Haphey v. Linn County, 90-35226

• Decision Date: 05 February 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-35226,90-35226
• Citation: Haphey v. Linn County, 924 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1991)
• Parties: 136 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2521 Robert HAPHEY and Carl J. Bondietti, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. LINN COUNTY; Linn County Sheriff's Office; Art Martinak, Sheriff, acting in his official and individual capacity, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1512

924 F.2d 1512

136 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2521

Robert HAPHEY and Carl J. Bondietti, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. LINN COUNTY; Linn County Sheriff's Office; Art Martinak Sheriff, acting in his official and individual capacity, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 90-35226.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Nov. 6, 1990.

Decided Feb. 5, 1991.

Robert D. Durham, Barbara J. Diamond, Bennett & Durham, Portland, Or., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Lisa E. Lear, I. Franklin Hunsaker, Bullivant, Houser, Bailey, Pendergrass & Hoffman, Portland, Or., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon.

Before WRIGHT, CHOY and THOMPSON, Circuit Judges.

CHOY, Circuit Judge:

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Robert Haphey (Haphey) and Carl Bondietti (Bondietti) were employed by the Linn County Sheriff's Office (Linn County) as deputy sheriffs. Both were laid off in May 1986. Haphey and Bondietti applied for recall by submitting letters to the Sheriff of Linn County (Sheriff) in October 1986. Haphey and Bondietti submitted applications for new hire in January 1988.

From May 1986 through the Fall of 1988 the Sheriff hired or rehired about two dozen deputies. On November 25, 1987, Haphey and Bondietti filed unfair labor practice charges with the Oregon State Employment Relations Board (ERB). They claimed that they were not recalled or hired because of their union activities. On May 31, 1989, after the hearing in the ERB proceeding but before a final decision was rendered, Haphey and Bondietti filed an action in United States district court under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for violation of their free speech rights and a pendent state law claim for breach of contract.

On September 11, 1989, the ERB ruled that Haphey and Bondietti's claim that they were not recalled for discriminatory reasons was untimely, but found that Haphey and Bondietti had not been hired because they had engaged in activities protected by Oregon statute. The ERB ordered the Sheriff to offer Haphey and Bondietti reinstatement and back pay from January 1988 and assessed a civil penalty of $500 against the Sheriff. In a later order, the ERB granted Haphey and Bondietti $6,500 in attorney's fees. Linn County declined to appeal the ERB's decisions and complied with the orders.

Back in district court, Linn County moved for summary judgment on the ground that Haphey and Bondietti were precluded from pursuing their section 1983 claim because of the relief they had sought and received in the ERB proceeding. Haphey and Bondietti moved for partial summary judgment on the ground that the ERB proceeding barred Linn County from litigating the issue of liability. The district court granted Linn County's motion and thus found Haphey and Bondietti's motion moot. Haphey v. Linn County, 731 F.Supp. 410 (D.Or.1990). In light of its decision on Haphey and Bondietti's federal claim, the district court declined to retain jurisdiction over the pendent state claim for breach of contract. ¹ Id.

Haphey and Bondietti appeal the decision of the district court granting Linn County's motion for summary judgment. ² Haphey and Bondietti emphasize that they could not bring the section 1983 action in the ERB proceeding and that under section 1983 general compensatory and punitive damages are available which are not available through the ERB proceeding. The record in this case does not clearly establish the jurisdictional scope of the ERB and the nature of the relief it may grant. The trial court's decision assumed that Haphey and Bondietti could not bring their section 1983 claim in the ERB proceeding and that the relief available in a section 1983 proceeding in federal court is greater than that available in the ERB proceeding. ³

II. Standard of Review

A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine if there are any genuine issues of material fact. We must also determine whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. Tzung v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 873 F.2d 1338, 1339-40 (9th Cir.1989).

III. Discussion

This case requires us to determine whether a judgment obtained from one tribunal prevents a plaintiff from seeking an additional award from another tribunal. Normally we would decide such a question under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a subcategory of the doctrine of res judicata. Thus an understanding of how res judicata principles apply to section 1983 actions provides the necessary background for resolution of this case. However, because of the unusual development of the law in this circuit, we are constrained to resolve this case under the somewhat obscure doctrine of "election of remedies."

