Hanson v. Trust Co. of Chicago

• Decision Date: 21 September 1942
• Docket Number: No. 26650.,26650.
• Citation: 380 Ill. 194,43 N.E.2d 931
• Parties: HANSON v. TRUST CO. OF CHICAGO.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

380 Ill. 194

43 N.E.2d 931

HANSON

v.TRUST CO. OF CHICAGO.

No. 26650.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 21, 1942.

Action by William T. Hanson against the Trust Company of Chicago, administrator of the estate of Edward Maskell, deceased, to recover for injuries sustained by the plaintiff, when an automobile in which he was riding collided with an automobile driven by the deceased. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court, 312 Ill.App. 261, 38 N.E.2d 365, affirmed the judgment, and the defendant appeals.

Judgments reversed, and cause remanded for new trial.Appeal from First Division, Appellate Court, First District, on Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; Walter T. Stanton, Judge.

Samuel Levin, of Chicago, for appellant.

C. D. Jones, of Chicago, for appellee.

MURPHY, Justice.

Plaintiff-appellee, William T. Hanson, recovered a verdict and judgment in the superior court of Cook county for $2,000 against the estate of Edward Maskell. It was to cover damages for personal injuries sustained by him when the automobile in which he was a passenger collided with the automobile driven by the deceased, Edward Maskell. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment and leave to appeal was granted.

The only question on this appeal is as to the giving of a peremptory instruction which omitted the requirement of law that before a plaintiff can recover the jury must find from the evidence that he was in the exercise of due care for his own safety.

The accident occurred at an intersection of two streets in the city of Chicago, where the traffic was moved by stop and go lights. There is a conflict in the evidence as to whether the car in which plaintiff was riding or the car driven by Maskell had the right of way. Plaintiff's evidence tends to prove that the Maskell car approached the intersection at an excessive rate of speed and drove into it without stopping, at a time when the traffic light was against it. Defendant-appellant's evidence tends to prove the car in which plaintiff was riding drove into the intersection without stopping when the signal lights were against it.

The Appellate Court found that the verdict of the jury on the question of negligence was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and concluded that the instruction in question, although erroneous, was cured by the giving of other instructions which contained a full statement as to the law of due care.

The instruction was as follows: ‘The jury are instructed if they find from the evidence in this case that the intersection of Belmont Avenue and Narragansett Avenue in the City of Chicago on the 21st day of May, 1939, was guarded by stop and go light; and if you further find that said lights aforesaid were in operation at the time of the occurrence herein sued on; and if you further find that at and immediately before the time of the occurrence herein complained about, the light was red as against the passage of the automobile of the defendant's intestate when he reached Belmont Avenue; and if you further find that the defendant's intestate, the driver of the car, was negligent in crossing Belmont Avenue against the red light, if you find that such was the case; and if you further find that in crossing against the red light that the defendant's intestate was the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff, then and in such an event you are instructed that the plaintiff may recover in this case, and you should find for the plaintiff.’

The effect of the instruction was to tell the jury that if they found from the evidence that the matters stated in the instruction had been proven, then they should find for the plaintiff and this without regard to what the evidence showed as to plaintiff's exercise of due care.

It is elementary that where an instruction directs a verdict, all the elements necessary to sustain such a verdict must be contained in the instruction. O'Day v. Crabb, 269 Ill. 123, 109 N.E. 724;Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Smith, 208 Ill. 608, 70 N.E. 628;Pardridge v. Cutler, 168 Ill. 504, 48 N.E. 125;Illinois Iron & Metal Co. v. Weber, 196 Ill. 526, 63 N.E. 1008. It was incumbent upon plaintiff to allege and prove that he was in the exercise of due care for his own safety at the time of the accident (Dee v. City of Peru, 343 Ill. 36, 174 N.E. 901;Carson, Pirie, Scott & Co. v. Chicago Railways Co., 309 Ill. 346, 141 N.E. 172;Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Oswald, 338 Ill. 270, 170 N.E. 247); and in omitting to...