O'Hara v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania

• Decision Date: 26 March 2001
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A. 00-1496.,Civ.A. 00-1496.
• Citation: 171 F.Supp.2d 490
• Parties: Lisa J. O'HARA, Plaintiff, v. INDIANA UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, Helen Soltis, in her individual capacity, Linda Szul, in her individual capacity, William McPherson, in his individual capacity and Virginia Hemby, in her individual capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

Page 490

171 F.Supp.2d 490

Lisa J. O'HARA, Plaintiff, v. INDIANA UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, Helen Soltis, in her individual capacity, Linda Szul, in her individual capacity, William McPherson, in his individual capacity and Virginia Hemby, in her individual capacity, Defendants.

No. Civ.A. 00-1496.

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.

March 26, 2001.

Ogg Cordes Murphy & Ignelzi, Mary R Roman, Pittsburgh, PA, for plaintiff.

Att Gen Office, Kemal Alexander Mericli, Pittsburgh, PA, for defendants.

OPINION

AMBROSE, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is a Partial Motion to Dismiss by Defendant Indiana University of Pennsylvania ("the University"). Specifically, the Motion seeks to dismiss the claims of Plaintiff Lisa J. O'Hara under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), and for punitive damages under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) ("Title VII"). For the reasons discussed below, the Motion is denied in part as moot and granted in part.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Factual History¹

Lisa O'Hara was hired by Indiana University of Pennsylvania in August 1996 as a temporary, non-tenure track instructor in the Department of Technology and Training (the "Department"), part of the University's Eberly College of Business. In January 1997, Ms. O'Hara enrolled at the University of Pittsburgh as a student in the doctoral program in Instruction Design and Technology. By the spring of 1999, she had completed all degree requirements except writing her dissertation, the point informally known in academia as "ABD" (all but dissertation).

In the Fall of 1998, the Department began a search for a tenure-track assistant or associate professor. Even before the position was advertised to the public, several members of the search committee advised Ms. O'Hara it was unlikely she would be considered for the position because "the consensus among the department ... was that [it] should hire a male for the position for image reasons." (Complaint, "Compl.," ¶ 32.) However, because the job posting indicated ABD candidates would be considered, Ms. O'Hara submitted her application in February 1999. A second similar position became available in April 1999 and the University decided to fill both vacancies from the same candidate pool.

Plaintiff and two men were identified as the top three candidates for the positions. Both men were interviewed in April 1999, subsequently received offers from the University, but turned them down. Ms. O'Hara was not interviewed. When she inquired of the Department chairman why she had not been considered for either position, she was told that she lacked the necessary "information technology background at the masters degree level," a qualification both men supposedly had. (Compl., ¶ 50.) Ms. O'Hara later learned that this statement regarding the men's qualifications was not true.

At a meeting with the search committee on May 17, 1999, Plaintiff expressed her belief that she had been excluded from consideration because of her gender. After that meeting, the search was reopened, but this time, the job description was re-written to exclude ABD-level candidates. Again, Plaintiff was not interviewed and her application was formally rejected on June 1. One of the male candidates who had declined the position previously then accepted it.

Ms. O'Hara contacted Helen Soltis, the University's Social Equity Officer, who reviewed the job description and told Ms. O'Hara she should have been considered for the opening. Plaintiff was later told by the Dean of the Business College that "he believed it was legitimate for the University to make employment decisions based on gender." (Compl., ¶ 67.) Ms. O'Hara resigned from her position as an instructor on July 23, 1999, telling Ms. Soltis that she was resigning because of gender discrimination.

