Hansler v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Network

• Decision Date: 19 August 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–1772.,14–1772.
• Citation: 798 F.3d 149
• Parties: Deborah HANSLER, Appellant v. LEHIGH VALLEY HOSPITAL NETWORK.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

798 F.3d 149

Deborah HANSLER, Appellant

v.LEHIGH VALLEY HOSPITAL NETWORK.

No. 14–1772.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued on Jan. 13, 2015.

Filed: Aug. 19, 2015.

Samuel A. Dion, Esq., Argued, Dion & Goldberger, Philadelphia, PA, Counsel for Appellant.

Darren M. Creasy, Esq. Karyn Dobroskey Rienzi, Esq., A. James Johnston, Esq. Andrea M. Kirshenbaum, Esq., Argued, Post & Schnell, Philadelphia, PA, Glenn Guanowsky, Esq., Lehigh Valley Hospital Department of Legal Services, Allentown, PA, Counsel for Appellee.

Before: AMBRO, FUENTES, and ROTH, Circuit Judges.

SUR PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING

The petition for rehearing filed by appellee Lehigh Valley Hospital Network in the above-entitled case having been submitted to the judges who participated in the decision of this Court, it is hereby ORDERED that the petition for rehearing by the panel is granted. The opinion and judgment entered June 22, 2015 are hereby VACATED.^*

OPINION

FUENTES, Circuit Judge.

Deborah Hansler requested intermittent leave from her former employer, Lehigh Valley Health Network (“Lehigh Valley”), under the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA” or the “Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.¹ Specifically, Hansler submitted a medical certification requesting leave for two days a week for approximately one month. As alleged in the complaint, the medical certification refers to the length of her requested leave but not the nature or duration of her condition. A few weeks later, after she took several days off work, Lehigh Valley terminated Hansler's employment without seeking any clarification about her medical certification, as required by law. Lehigh Valley cited excessive absences and informed her that the request for leave had been denied. Hansler sued Lehigh Valley for violations of the Medical Leave Act, and the District Court dismissed the complaint on the basis that the medical certification supporting Hansler's request for leave was “invalid.” We conclude that, by alleging that Lehigh Valley terminated her instead of affording her a chance to cure any deficiencies in her medical certification, Hansler has stated a claim that Lehigh Valley violated the Medical Leave Act. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Hansler was hired by Lehigh Valley in 2011 to work as a technical partner. In early March 2013, Hansler began experiencing shortness of breath, nausea, and vomiting. At the time, the cause of these symptoms was unknown. On March 13, Hansler's physician completed a medical certification form “requesting intermittent leave at a frequency of 2 times weekly starting on March 1, 2013 and lasting for a probable duration of one month- or until about April 1, 2013.” App. 44. Hansler submitted the certification to Lehigh Valley as part of a formal request for leave under the Medical Leave Act. As a result of her condition, Hansler was unable to work on March 13, 14, 23, 24, and 25.

Without seeking further information about the medical certification from either Hansler or her physician, Lehigh Valley terminated Hansler at the end of her shift on March 28. The basis for Hansler's termination was absenteeism, including the five days she took off in March. Hansler reminded Lehigh Valley that she had requested time off under the Medical Leave Act, but Lehigh Valley informed her, for the first time, that her request had been denied. Following the last of her absences, Hansler learned of a letter dated March 26 explaining that her request for “leave of absence (FMLA) for the period of 3/1/13–3/11/13” was denied because her “condition presently does not qualify as a serious health condition under the criteria set forth by the [Medical Leave Act].” App. 45. In early April 2013, after her dismissal, Hansler received a diagnosis of diabetes

and high blood pressure. She alleges that these previously undiagnosed and untreated conditions are what caused her March absences.

