Hansra v. Superior Court

Decision Date28 May 1992
Docket NumberNo. C012758,C012758
Citation7 Cal.App.4th 630,9 Cal.Rptr.2d 216
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesSurinder Singh HANSRA et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT of Yuba County, Respondent. Jesus MAGANA et al., Real Parties in Interest.

Douglas L. Smith, Caulfield, Davies & Donahue, Sacramento, for petitioners.

No appearance for respondent.

John T. Larimer, Jr., Marysville, for real parties in interest.

PUGLIA, Presiding Justice.

Petitioners Surinder Singh Hansra and Balbir Kaur Hansra seek a writ of mandate to compel the superior court to grant their motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ.Proc., § 437c, subd. (l).) Petitioners, the mother and brother of Joginder Hansra, are defendants in the underlying wrongful death action. Joginder Hansra was married to Juanita Hansra. Real parties in interest, plaintiffs in the wrongful death action, are the children of Juanita Hansra and the Estate of Juanita Hansra. 1

Joginder Hansra shot and killed his wife, Juanita Hansra, and then killed himself. Real parties in interest (hereafter "plaintiffs") filed a wrongful death action (Code Civ.Proc., § 377) alleging that petitioners (hereafter "defendants") knew of Joginder's dangerous propensities and failed to warn Juanita, or alternatively, that petitioners negligently incited Joginder to violence.

The trial court denied defendants' summary judgment motion because they failed to controvert allegations that they had criticized, belittled and demeaned Juanita with the intent of causing marital discord, and as such there was a material factual dispute whether a special relationship existed between defendants and Juanita which would give rise to a duty to warn.

We notified the parties that we were considering issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate in the first instance (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 203 Cal.Rptr. 626, 681 P.2d 893) and that we were disposed to consider the order denying the motion for summary judgment as an order denying a motion for judgment on the pleadings. So considered, we shall conclude that the complaint does not state a cause of action. Since a motion for summary judgment necessarily tests the sufficiency of the complaint, and the complaint here was deficient, defendants were not required to negate its allegations or to establish a defense as a matter of law in order to prevail. Consequently, the motion should have been granted.

If the order is permitted to stand, defendants will be forced to undergo trial on nonactionable claims. Such circumstances call for issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order and to enter an order granting the motion.

The remaining issue is whether plaintiffs should be granted leave to amend to plead a cognizable claim. They argue that the evidence submitted in opposition to defendants' motion would support allegations which would cure the complaint's present deficiencies. Our review of this evidence leads us to the contrary conclusion. Therefore we shall issue a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its present order and to enter an order treating defendants' motion as one for judgment on the pleadings and granting the same without leave to amend.

Plaintiffs sued the Yuba-Sutter Mental Health Services and the counties of Yuba and Sutter. The original complaint alleged that Joginder had received treatment and counseling from the Yuba-Sutter Mental Health Services for a 16-month period; during treatment Joginder had made threats of serious physical violence against a number of individuals; Juanita was a reasonably identifiable victim of these threats; the governmental entities named as parties failed to warn Juanita of such threats; and as a result of the failure to warn Juanita continued living with Joginder, resulting in her death. (See Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334.)

In their first amended complaint, plaintiffs substituted defendants Surinder and Balbir Hansra for fictitious defendants. Defendants' demurrer was sustained on the ground that plaintiffs had not pleaded facts sufficient to show the existence of a special relationship giving rise to a duty to warn. Leave to amend was granted on plaintiffs' representations that they would be able to plead such facts in addition to other facts showing that defendants had incited Joginder to action.

Plaintiffs attempted to supply the missing factual allegations in their second amended complaint, which we shall hereafter refer to as "the complaint." Plaintiffs alleged that Joginder had previously been married to an East Indian woman in a marriage arranged by defendants and other members of Joginder's family; Joginder's relationship with Juanita led to his divorce from his East Indian wife in January 1987 and marriage to Juanita in May 1987; defendants disapproved of Juanita because she was Mexican and had four children by previous unions and defendants had not arranged the marriage; fearing that Juanita would lay claim to an interest in the family orchard operations in which Joginder was a partner, defendants directed Joginder to divest himself of title to his interest in the real property; Joginder complied with these directives immediately before his marriage to Juanita; defendants expressed disapproval of Juanita because she was not receiving child support for all of her children; defendants pressured Joginder to take steps to obtain the support payments, including writing a letter to the father of one stating that visitation would be withheld until support payments were received; defendants, using their native tongue, Punjabi, spoke derogatorily of Juanita in her presence; defendants were motivated by their dislike of Juanita, her race, her children, her lack of independent financial means, and her unwillingness to work in their family orchards; and by these actions defendants intended to provoke marital disharmony and cause a termination of the marital relationship.

