O'Hara v. Holy Cross Hosp.

• Decision Date: 23 May 1990
• Docket Number: Nos. 68903,68925,s. 68903
• Citation: 148 Ill.Dec. 712,561 N.E.2d 18,137 Ill.2d 332
• Parties: , 148 Ill.Dec. 712, 90 A.L.R.4th 465 Kathleen O'HARA, Appellee, v. HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL et al., Appellants.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 18

561 N.E.2d 18

137 Ill.2d 332, 148 Ill.Dec. 712, 90

A.L.R.4th 465

Kathleen O'HARA, Appellee, v. HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL et al., Appellants.

Nos. 68903, 68925.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 23, 1990.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 1, 1990.

Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, Chicago (D. Kendall Griffith, Mary Tobin and Gerald Haberkorn, of counsel), for appellant Holy Cross Hosp.

Sweeney & Riman, Ltd., Chicago (Mary Jo Connelly, of counsel), for appellant Emergency Medicine, S.C.

David L. Poindexter, of Holstein, Mack & Klein, Chicago, for appellee.

Chief Justice THOMAS J. MORAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Kathleen O'Hara, brought a negligence action against, amongst others, Holy Cross Hospital (Holy Cross) and Emergency Medicine, S.C. (Emergency Medicine). The circuit court granted Emergency Medicine's motion for summary judgment on the basis that it did not owe plaintiff a duty of due care, and plaintiff appealed. During the pendency of that appeal, the circuit court granted Holy Cross' motion for summary judgment on the same grounds and plaintiff again appealed. The appellate court consolidated the causes and reversed the orders of the circuit court (185 Ill.App.3d 694, 134 Ill.Dec. 11, 542 N.E.2d 11). We allowed defendants' petitions for leave to appeal (107 Ill.2d R. 315), and also consolidated the causes on appeal.

The sole issue presented for review is whether defendants owed plaintiff, a nonpatient bystander in the emergency room of a hospital, a duty to protect her from the injuries sustained herein.

Plaintiff alleged the following facts in her complaint. On February 28, 1982, plaintiff brought her 11-year-old son to the emergency room of Holy Cross Hospital for treatment of a facial laceration. The nurse invited plaintiff to accompany her son into the emergency room. During the course of the treatment, plaintiff wiped Novocain from her son's mouth. Soon thereafter, plaintiff fainted, hit her head and subsequently suffered necrosis of brain cells in the area of the injury.

Plaintiff alleged that defendants owed her a duty of due care. She further alleged that defendants breached that duty by: allowing her to remain in the emergency room when defendants knew or should have known that she was susceptible to fainting; requesting and allowing her to wipe Novocain from her son's mouth; and failing to staff the hospital adequately so that it would not have been necessary to request her to participate in the care of her son.

Holy Cross leased the operation of its emergency room to Emergency Medicine. Under the terms of the agreement, Emergency Medicine provided the emergency room physicians and Holy Cross provided the nurses, administrative personnel, space and equipment. Plaintiff alleged that the relationship between Holy Cross and Emergency Medicine was that of principal and agent, and that Dr. Max Koenigsberg, the emergency room physician, was an employee of Emergency Medicine.

In her deposition, plaintiff testified that the nurse invited her to enter the emergency room with her son. Plaintiff further testified that Dr. Koenigsberg asked her to take a piece of gauze and wipe the Novocain from her son's mouth while the nurse lifted the covering from her son's face. Plaintiff stated that after wiping her son's mouth, she turned around and fainted. She further testified that she had never fainted before.

In his deposition, Dr. Koenigsberg testified as follows: it was hospital policy to allow one person to remain with the patient and customary to assign one nurse to that patient; he asked plaintiff to sit in the waiting room, but she refused and insisted on remaining with her son; plaintiff informed him that she had previously seen suturings performed on her other child and assured him that she would not become ill; he therefore asked plaintiff to place herself in a position away from her son, but she refused and insisted on standing near him. Dr. Koenigsberg further stated that the anesthetic began to run from the patient's mouth and plaintiff attempted to wipe it. He instructed her not to do so because of the "risk of infection" and gave her a sterile towel with which to wipe her son's mouth. Dr. Koenigsberg then testified that after the anesthetic took effect, he began suturing the wound, at which point plaintiff moved away and fainted.

The circuit court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment, holding that they did not owe plaintiff a duty of due care. On appeal, the appellate court implicitly found that defendants owed plaintiff a duty of due care and held that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact existed.