Hansler sued Lehigh Valley under the Medical Leave Act for interfering with her substantive rights to medical leave and for terminating her in retaliation for seeking leave. In her complaint, Hansler alleges she has chronic serious health conditions and argues that Lehigh Valley improperly denied her request for leave without providing her an opportunity to cure her medical certification. The District Court granted Lehigh Valley's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. It concluded that Hansler's request for leave was defective because her medical certification indicated that her condition would last only one month, but the Medical Leave Act requires that a chronic serious health condition persist for an “extended period of time.” The District Court held that because the certification showed that Hansler was not entitled to leave, Lehigh Valley was not required to afford Hansler a cure period and was permitted to terminate Hansler for her subsequent absences. That Hansler was later diagnosed with diabetes

and high blood pressure was of no consequence. According to the Court, “[a]lthough the timing of events for plaintiff was, without question unfortunate, the fact remains that her diagnosis with diabetes and high blood pressure did not occur until after her leave request was denied and she was fired by defendant.” Hansler v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, No. 13–cv–03924, 2014 WL 1281132, at *10 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 28, 2014). Hansler filed this appeal.²

II.

Congress passed the Medical Leave Act “to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families” and “to entitle employees to take reasonable leave for medical reasons.” 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b). The Medical Leave Act carries out these objectives by providing that eligible employees are entitled to 12 workweeks of leave during any 12–month period if the employee has a “serious health condition” that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of her position.Id. § 2612(a)(1)(D). After a worker returns from leave, the worker is entitled to be reinstated to her previous position or an equivalent one. Id. § 2614(a)(1).

A “serious health condition” is one that involves inpatient care in a hospital or “continuing treatment by a health care provider.” Id. § 2611(11). In its implementing regulations, the Department of Labor defines “[c]ontinuing treatment by a health care provider” to include “chronic serious health condition[s]” that (i) “[r]equire[ ] periodic visits (defined as at least twice a year) for treatment by a health care provider,” (ii) “[c]ontinue[ ] over an extended period of time,” and (iii) “[m]ay cause episodic rather than a continuing period of incapacity (e.g., asthma

, diabetes, epilepsy, etc.).” 29 C.F.R. § 825.102.

Prior to taking leave, an employee must give her employer notice of the request for leave, “stat[ing] a qualifying reason for the needed leave.” Id. § 825.301(b). An employer may require its employees to support their requests for leave with a certification issued by a health care provider. 29 U.S.C. § 2613(a). A “sufficient” medical certification must state (1) the date on which the serious health condition began, (2) the probable duration of the condition, (3) relevant medical facts, (4) a statement that the employee is unable to perform the functions of her position, (5) the dates and duration of any planned medical treatment, and (6) the expected duration of the intermittent leave. Id. § 2613(b).

Significantly, the Department of Labor's regulations govern how employers are to respond to perceived deficiencies in employee notices generally, and in medical certifications in particular. While an employee seeking FMLA leave must “state a qualifying reason for the needed leave” and fulfill notice requirements, the employee “does not need to expressly assert rights under the Act or even mention the FMLA.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(b). Instead, in “any circumstance where the employer does not have sufficient information about the reason for an employee's use of leave, the employer should inquire further of the employee ... to ascertain whether leave is potentially FMLA-qualifying.” Id. § 825.301(a). In addition, an employer “shall advise an employee whenever the employer finds a certification incomplete or insufficient, and shall state in writing what additional information is necessary to make the certification complete and sufficient.” Id. § 825.305(c). A certification is “incomplete” if the “employer receives a certification, but one or more of the applicable entries have not been completed.” Id. A certification is “insufficient” if the “employer receives a complete certification, but the information provided is vague, ambiguous, or non-responsive.” Id. If the employer determines that a certification is either incomplete or insufficient, it may deny the requested leave on the basis of an inadequate certification. But it may only do so if it has “provide[d] the employee with seven calendar days (unless not practicable under the particular circumstances despite the employee's diligent good faith efforts) to cure any such deficiency.” Id.; see Hansen v. Fincantieri Marine Grp., LLC, 763 F.3d 832, 837 (7th Cir.2014) (“[T]he regulations do not authorize the employer to deny FMLA leave where the employee fails to provide a complete and sufficient certification but is not given the opportunity to cure the deficiency.”).

A.

Hansler's first claim is that Lehigh Valley interfered with her rights underthe Medical Leave Act by failing to afford her a chance to cure deficiencies in her medical certification. This claim is based on statutory text providing that employers may not “interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or attempt to exercise” rights granted under the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). Moreover, “[a]ny violations of the Act or of these regulations constitute interfering with” the exercise of an employee's rights. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b). To assert an interference claim, an employee must establish, among other things, that she was denied benefits under the Act. Ross v....