Haraburda v. United States Steel Corporation

Citation187 F. Supp. 86
Decision Date04 August 1960
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 3578.
PartiesHenry HARABURDA, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, a corporation, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

Alexander, Cholette, Buchanan, Perkins & Conklin and Paul E. Cholette and William D. Buchanan, Grand Rapids, Mich., for plaintiff.

Uhl, Bryant, Wheeler & Upham and Gordon B. Wheeler, Grand Rapids, Mich., for defendant.

STARR, Chief Judge.

The plaintiff, a citizen of Michigan residing in Kent county, began this action in the circuit court of Kent county on November 26, 1958, against the defendant, a New Jersey corporation authorized to do business in Michigan, to recover damages resulting from personal injuries. On January 2, 1959, the defendant removed the action to this court on the basis of diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

In his declaration filed in circuit court plaintiff alleged that his employer, the American News Company, Inc., had leased an electric wire-tying machine from the defendant through its Gerrard Steel Strapping division, to be used for the bailing of magazines and other news material, and had purchased bailing wire from the defendant to be used in the machine. Plaintiff alleged that at all times the title to the leased machine remained in the defendant. He alleged that on or about December 7, 1955, while using the wire-tying machine in the bailing of magazines, the wire on a bundle being bailed broke and flew up in his face, causing severe facial and eye injuries. He further alleged that the defendant was careless and negligent in the manufacture and inspection of its wire-tying machine and in the manufacture of bailing wire for use in the machine; that defendant warranted that the machine was reasonably fit for the use and purpose for which it was intended; and that defendant's carelessness, negligence, and breach of warranty were the direct and proximate cause of his injuries and resulting damages.

On January 6, 1959, the defendant filed motions to quash service of summons, to strike the declaration, and to dismiss the action. On February 27, 1960, this court filed opinion and entered an order denying each of the defendant's motions. 187 F.Supp. 79. On March 8th the defendant filed a motion in pursuance of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to amend the order entered February 29th by including in the order a finding that it involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Section 1292(b) as amended relating to permissible appeals from interlocutory orders of United States district courts provides as follows:

"When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order."

The question presented by defendant's motion to amend is whether the order entered February 29, 1960, denying its motions to quash service of process, to strike plaintiff's declaration, and dismiss the action comes within the meaning and the intent of Congress in the enactment of § 1292(b). It is clear that the determination of that question depends upon the interpretation of said section. In People of Puerto Rico v. The Shell Co. (P.R.), Limited, 302 U.S. 253, 258, 58 S. Ct. 167, 169, 82 L.Ed. 235, the court stated:

"Words generally have different shades of meaning, and are to be construed if reasonably possible to effectuate the intent of the law-makers; and this meaning in particular instances is to be arrived at not only by a consideration of the words themselves, but by considering, as well, the context, the purposes of the law, and the circumstances under which the words were employed. Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433, 52 S.Ct. 607, 608, 76 L.Ed. 1204; Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 86, 87-88, 55 S.Ct. 50, 51, 79 L.Ed. 211."

This statement in the Puerto Rico case was quoted with approval in Vermilya-Brown Co., Inc., v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 386, 69 S.Ct. 140, 93 L.Ed. 76. In Ebert v. Poston, 266 U.S. 548, 554, 45 S.Ct. 188, 190, 69 L.Ed. 435, the Supreme Court stated: "The judicial function to be exercised in construing a statute is limited to ascertaining the intention of the Legislature therein expressed." In United States v. Public Utilities Commission of California, 345 U.S. 295, 315, 316, 73 S. Ct. 706, 717, 97 L.Ed. 1020, the court said:

"Where the language and purpose of the questioned statute is clear, courts, of course, follow the legislative direction in interpretation. Where the words are ambiguous, the judiciary may properly use the legislative history to reach a conclusion. And that method of determining congressional purpose is likewise applicable when the literal words would bring about an end completely at variance with the purpose of the statute. Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 27 S.Ct. 350, 51 L.Ed. 553; Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152; International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237, 243, 72 S.Ct. 235, 239, 96 L.Ed. 275; Johansen v. United States, 343 U.S. 427, 432, 72 S.Ct. 849, 853, 96 L.Ed. 1051."

