basic issue to be resolved on this appeal is the meaning of the term "state officers" as used in Article VII, Sec. 16.
At statehood the office of Attorney General was established as an office within the executive branch of government by Article VII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. Meyers v. Second Judicial District Court, 108 Utah 32, 156 P.2d 711 (1945). As originally written, Article VII, Sec. 1 stated: "The Executive Department shall consist of Governor, Secretary of State, State Auditor, State Treasurer, and Attorney General ...." 1
The executive article, Article VII, was drafted to give effect to the fundamental principle that the organic law establishing the basic framework of government for this State should provide sufficient flexibility and latitude, within the limitations of certain fundamental restrictions, so that government could be organized to cope with the inevitable and unforeseeable exigencies that would arise. In part, the powers conferred on the constitutional executive officials were constitutionally based. However, the framers also conferred on the Legislature broad authority to shape the powers and authority of those officials as the needs of the times dictated. The 1980 amendments to the executive article reaffirmed, and to some extent extended, the same general principle setting forth the powers and duties of the constitutionally established executive officers. 2
Thus, except for the powers of the Governor, 3 the executive article tersely states in one section certain basic or core duties of each constitutional officer, and in addition, provides that the Legislature may add thereto certain powers and responsibilities. See, e.g., Sec. 14, specifying the duties of the Lieutenant Governor; 4 Sec. 15, specifying the duties of the Auditor and Treasurer; 5 and Sec. 17, specifying the duties of the Superintendent of Public Instruction. 6 Section 16 establishes the powers of the Attorney General in the following language:
The Attorney General shall be the legal adviser of the State officers, except as otherwise provided by this Constitution, and shall perform such other duties as provided by law.
The Attorney General contends that the term "state officers" as used in Sec. 16 encompasses all state employees. The defendants rely on Hansen v. Legal Services Committee of the Utah State Legislature, 19 Utah 2d 231, 429 P.2d 979 (1967), in support of the argument that the term "state officers" should be narrowly construed.
In Hansen the Court held that the Legislature, by appointing its own legal adviser to assist in the performance of the Legislature's constitutional duties, had invaded the constitutional authority of the Attorney General. The Court defined the term "state officers" as used in Article VII, Sec. 16 (then Article VII, Sec. 18) to mean the same as it means in Article XXIV, Sec. 12 of the Constitution. 7 The Court therefore held that since Senate and House members are referred to in Article XXIV, Sec. 12 as "state officers," the Attorney General had exclusive constitutional power under Article VII, Sec. 16 to act as legal adviser to the Legislature.
After a careful reanalysis, we are of the view that Hansen does not provide a sound basis for defining the term "state officers." Article XXIV, Sec. 12, the lynchpin of the Hansen opinion, provides:
The State Officers to be voted for at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be a Governor, Secretary of State, State Auditor, State Treasurer, Attorney General, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Members of the Senate and House of Representatives, three Supreme Judges, nine District Judges, and a Representative to Congress.
Clearly, Article XXIV, Sec. 12 was not intended to define the term "state officers" wherever it appeared in the Constitution. On its face, Article XXIV, Sec. 12 was intended only to provide for launching the new state government by specifying those "state officers" who were initially to stand for election. To construe Article XXIV, Sec. 12 to define the term "state officers" as used in other constitutional provisions and in entirely different contexts would violate basic rules of constitutional interpretation and would produce anomalous consequences violative of such basic principles as the doctrine of separation of powers. See Article V, Sec. 1. Clearly, it is as impermissible for the Attorney General to act as legal adviser to the judiciary in the performance of the judicial function, 8 as it is for him to act as legal adviser to the Legislature. Furthermore, the term "state officers" as used in Article XXIV, Sec. 12, includes the "Representative to Congress." That officer, however, is not an officer of state government at all, but of the federal government.
Finally, the specific holding in Hansen was overturned by a constitutional amendment ratified in 1972 that amended Article VI, Sec. 32 expressly to authorize the Legislature to employ its own legal counsel to assist in performing its legislative duties.
Although the constitutional power of the Attorney General is to act as "legal adviser" to "state officers," the text of Section 16 does not permit the term "state officers" to be read in its most expansive meaning to include all employees of state government. In the first place, the office of Attorney General is by virtue of specific constitutional language an executive department office. Article VII, Sec. 1. As such, it naturally follows that its constitutional duties should be limited to rendering advice to executive department officials. Furthermore, to interpret the phrase "state officers" to vest plenary authority in the Attorney General to act as legal adviser to all state officers and agencies would effectively nullify the power conferred by Section 16 on the Legislature to add to and shape the powers of the Attorney General. The result would be to undermine the intended flexibility accorded the Legislature to provide legal counsel to various state agencies whose functions may require special legal counsel or whose duties could result in conflicts of interest. The construction contended for by the Attorney General would also require the inadmissible conclusion that the Attorney General is to act as legal adviser to officials of both the legislative and the judicial branches of government.
Other provisions in the Constitution also use the term "state officer," but they do not require a more expansive definition of that term than is used in Article VII, Sec. 16. The term "state officers" is used in a variety of contexts, each for a different purpose and each requiring a construction in accord with that purpose. Cf. State v. Yelle, 52 Wash.2d 856, 329 P.2d 841 (1958). Thus, for example, Article VII, Sec. 18 uses the term broadly to provide that compensation should be paid those executive branch officers enumerated in Article VII, Sec. 1, as well as "such other State and District officers as provided for by law ...." 9 The terms "state officers" or "state office" are used in still another context with a much narrower meaning in Article VII, Sec. 9, which provides for interim appointments by the Governor under certain conditions. The term is also used with a restricted meaning in Article VII, Sec. 10, which provides for senatorial confirmation of certain state officers appointed by the Governor. In sum, the term "state officers" has been used in the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Cooper v. State of Utah
...Planning and Water Management Agency v. Central Utah Water Conservancy Dist., 690 P.2d 562, 567 (Utah 1984); Hansen v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 652 P.2d 1332, 1336 (Utah 1982); Matheson v. Ferry, 641 P.2d 674, 689 (Utah 1982); Shea v. State Tax Comm'n, 101 Utah 209, 120 P.2d 274, 275 (194......
-
State v. Nibert
...State ex rel. Comm'r of Transp. v. Medicine Bird Black Bear White Eagle, 63 S.W.3d 734 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001); Hansen v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 652 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1982); McLaughlin v. State, 161 Vt. 492, 642 A.2d 683 (1994); Commonwealth ex rel. Beales v. JOCO Found., 263 Va. 151, 558 S.E.2d 280......
-
Hill v. Vanderbilt Capital Advisors, LLC
...v. Milwaukee Cnty., 199 Wis.2d 549, 552, 544 N.W.2d 888, 889 (Wis.1996)(treating public pension fund as a trust); Hansen v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 652 P.2d 1332, 1338 (Utah 1982) (explaining that various state retirement funds “administered as a common trust fund”); La. State Emps.' Ret. Sys.......
-
University of Utah v. Shurtleff
...were "beyond the power of legislative control." 295 P.2d at 371 (Crockett, J., concurring); see also Hansen v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 652 P.2d 1332, 1340 (Utah 1982) (recognizing that "the University of Utah ... enjoys a degree of constitutionally rooted independence" distinct from "an ......