Hansford v. District of Columbia

• Decision Date: 01 September 1990
• Docket Number: No. 150,150
• Citation: 617 A.2d 1057,329 Md. 112
• Parties: Thomas T. HANSFORD, Sr. et al. v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 112

329 Md. 112

617 A.2d 1057

Thomas T. HANSFORD, Sr. et al. v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

No. 150, Sept. Term, 1990.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Jan. 14, 1993.

Gary M. Sidell (Leslie G. Fein, Crowley, Hoge & Fein, P.C., all on brief), for petitioners.

Lutz Alexander Prager, Asst. Deputy Corp. Counsel (John Payton, Corp. Counsel, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, all on brief), for respondents.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, CHASANOW, JJ. and J. WILLIAM HINKEL, Administrative Judge of the Third Judicial Circuit of Maryland (Specially Assigned).

ELDRIDGE, Judge.

The principal issues in this case concern the authority of a Maryland court to exercise jurisdiction in a tort suit against the District of Columbia, where the District's allegedly tortious conduct occurred on a federal enclave within the State of Maryland, over which enclave the State had ceded "exclusive jurisdiction" to the United States.

In June 1987 Carl Sewanti Richardson escaped from the juvenile detention facility known as Oak Hill Youth Center, located near Laurel, in Anne Arundel County, Maryland. The facility is operated by the District of Columbia. During the time after his escape and before his recapture, Richardson killed Thomas T. Hansford, Jr., in Prince George's County, Maryland. Richardson was convicted in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, on August 3, 1988, of felony murder.

On August 15, 1988, the decedent's parents, Thomas T. Hansford, Sr., individually and as personal representative of the decedent's estate, and Mary Dell Hansford, instituted the present suit in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County against the District of Columbia, Mr. J.E. Neil Ollivierra, then Acting Superintendent of Oak Hill Youth Center, and Carl Sewanti Richardson. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the District of Columbia through its employees failed to "properly supervise and maintain custody and control" over Richardson and thereby negligently allowed him to escape from the Oak Hill Youth Center. It was also alleged that the District, by its employees at Oak Hill, was negligent in failing to "recapture [Richardson] in a timely manner." The District was alleged to be responsible, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, for the negligent acts of its employees.

Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that, at the time of Richardson's escape, the District of Columbia had a policy or custom of permitting escapees from the Oak Hill Youth Center to remain at large. The complaint stated that one of every three detainees was permitted to be missing from the facility. The plaintiffs argued that the District's negligent policy or custom of allowing Richardson to remain at large violated the decedent's civil rights by depriving him of his life without due process of law. The plaintiffs, therefore, claimed damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Finally, the complaint included an "assault and battery" count which applied only to the action against Richardson.

The plaintiffs, in asserting that the Circuit Court for Prince George's County could exercise jurisdiction in the case, relied on, inter alia, Maryland Code (1974, 1989 Repl.Vol.), §§ 3-902, 3-904, 6-101 and 6-103 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. ¹ They also stated that they had complied with the provision of District of Columbia law which requires that notice of intent to sue the District be filed within six months of the incident alleged. D.C.Code § 12-309 (1981).

The District filed, on the same day, both a motion to dismiss and an answer to the complaint. The motion to dismiss asserted, with regard to the District, a lack of jurisdiction over the person. The motion also claimed that Mr. Ollivierra was immune from suit and that the complaint failed to state a cause of action against either the District or Mr. Ollivierra.

Although the plaintiffs in their opposition to the motion to dismiss did not raise the issue, the circuit court, at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, sua sponte raised a question about the timeliness of the motion. Maryland Rule 2-322 provides in pertinent part as follows:

"PRELIMINARY MOTIONS

"(a) Mandatory.--The following defenses shall be made by motion to dismiss filed before the answer, if an answer is required: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (2) improper venue, (3) insufficiency of process, and (4) insufficiency of service of process. If not so made and the answer is filed, these defenses are waived.