The complaint further averred that defendants were aware that: Joginder was mentally and emotionally unstable and had had past outbursts of violent, uncontrollable rage; Joginder was receiving mental health treatment; Joginder had been disciplined at his place of employment based on his threats of physical violence against fellow employees, resulting in issuance of one or more Tarasoff letters by the employer and the reassignment of Joginder to another office; law enforcement officers had been required to remove weapons from Joginder's custody or control on previous occasions of threatened violence; and Joginder was frustrated by the visits between one of Juanita's children and his father while the father was not paying child support.

The complaint further alleged that prior to April 12, 1989, Juanita decided to terminate her marriage to Joginder and informed him of this fact; Joginder reacted with characteristic anxiety, depression and hostility toward Juanita, and Joginder communicated these feelings to defendants; defendants were aware that Joginder had access to one or more weapons; and Joginder had expressed a desire to prevent Juanita's departure by any means at his disposal. Notwithstanding this knowledge, as well as Juanita's particular vulnerability, defendants failed to warn her so that she might take steps to remove herself from the family dwelling. As a proximate result of defendants' breach, Joginder beat Juanita and then shot her to death.

After unsuccessfully demurring to the second amended complaint, defendants moved for summary judgment based on six allegedly undisputed facts: (1) Surinder was the natural brother of Joginder; (2) Balbir was the natural mother of Joginder; (3) on April 12, 1989, Joginder shot and killed Juanita then shot and killed himself; (4) defendants had no knowledge of Joginder's crime until after it was committed; (5) defendants were not present at the time of the shootings; and (6) defendants did not supply Joginder with the weapons he used to commit the murder/suicide. Defendants argued that they had no duty to control Joginder or warn Juanita of an impending attack and that they did not act in concert with Joginder and thus were not liable as joint tortfeasors or under a conspiracy theory. Defendants also argued that the allegations of the complaint failed to state a cause of action.

Plaintiffs opposed the motion on the grounds that their allegations were sufficient to state a viable claim and that defendants' undisputed facts did not negate the allegations of the complaint. Consequently, plaintiffs relied in part on the allegations of the complaint to oppose the motion since defendants had not attempted to negate those allegations.

Plaintiffs also submitted evidence in opposition, consisting of a treatment summary from the Sutter-Yuba Mental Health Services, several pages from the police report summarizing the investigation of the deaths, and a declaration from one of Juanita's children. The treatment summary detailed Joginder's psychological problems. The police report summarized the circumstances of the shootings, and stated that police had found a signed joint petition for summary dissolution of marriage in one of the bedrooms. In the declaration, Jesus Magana declared that he had lived with his mother, his brother, and Joginder in a mobile home at defendants' orchards. Jesus declared that Joginder's brother, defendant Surinder, would enter the mobile home at any time without notice. Jesus recounted how Joginder's mother, defendant Balbir, would enter the mobile home and speak with Joginder in Punjabi, and that soon thereafter Joginder would inform Juanita, his brother and himself that they could either work in the orchards or move out of the mobile home. Jesus declared that for a time they worked in the orchards but were never paid. Jesus eventually moved out because he refused to work.

The trial...

To continue reading

Request your trial
41 cases
  • Adams v. City of Fremont
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • December 3, 1998
    ...weighs against the imposition of a duty, we conclude that no special relationship duty may be imposed. (Cf. Hansra v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 630, 646, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 216 [resolution of the question whether a special relationship gives rise to a duty of protection requires consid......
  • Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • September 29, 1999
    ...affirmative acts increasing the risk of harm rather than merely a failure to protect against harm. (See, Hansra v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal. App.4th 630, 642, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 216.) In any event, as with Knight v. Jewett, supra, our point is not that the cases discussed in the text provide ......
  • People v. Heitzman
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • December 30, 1994
    ...1008, 1014, 272 Cal.Rptr. 222 [defendant wife lacked ability to control husband's violent conduct]; Hansra v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 630, 645, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 216 [no facts alleged sufficient to show defendant mother and brother of violent individual had ability to control his be......
  • Hernandez v. Kwph Enterprises
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • February 26, 2004
    ...a duty of care in particular circumstances outweigh [or do not outweigh] the countervailing factors...." (Hansra v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 630, 646, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 216.) We believe that using another approach to duty analysis in this case — that is, the approach of analyzing var......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT