Hanson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau
| Decision Date | 20 May 1933 |
| Docket Number | 6008 |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, Cole, J Remanded for further proceedings.
Thomas J. Burke, for appellant.
Under the provisions of § 18 of the Workmen's Compensation Act the bureau is vested with a continuous jurisdiction over all claims for compensation, including those which have been determined by the district courts upon appeal from the bureau's decision. Crandall v. Workmen's Comp Bureau, 53 N.D. 636, 207 N.W. 551.
The law allows interest only on the ground of contract, express or implied, for its payment or as damages for the detention of money, or the breach of some contract, or the violation of some duty, or where it is provided by statute. 33 C.J. 182.
The functions of the bureau are purely administrative in character, and in administering the act it is empowered fully and finally to determine all questions of fact, but none other. Craig v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 53 N.D. 649, 207 N.W. 555; Borginis v. Falk Co. 133 N.W. 209; Light v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 57 N.D. 487, 222 N.W. 952; Gotchy v. N.D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 49 N.D. 915; Zimmerman v Boynton, 59 N.D. 112, 229 N.W. 3; Clemons v. Helehan (Neb.) 72 N.W. 270; King v. Dekie, 53 Fla. 940, 43 So 586.
In case of error by acting beyond judicial power, the result is an usurpation, and not binding on anyone. Cowie v Strohmeyer (Wis.) 136 N.W. 956; Deming v. Nelson (S.D.) 210 N.W. 726.
A judgment sustaining the bar of limitations which had not been properly pleaded was "as fatally defective as if not supported by a verdict or findings." Satterlund v. Beal, 12 N.D. 122, 95 N.W. 518; Visscher v. Hudson River R. Co. 15 Barb. 37; Reddin v. Frick (S.D.) 223 N.W. 50.
Even though a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties if it proceeds to dispose of matters over which it is not authorized to act, or grant relief of a character which it has no authority to grant, its judgment is in that respect void. Glover v. Brown (Idaho) 184 P. 649; Windsor v. McVey, 93 U.S. 274, 23 L. ed. 914; Hardin v. Graham (S.D.) 159 N.W. 895.
A decree entered by the supreme court on a proceeding in error taken from an order not appealable, is void, and subject to collateral attack, though the proceeding in error was taken and the decree entered pursuant to the stipulation of the parties. John v. Parrotte (Neb.) 64 N.W. 363.
Lemke & Weaver, for respondent.
A question involved and expressly decided by the circuit court is res adjudicata, where the entire judgment is affirmed on appeal, though that question is not referred to, the decision of the lower court on the point not having been questioned. Ford v. Ford (Wis.) 59 N.W. 464; Stimson v. Stimson, 30 N.D. 78, 152 N.W. 133.
A valid judgment upon a question directly involved in a suit is conclusive as to that question in any other suit between the same parties. Pipan v. AEtna Ins. Co. 58 N.D. 435, 226 N.W. 498; Reko v. Moore, 44 N.D. 644, 176 N.W. 115; Hall v. Kalamazoo (Mich.) 104 N.W. 689; Spitzley v. Garrison (Mich.) 175 N.W. 390; Gerwein v. McDonnell, 54 N.D. 509, 209 N.W. 986; D.M. Osborne & Co. v. Stringham, 4 S.D. 593; Beran v. Tradesman Nat. Bank, 45 N.Y.S. 807; 4 C.J. 1093 and 1096.
The industrial accident board is not a court but is an administrative tribunal. Levangie's Case, 228 Mass. 213, 113 N.E. 200.
The very essence of judicial power is that, when a matter is once ascertained and determined, it is forever concluded, when it arises again under the same circumstances and conditions, between the same parties or their privies. State ex rel. Smith v. Kennedy, 83 N.W. 87; People v. Holiday (Cal.) 29 P. 54; People v. Detroit etc. R. Co. (Mich.) 121 N.W. 814; 15 R.C.L. 1029.
The opinion on appeal is the law of the case on questions discussed and determined. Hallowell v. McLaughlin (Iowa) 121 N.W. 1039.
An appellate court has no appellate jurisdiction over itself. Corning v. Troy Iron etc. Factory, 15 How. 451, 14 L. ed. 768.
After the expiration of the term at which a decision is made the court has no power to review or reverse its decision. Magwire v. Taylor, 17 Wall. 253, 21 L. ed. 576.
