Hanson v. Estate of Belden, 83-60

Decision Date09 September 1983
Docket NumberNo. 83-60,83-60
Citation668 P.2d 1331
PartiesKent A. HANSON, Executor and Personal Representative of the Estate of Donald P. Hanson, deceased, and Anna M. Hanson, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. The ESTATE OF Charles F. BELDEN, a/k/a Charles Franklin Belden, deceased, Appellee (Defendant).
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

John B. Scott, argued, Kathleen A. Hunt, and John E. Stanfield, argued, of Smith, Stanfield & Scott, Laramie, for appellants.

Thomas A. Fennell and Roy Stoddard, Jr., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment because plaintiffs' action was not filed within the thirty-day period provided in the Probate Code. We reverse and remand.

Appellants raise six issues of error:

"1. Did the 30 day limitation under § 2-7-718, Wyoming Statutes 1977, for filing suit ever become effective since the Appellee failed to send the notice of rejection by certified mail as mandated by that statute and by § 2-7-712, W.S.1977?

"2. Did the Trial Court fail to apply basic rules of equity in granting the Appellee's motion for Summary Judgment[?] In this regard, did the Court give proper effect to Iowa case law, which is the law of origin for the Wyoming Probate Code under the applicable decisions of this Court? Further, was summary judgment proper as to this issue?

"3. Does the Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel prevent the Appellee and/or its insurance carrier from relying on the Probate Code proviso that suit must be commenced within 30 days after denial of the claim?

"4. Did the Court err in its application of Rule 6 (WRCP) in its computation of time to file?

"5. Does § 2-14-202, W.S.1977, which allows 2 years in which to file a wrongful death suit, control the general 30 day limitation under the Probate Code?

"6. Is the Probate Code as it applies to this situation in violation of Article 1, Section 6 and Section 8 and Article 10, Section 4, of the Wyoming Constitution?"

Since we agree with appellant as to issue one, it is unnecessary to discuss the other five.

This case arises out of an automobile accident in which both Mr. Hanson and Mr. Belden were killed and Mrs. Hanson was severely injured. The probate of Mr. Belden's estate was commenced in the Sheridan County District Court on November 12, 1981. The first publication of the notice to creditors occurred on February 1, 1982. A timely creditor's claim was filed on behalf of the Hanson family for the wrongful death of Mr. Hanson and the injuries to Mrs. Hanson. On February 23, 1982, that claim was rejected by the personal representative of the Belden estate.

The notice of rejection of the creditor's claim was mailed regular mail (not certified) and received in the office of counsel for plaintiffs on February 25, 1982. On March 31, 1982, a civil action for wrongful death and personal injuries was filed by appellants against appellee's estate. This action was not filed within thirty days after actual receipt of notice of the rejection.

Section 2-7-712(d), W.S.1977, provides:

"When a claim has been filed with the clerk and is rejected in whole or in part, the personal representative shall immediately upon rejection notify the claimant by certified mail." (Emphasis added.)

When this statute is complied with, it triggers § 2-7-718, W.S.1977:

"When a claim is rejected and notice given as required, the holder shall bring suit in the proper court against the personal representative within thirty (30) days after the date of mailing the notice, otherwise the claim is forever barred." (Emphasis added.)

Therefore, we must answer the question whether a claim rejection sent by regular mail and received by claimant's attorney fulfills the notice requirements of § 2-7-712(d) in order to trigger § 2-7-718 and start the running of the thirty-day period within which the claim must be filed.

The district court granted summary judgment on the theory that the suit was not filed within the thirty-day period. The court stated that because the notice of rejection was not sent by certified mail as required by the statute, it was possible that the thirty-day period for filing did not commence to run until the notice was actually received on February 25, 1982. However, even using the date of receipt, rather than the date the letter was mailed, the action was not filed within the thirty days provided.

We hold that, notice having not been given by certified mail as required, the thirty-day period did not begin to run and the action is not barred. We note the rule of law that, generally, actual notice is a sufficient substitute for notice by mail and that defects in complying with technicalities can be ignored when actual notice is proved. However, in this situation, the thirty-day period for filing of a claim is so short, that strict compliance with the requirements of notice by certified mail ought to be required. The statute is clear and precise. The notice of rejection by certified mail to the claimant is not burdensome.

There are some practical reasons for requiring notice of rejection by certified mail. One is more likely to pay...

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3 cases
  • Accelerated Receivable Solutions v. Hauf
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • 15 Mayo 2015
    ...mail. In addition, certified mail avoids any question as to whether or when actual notice of rejection was received.Hanson v. Estate of Belden, 668 P.2d 1331, 1332 (Wyo.1983).[¶ 13] In the present case, it is clear from the face of ARS's complaint that the notice the Estate sent via certifi......
  • Estate of Reed, Matter of
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • 31 Enero 1989
    ...to meet the statutory mandate. Additionally, this situation is more egregious than the one this court faced in Hanson v. Estate of Belden, 668 P.2d 1331 (Wyo.1983) involving a similar matter in a slightly different context where strict compliance was required. The sufficiency of the notice ......
  • Zmijewski v. Wright
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • 19 Abril 1991
    ...73 U.S. at 396. This rule, since originally stated in 1867, remains foundational today for statutory construction. In Hanson v. Estate of Belden, 668 P.2d 1331 (Wyo.1983), this court held that the failure to fulfill the requirements of W.S. 2-7-712(d) prevents the triggering of W.S. 2-7-718......

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