B. Procedural History

Ms. O'Hara satisfied all the procedural and administrative requirements by filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 300 days of the last discrimination she experienced; she received a Notice of Right to Sue by the Department of Justice on July 19, 2000, and filed suit in this Court on August 4, 2000, within 90 days of receiving the Right to Sue Notice.² (Compl., ¶ 2.) Ms. O'Hara's complaint includes four counts, three of which are against the University. In Count I, Plaintiff alleges gender discrimination under Title VII; in Count II, gender discrimination under Section 1983; and in Count IV, violation of Plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by the University and certain individual Defendants. As the cumulative result of these actions by the University and the individual Defendants, Ms. O'Hara claims she suffered lost wages and benefits, anxiety, loss of reputation, loss of career opportunities, emotional distress, humiliation and inconvenience. (Compl., ¶¶ 80, 91, 102, 113.) In compensation, she seeks an appropriate tenure track position with all benefits incident thereto; back wages for the position she was not offered; front pay if placement in a tenure track position is not feasible; compensatory damages; punitive damages against the University under Title VII; punitive damages against the Individual Defendants under Section 1983; an injunction against all Defendants from further discrimination or retaliation in any manner prohibited by Title VII or Section 1983; and attorneys' fees and costs of litigation. (Compl., ¶ 113.)

The University subsequently filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss on September 20, 2000. ("Motion to Dismiss," Docket No. 12). In the motion, the University claims it is immune from punitive damages under Title VII and from suit for monetary damages under section 1983. (Brief in Support of Partial Motion to Dismiss, "Def.'s Brief in Support," Docket No. 13, at 1.)

Counts I and II are discussed in more detail below. Count III of the Plaintiff's Complaint is brought only against the Individual Defendants for gender discrimination violations of Plaintiff's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl., ¶¶ 92-102.) The Individual Defendants have not asked that this claim be dismissed and therefore Count III is not addressed. Count IV is brought against the University and the Individual Defendants for retaliation against Plaintiff for exercise of her right to speak on matters of public concern under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (Compl., ¶¶ 103-113.) The University does not seek to have this claim dismissed and it is not addressed below.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendant University does not identify its motion as arising under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of jurisdiction over the person, Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, or any other basis. Moreover, Defendants had already filed a joint Answer to the Complaint prior to filing this Motion; theoretically, therefore, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), this motion properly should have been characterized as a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.³ Turbe v. Gov't of the Virgin Islands, 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir.1991). Defendants undefined motion will be treated as a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which is analyzed under the same standard as a motion to dismiss. Turbe, id.; DeBraun v. Meissner, 958 F.Supp. 227, 229 (E.D.Pa. 1997).

In deciding a motion to dismiss, all factual allegations and all reasonable inferences therefrom must be accepted as true and viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 838 F.2d 663, 665-666 (3d Cir.1988). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must decide whether there are sufficient facts pled to determine that the complaint is not frivolous, and to provide the defendants with adequate notice to frame an answer. Id. at 666. A motion to dismiss will be granted only if it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).

Jurisdiction in this Court is invoked pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(f)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Count 1 — Violation of Title VII by the University

Based on explicit statements by several members of the search committee that the department needed to hire a male professor "for image reasons," the statement by the Business College Dean that he believed it was legitimate to make employment decisions based on gender, the University's failure to interview Ms. O'Hara although she was qualified and ranked as one of the top three candidates for the vacant positions, and revision of the job description to exclude her from further consideration, Plaintiff claims that the University violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).⁴ She further claims these acts were intentional and done with reckless disregard for her right to be considered for the positions without regard to her gender. (Compl., ¶¶ 70-80.)

In her Complaint, Ms. O'Hara claimed to seek punitive damages against the University for violation of Title VII. The University claims, as discussed in more detail below in Section B, that it is a public employer and a component of the State System of Higher Education, a state agency of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Therefore, it is immune from suit for punitive damages under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1).⁵ (Def.'s Brief in Support at 2.) Plaintiff concedes that punitive damages are not available against the University under Title VII and voluntarily withdraws this aspect of her claim for relief. (Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss, "Plf.'s Brief in Opp.," Docket No. 15, at 3.) Therefore, Defendant's Motion as it relates to Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages under Title VII is...