Hanson-Metayer v. Rach, 737
| Decision Date | 17 October 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 1657,No. 737,737,1657 |
| Parties | ELIZABETH HANSON-METAYER v. LESLIE RACH |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Circuit Court for Prince George's County
Case No. CAL16-35673 & CAL17-07312
UNREPORTED
Wright, Leahy, Zarnoch, Robert A., (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) JJ.
Opinion by Wright, J.
*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.
This consolidated opinion arises from a landlord-tenant dispute between appellants, Arthur Hawgood and Elizabeth Hanson-Metayer, and their Landlords, Leslie Rach and Aly Lo, appellees.1 Appellants alleged retaliatory action, marital discrimination, housing discrimination, disability discrimination, trespass, inclusion upon seclusion, breach of lease, rent escrow, and conspiracy, among various other claims.
After a bench trial, the Circuit Court for Prince George's County granted summary judgment against appellants, finding their claims to be baseless.
Appellants timely appealed and ask us to review several questions, which we have reduced to two:2
For the reasons to follow, we affirm the decision of the circuit court, and will remand this decision for the circuit court to elucidate its findings as to attorney's fees, and to attorney's fees for the retaliatory actions only.
In May 2016, appellants decided to separate, and Mr. Hawgood asked Ms. Hanson to move out of their home, which forced Ms. Hanson to find new housing for herself and the couple's four children. Ms. Hanson initially approached Ms. Rach about a property located on Adelphi Road. Ms. Rach informed Ms. Hanson that the property would be unsuitable for her and the children because it was located on a busy street. Instead, Ms. Rach and Mr. Lo, given the time sensitive nature of the situation, invited Ms. Hanson to rent the property, located at 3314 Gumwood Drive ("the Property"). When Ms. Rach inquired as to how many tenants would be living in the home, Ms. Hanson answered that she did not expect her husband, Mr. Hawgood, to be living at the home because of the separation. With that understanding, the parties signed the lease in late May which did not include Mr. Hawgood. Ms. Hanson and the children moved in on or about June 1, 2016.
Toward the end of the summer, Mr. Hawgood's home, managed by Streamline Management, allegedly flooded and that created an environment for the growth of toxic mold. Mr. Hawgood vacated the property and eventually negotiated a settlement with Streamline Management. During this time, appellants were working on repairing theirmarriage, and Mr. Hawgood moved into the Property with Ms. Hanson and the children.3 At this time, Mr. Hawgood was still not a named or signed party to the lease.
At the end of May, after Mr. Hawgood had moved into the home, Ms. Rach emailed Ms. Hanson inquiring about whether Mr. Hawgood had moved in, in addition to writing about other matters. Ms. Hanson responded by formally asking that Ms. Rach and Mr. Lo sign Mr. Hawgood to the lease. Ms. Rach responded that, unlike Ms. Hanson, the Landlords had not had the opportunity to properly vet Mr. Hawgood. Ms. Hanson responded that because Mr. Hawgood was admitted to "various state bars" and had TSA-precheck, the background check should be waived. The Landlords denied Ms. Hanson's request citing, in part, that Mr. Hawgood failed to pay rent at his prior residence with Streamline Management.4
On September 12, 2016, appellants filed their first complaint (the "September Complaint") against appellees alleging housing discrimination, retaliatory action, conspiracy, rent escrow, breach of contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and negligence.
On September 13, 2016, the hot water heater at the Property began malfunctioning and stopped working. Ms. Hanson contacted Mr. Lo after the heater had been serviced. According to Ms. Hanson, Mr. Lo refused to fix the water heater due to the complaint filed the day before.
On September 14, 2016, appellants filed a motion for an "Emergency Temporary Restraining Order," seeking repair of the hot water heater after alleging that appellees had "flatly refused" to fix the hot water heater. That same day, Ms. Rach petitioned for a Peace Order alleging that Mr. Hawgood had "entered my property 3 times since September 11, [2016,] coming to [the] door, asking for me, and accosted me by getting out of a vehicle with an accomplice after phoning to ask if I 'have children' and saying[,] 'you don't know who you are dealing with.'" The District Court of Maryland for Montgomery County granted the order, effective through September 21, 2016.5 The court ordered that Mr. Hawgood stay away from and refrain from contacting Ms. Rach and her daughter at school, Ms. Rach's place of employment, or their home. The parties reached a Settlement Agreement on September 21, 2016.