A complaint for common law negligence must set forth the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty and an injury proximately resulting from that breach. (Mieher v. Brown (1973), 54 Ill.2d 539, 541, 301 N.E.2d 307.) A duty is an obligation to conform to a certain standard of conduct for the protection of another against an unreasonable risk of harm. (Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc. (1975), 60 Ill.2d 552, 554, 328 N.E.2d 538.) The existence of a duty is an issue of law that must be resolved by the court. (Pelham v. Griesheimer (1982), 92 Ill.2d 13, 18-19, 64 Ill.Dec. 544, 440 N.E.2d 96.) If the court finds that the defendant owes no duty of due care to the plaintiff, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Barnes v. Washington (1973), 56 Ill.2d 22, 27, 305 N.E.2d 535.

Defendants argue that they did not owe plaintiff a duty of due care. Defendants point out that the question of whether a duty is owing depends upon the nature of the relationship between the parties (Cunis v. Brennan (1974), 56 Ill.2d 372, 374, 308 N.E.2d 617), and emphasize that the relationship between them and plaintiff was not one of physician and patient. Defendants also argue that they did not owe plaintiff a duty because it was not reasonably foreseeable that she would faint and public policy does not support the imposition of a duty to protect a nonpatient from fainting.

Plaintiff argues that defendants owed her a duty of due care. Although plaintiff was not a patient, she argues that defendants owed her a duty based on the "special relationship" between herself and her son. Plaintiff further argues that even if defendants did not owe her a duty based on the special relationship, they owed her a duty because they took the initiative of inviting her into the emergency room and asking her to wipe her son's mouth. Plaintiff asserts that under these circumstances it was reasonably foreseeable that she would faint.

As plaintiff was a nonpatient bystander and not a patient, the first question to be addressed is whether defendants owed plaintiff a duty of due care based on the "special relationship" between herself and her son, who was a patient. Defendants argue that the "special relationship" rule set forth in Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital (1977), 67 Ill.2d 348, 10 Ill.Dec. 484, 367 N.E.2d 1250, and Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center (1987), 117 Ill.2d 507, 111 Ill.Dec. 944, 513 N.E.2d 387, is not applicable to this case. Plaintiff asserts that this rule does apply. We agree with defendants.

In Renslow, the court held that defendants owed a child, who was not yet conceived when the negligent acts were committed, a duty of due care. (Renslow, 67 Ill.2d at 359, 10 Ill.Dec. 484, 367 N.E.2d 1250.) Defendants negligently transfused the child's mother with Rh-positive blood, which was incompatible with the mother's Rh-negative blood. Her condition was not discovered until her pregnancy several years later. The child was born prematurely and suffered permanent injuries. (67 Ill.2d at 349-50, 10 Ill.Dec. 484, 367 N.E.2d 1250.) The court found that it was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the blood transfusion that she would eventually become pregnant and give birth to a child who would suffer injuries as a result of the improper transfusion. Although the child was not yet conceived at the time of the negligent acts, defendants owed her a duty based on the "intimate relationship" between child and mother. 67 Ill.2d at 356-57, 10 Ill.Dec. 484, 367 N.E.2d 1250.

In Kirk, the court held that a physician did not owe a nonpatient, who was a passenger in the car driven by the physician's patient, a duty of due care. (Kirk, 117 Ill.2d at 531, 111 Ill.Dec. 944, 513 N.E.2d 387.) The physician failed to warn his patient that the drug prescribed to him could diminish his physical and mental abilities. After ingesting the drug, the patient was involved in an automobile accident which resulted in an injury to the nonpatient. The court found that the physician did not owe the nonpatient a duty, because there was neither a physician-patient relationship between them nor a "special relationship" between the patient and the nonpatient. 117 Ill.2d at 531, 111 Ill.Dec. 944, 513 N.E.2d 387.

Plaintiff misapprehends the "special relationship" rule set forth in Renslow and Kirk. In both cases, defendants acted negligently towards their patients and the nonpatients suffered injuries as a result. The issue presented was whether the duty that was owed to the patient transferred to the nonpatient based on the special relationship between the patient and the nonpatient. In the case at bar, plaintiff did not allege that defendants acted negligently towards their patient, the 11-year-old boy, and her injuries were in no way related to any negligent act directed towards the patient. Hence, the "special relationship" rule does not apply to this case.

Although defendants did not owe plaintiff a duty based on the "special relationship" rule, the question remains whether defendants owed a duty to plaintiff, a nonpatient bystander, to protect her from fainting. The question of whether a legal duty exists is contingent upon a variety of factors, and the weight accorded each...