A. Res Judicata

Res judicata consists of two related concepts, claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n. 1, 104 S.Ct. 892, 894 n. 1, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984). The doctrine of claim preclusion " 'treats a judgment, once rendered, as the full measure of relief to be accorded between the same parties on the same "claim" or "cause of action." ... [T]he effect of a judgment extends to the litigation of all issues relevant to the same claim between the same parties, whether or not raised at trial.' " 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 4402 (1981) (quoting Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g & Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 535-36 (5th Cir.1978)).

Issue preclusion "recognizes that suits addressed to particular claims may present issues relevant to suits on other claims.... [This doctrine] bars the relitigation of issues actually adjudicated, and essential to the judgment, in a prior litigation between the same parties." Id. The difference between an issue and a claim is often one of degree and emphasis. Id.

The doctrine of res judicata, as applied to a federal court's consideration of a suit brought under section 1983 subsequent to a judgment by a state authority on some part of the underlying controversy, is divided into four categories. University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 796-99, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 3224-26, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986). First, with respect to issue preclusion, where the judgment is rendered by a state court, the state judgment is given the same issue preclusive effect in federal court as it would have in the courts of the rendering state. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 102-05, 101 S.Ct. 411, 419-20, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). Thus state rules of issue preclusion control. Likewise, where the judgment is rendered by a state court, state rules of claim preclusion control. Migra, 465 U.S. at 85, 104 S.Ct. at 898. Where the judgment is rendered by a state administrative body, state rules of issue preclusion also control, provided the "administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate...." United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422, 86 S.Ct. 1545, 1560, 16 L.Ed.2d 642 (1966). ⁴ Finally, neither this circuit nor the Supreme Court has decided whether state or federal rules of claim preclusion apply where the judgment is rendered by a state administrative body. The Fifth Circuit has recognized and declined to decide the issue, Frazier v. King, 873 F.2d 820 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 502, 107 L.Ed.2d 504 (1989), and the Eleventh Circuit has decided that federal claim preclusion law controls, Gjellum v. City of Birmingham, 829 F.2d 1056 (11th Cir.1987).

The case before us involves the claim preclusive effects of an unreviewed decision by a state administrative agency. ⁵ Thus, if we were deciding this case under a res judicata analysis we would address three issues: whether state or federal law applies, the claim preclusive effects of an unreviewed administrative decision under Oregon law with respect to a subsequent section 1983 action, and the claim preclusive effects of an unreviewed administrative decision under federal law with respect to a subsequent section 1983 action. However, because we find that this case is controlled by this court's decision in Punton v. City of Seattle, 805 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029, 107 S.Ct. 1954, 95 L.Ed.2d 527 (1987), under the doctrine of election of remedies, we do not address these important res judicata issues.

B. The Punton Decision

Punton, an officer of the Seattle Police Department, was dismissed from his job. Shortly after his dismissal, Punton filed an appeal with the Seattle Public Safety Civil Service Commission arguing that the Police Department's failure to provide a pre-termination hearing rendered his discharge constitutionally invalid. The commission did not reach the constitutional question. Believing its jurisdiction to be confined to the determination of whether the discharge was in good faith, the commission affirmed the dismissal. Punton then sought a writ of certiorari in Washington Superior Court. Id.

The superior court concluded that dismissal without a hearing violated Punton's state and federal due process rights. Punton did not seek general damages. The court ordered Punton's reinstatement with back pay and awarded attorneys' fees. The commission appealed from the superior court to the Washington Court of Appeals. The court of appeals affirmed Punton's reinstatement agreeing that there had been a due process violation. However, it reversed the award of attorneys' fees because proceedings pursuant to a writ of certiorari are limited in scope and may only secure the rendition of the judgment which should have been entered by the lower tribunal. Since the commission lacked authority to award attorneys' fees, the superior court could not award attorneys' fees. Id. Thus the court of appeals' decision is best read as holding that the Seattle...