On September 22, 2016, Issac Marks, appellees' counsel, asked Alexander Hawgood6, appellants' counsel, to cease and desist from communication, as he was "essentially engaging in the unauthorized practice of law." Mr. Marks also let AlexanderHawgood know that appellees would be conducting inspections of the property on September 23, 2016, and that Mr. Hawgood, per the peace order, should not be present.
In October 2016, Ms. Rach began rejecting rent money from Mr. Hawgood, and in this same month, the appellees made their first Complaint for Repossession of Rented Property in the District Court of Maryland for Prince George's County.7 In the middle of October, Ms. Rach and Mr. Marks, inspected the property, in question, and found that it had a horrible stench, was messy, and that appellants had altered the fixtures. All conditions were violations of the lease.
On October 26, 2016, appellants filed their second-amended complaint alleging housing discrimination, Hyattsville disability discrimination, retaliatory actions, self - help eviction, conspiracy, rent escrow, breach of contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, contract reformation, trespass, and intrusion upon seclusion.
On October 27, 2016, appellants filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction in the circuit court to enjoin "[appellees] and the clerk of the district court [for Prince George's County] from filing and pursuing any claims in Maryland District Court for the breach of lease and failure to pay rent claims (the "October motion")."8 Appellants alleged that appellees were bringing claims againstthem in district court for failure to pay rent and breach of lease in order to nullify their constitutional right to a jury trial. Judge Erik H. Nyce of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, denied appellants' request for a Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") because it did not have "the authority to restrain somebody from going to a proper court of jurisdiction."
On November 16, 2016, appellees sent appellants a Notice of Default, outlining various violations of the lease terms: the number of occupants, the subletting to Mr. Hawgood, the failure to pay the water bill, and the removal of fixtures, including the smoke detector, the thermostat for the air conditioning unit, and the installation of television wall mounts.
Dissatisfied with Judge Nyce's findings, appellants filed a second motion for a preliminary injunction on or about November 22, 2016 (the "November motion"), Judge Leo Green of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County presiding, that was nearly identical to their October motion. Judge Green denied this motion after a December 20, 2016 motions hearing "for the same reasons as . . . given by the court on previous occasions [.]" Judge Green ruled that the district court had original jurisdiction over a landlord and tenant dispute.
In December 2016, the dispute came to a head. On December 8, 2016, appellees filed a Complaint for Repossession of Rented Property alleging a failure to pay rent due for December. On December 8, 2016, appellees sent appellants a 14-Day Notice of Termination of Tenancy, Demand to Vacate Premises, and Notice Regarding Security Deposit. Like the Notice of Default, appellees alleged various violations of the lease, thistime including a violation of the pet policy, failure to obtain evidence of renter's insurance, and the accumulation of clothing and debris around the premises. Around that same time, appellants also filed a motion for the special admission of appellants' counsel who was not a member of the Maryland bar.
On December 21, 2016, appellants filed an appeal of the December 20, 2016 order denying their November Motion for preliminary injunction. Appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on March 24, 2017, and the Court of Special Appeals granted appellees' motion on May 19, 2017, because neither the circuit court record nor docket had the circuit court's ruling as required by Md. Rule 2-601(b).
The following month, on January 6, 2017, Mr. Marks sent a letter to Mr. Hawgood stating that Mr. Hawgood's check for $1,850.00, the rental amount, was "not acceptable and is being returned to you [since] you previously attempted to submit a check on this or a similar out-of-state personal account on behalf of Ms. Hanson, and later stopped payment on the check."
On July 25, 2017, Judge Alves in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, held a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, a Motion for Summary Judgment.9 The court held a disposition hearing on August 3, 2017. Appellants' counseldid not appear, and the court gave its ruling, finding against appellants because there was no genuine dispute of material fact. Additional facts will be provided as they become relevant to our analysis.
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