The state may be bound by a judgment against a public officer, but only with respect to a matter concerning which he is authorized to represent it. 34 C.J. 1027.
Doctrine of res judicata is applicable to a state as well as to subjects. Re Meinert (Iowa) 213 N.W. 938.
Birdzell, J. Burr, J., concurs. Nuessle, Ch. J. Christianson, J. Burke, J.
OPINIONUpon an appeal to the district court of Cass County from action of the board of compensation commissioners, the claimant Hanson obtained an award. From the judgment in his favor, an appeal was taken to this court. Hanson v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 60 N.D. 220, 233 N.W. 900. Upon that appeal the judgment was attacked upon the ground that no order had been made by the commissioners from which an appeal to the district court was authorized. No other question concerning the judgment or award of the district court was raised. This court affirmed the judgment. The judgment provided as follows:
"That the plaintiff have and does hereby have and recover from the defendant compensation at the rate of $ 20.00 per week from September 28, 1920, together with interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum and which compensation amounts to the sum of $ 12,281.10; further that he recover of the defendant his costs and disbursements as have been taxed and allowed by the Clerk of the above named Court in the sum of $ 332.50; further that the plaintiff recover from the defendant the sum of $ 500.00 as and for attorneys fees for his attorneys Lemke & Weaver, making a total judgment in the sum of $ 13,113.60 that the plaintiff does hereby have and recover of the defendant."
A new judgment was entered on the remittitur on January 5, 1931, for $ 13,113.60, plus $ 37 costs, together with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum on the prior judgment from December 26, 1929, until paid. Thereafter in January, 1931, the defendant paid a very substantial amount, apparently as compensation (the record before us is not clear as to the amount), and placed the plaintiff upon the "pension roll" for the payment of $ 20 per week for life but subject to the limitation in the Workmen's Compensation Act, which fixes $ 15,000 as the maximum amount payable from the fund under any award. The plaintiff brought the instant mandamus proceeding to compel the payment of the balance of the judgment and obtained a peremptory writ. The defendant appeals.
The basic contention of the appellant here is that the award made by the judgment of the district court, which was affirmed in this court, is subject to modification by the workmen's compensation commissioners to the end that it may be made to conform to the law in respect to matters embraced within it which were not questioned on the former appeal. More specifically, the appellant questions so much of the judgment as is represented by interest on unpaid compensation prior to the making of the award.
The appellant concedes that, if the action of the court in awarding interest was erroneous merely and did not transcend the jurisdiction of the court, the judgment became final; but it is argued that the court had no jurisdiction to impose interest and that, consequently, the judgment including it was to that extent void and is, hence, subject to collateral attack, though subsequently affirmed by this court. Upon the hypothesis that the foregoing contentions be not sustainable, the further contention is advanced that under the continuing jurisdiction, provided for in § 18 of the Compensation Act, the commissioners "have the right to review and disregard said judgment upon the matter of interest, or upon any other matter going to the administration of the act, except Hanson's right to participate in the fund."
Section 396a17, 1925 Supplement to the Compiled Laws of 1913, in providing for judicial review in cases where a claim is denied upon any ground going to the basis of the claimant's right, makes it the duty of the court to "determine the right of the claimant; and if it determines the right in his favor, (it) shall fix his compensation within the limits prescribed in this act;" and then it is provided that any final judgment so obtained shall be paid by the Workmen's Compensation Bureau out of the workmen's compensation fund in the same manner as awards are paid by such bureau. This language is so plain that argument is not needed to demonstrate that the jurisdiction of the court to fix compensation in any case properly before it is as extensive as the jurisdiction of the bureau. It does not contemplate additional proceedings before the bureau affecting matters determined in a final judgment. The duty of the bureau is to pay such judgment as it pays its own awards. We shall hereinafter consider the scope of the continuing jurisdiction of the bureau in such cases. The first question is the extent to which the judgment of the court is binding.
It is said that the act nowhere provides for the allowance of interest as part of the compensation to be awarded, and that hence the court, in awarding it, acted beyond its jurisdiction in that it did not fix the compensation "within the limits prescribed" by the act. The duty of the court to fix compensation necessarily involves a judicial determination of the limit prescribed for the case in hand and, inasmuch as the act defines the measure of the compensation, the court, in applying such measure, under the appellant's argument, determines a question of jurisdiction. If it be assumed, then, that the...
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