"(b) Permissive.--The following defenses may be made by motion to dismiss filed before the answer, if an answer is required: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (3) failure to join a party under Rule 2-211, and (4) governmental immunity. If not so made, these defenses and objections may be made in the answer, or in any other appropriate manner after answer is filed."

Counsel for the District of Columbia and for Mr. Ollivierra told the court that he had filed the motion to dismiss prior to filing the answer. The docket entries, however, read as if the answer were filed first. The circuit court found that counsel had in fact filed the motion to dismiss before filing the answer.

The circuit court then heard arguments on the motion to dismiss. The attorney in the Office of the Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, who represented both the District and Mr. Ollivierra, contended that, under Maryland law, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the District of Columbia, a foreign municipal corporation. Counsel, relying on Phillips v. Baltimore, 110 Md. 431, 72 A. 902 (1909), argued that a municipal corporation can be sued only in the courts of the jurisdiction where it is situated. It was also claimed that Mr. Ollivierra was immune from suit because he was a public official engaged in discretionary duties.

The District and Mr. Ollivierra further argued that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because there was no special relationship between the plaintiffs and these two defendants giving rise to a special duty. They also maintained that there was no causal connection between the alleged negligence of these defendants and the death of Thomas T. Hansford, Jr., and that there was no basis in law for the § 1983 claim.

On September 8, 1989, the circuit court dismissed the action against the District of Columbia, holding that a municipal corporation could not be sued, in transitory actions, outside the jurisdiction in which it is located. The circuit court's holding was based entirely on Phillips v. Baltimore City, supra, 110 Md. 431, 72 A. 902, which involved venue principles and the construction of a venue statute.

The circuit court refused to dismiss any part of the action against Mr. Ollivierra. The court stated that more factual development was required before it could render a decision on Mr. Ollivierra's defense of governmental immunity. The court also held that more factual development was needed before it could rule on the arguments that Mr. Ollivierra and the District owed no duty to the plaintiffs, that there was no causal connection between the death and alleged negligence of these defendants, and that there was no basis in law for the § 1983 claim.

The plaintiffs noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals on October 6, 1989. On December 4, 1989 the circuit court certified as final the judgment in favor of the District of Columbia. Rule 2-602(b). ²

In its brief in the Court of Special Appeals, the District argued that it had complied with the filing requirements of Rule 2-322(a), and that the circuit court correctly held that, because the District was a municipal corporation, it could not be sued outside its boundaries. Although not raised in the circuit court, the District contended in the Court of Special Appeals that there was another rationale for affirming the dismissal of the complaint against the District. The District argued that Maryland's cession of exclusive jurisdiction over the land upon which Oak Hill Youth Center rests deprived the circuit court of its ability to exercise jurisdiction over acts and omissions occurring on that land. The District maintained that, although in 1943 Maryland expressly reserved jurisdiction over lands leased or ceded to the United States, this reservation expressly did not

" 'affect the jurisdiction and authority of the State over land or persons, property, and transactions on land that the United States or its unit has acquired on or before May 31, 1943 to the extent that the State ceded jurisdiction under ... Chapter 743, §§ 2 and 3, of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1906.' "

(District's brief at 14, quoting, Code (1984, 1992 Cum.Supp.), § 14-102(b) of the State Government Article.)

The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment, although for a different reason than that relied upon by the circuit court. Hansford v. District of Columbia, 84 Md.App. 301, 578 A.2d 844 (1990). The intermediate appellate court held that a Maryland court could not exercise jurisdiction over the District of Columbia in this case because the District's alleged negligence occurred on a federal enclave which was ceded prior to 1943.

The plaintiffs filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari raising the following three issues (although in a somewhat different order): (1) whether the trial court erred in granting the District's "motion to dismiss due to lack of personal jurisdiction where" the District had allegedly filed the motion after filing its answer; (2) whether the trial court erred in holding that the District, as a municipal corporation, could not be sued outside of the jurisdiction in which it is located; (3) whether the Court of Special Appeals erroneously affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint against the District on the ground that the trial court could not exercise jurisdiction where the...