Many other authorities could be cited which hold that a statute should be construed, if reasonably possible, to effectuate the intention of the legislature at the time of its enactment. However, there are authorities that hold that a statute should be construed in accordance with the plain or literal meaning of the words of the statute. In Gemsco, Inc., v. Walling, Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, U. S. Department of Labor, 324 U.S. 244, 260, 65 S.Ct. 605, 614, 89 L.Ed. 921, the court stated: "The plain words and meaning of a statute cannot be overcome by a legislative history which, through strained processes of deduction from events of wholly ambiguous significance, may furnish dubious bases for inference in every direction." In Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61, 69 S.Ct. 944, 947, 959, 93 L.Ed. 1207, the court said: "There is no need to refer to the legislative history where the statutory language is clear." In Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63, 65, 78 S.Ct. 1079, 1081, 2 L.Ed.2d 1165, the court said: "In matters of statutory construction the duty of this Court is to give effect to the intent of Congress, and in doing so our first reference is of course to the literal meaning of words employed."

A court's interpretation of a statute based on the meaning of the words of the statute is but a judicial statement of what the terms mean to that particular court, rather than what the terms meant to the legislature which stated them. Therefore, in interpreting § 1292(b) relating to appeals from interlocutory orders, the court should evaluate the objective manifestations of legislative intent at the time that section was enacted. The report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives on the bill which became § 1292(b), House Report No. 1667, 85 Cong.2d Sess., pp. 1, 2, states in part:

"There should be some way, for example, in long-draw-out cases such as antitrust and conspiracy cases, to dispose of vital questions which are raised in the trial without having to wait for the taking of testimony and the conclusion of the trial before the questions can be finally determined on appeal. * * *
"It is felt that the instant bill, in permitting appeals in nonfinal orders, will not only save protracted and expensive litigation, but, with its built-in safeguards, prevent numerous and groundless appeals to our appellate courts. * * *
"There is made a part of this report a report to the Judicial Conference of the United States, which sponsors this legislation. Your committee adopts with approval the view contained therein that appeals under this legislation should only be used in exceptional cases where an intermediate appeal may avoid protracted and expensive litigation and is not to be used or granted in ordinary litigation wherein the issues raised can otherwise be properly disposed of."

The report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate on this bill, 1958 U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, pp. 5255, 5256, states in part:

"The bill results from a growing awareness of the need for expedition of cases pending before the district courts. Many cases which are filed in the Federal district courts require the district judge to entertain motions at an early stage in the proceedings which, if determined, against the plaintiff, result in a final order which would then be appealable to the circuit courts of appeals of the United States. However, such motions, if determined in the plaintiff's favor, are interlocutory since they do not end the litigation and are not therefore, under existing provisions of law, appealable. For example, in a recent case a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction was filed in the district court early in the proceedings. The district court denied the motion and the matter then proceeded to trial. The disposition of that case took almost 8 months. Upon final order the case was appealed and the court of appeals determined that the district court did not have jurisdiction and entered an order accordingly. Had this legislation been in effect
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  • City of Burbank v. General Electric Company
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • 20 Marzo 1964
    ...3 Cir. en banc, 1958, 260 F.2d 431, 433-434; Kroch v. Texas Company, S.D. N.Y.1958, 167 F.Supp. 947, 949; Haraburda v. U. S. Steel Corp., W.D.Mich. 1960, 187 F.Supp. 86; Seven-Up Company v. O-So Grape Co., S.D.Ill.1959, 179 F.Supp. 9 Section 16(a) likewise excludes by this proviso suits und......
  • Plunkett v. Gill
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Columbia District
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    ...R. R., 306 F.Supp. 513, 515 (S.D.N.Y.1969); Speir v. Robert C. Herd & Co., 189 F.Supp. 436, 439 (D.Md. 1960); Haraburda v. United States Steel Corp., 187 F.Supp. 86 (W.D.Mich.1960); Seven-Up Co. v. O-SO Grape Co., 179 F.Supp. 167 8. Judge Wright, in dissent, felt that the majority was mista......
  • Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. Lemay, C-3-80-362.
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    • 20 Mayo 1981
    ...of the case). This litigation is certainly not as simple as the personal injury litigation presented in Haraburda v. United States Steel Corporation, 187 F.Supp. 86 (W.D.Mich.1960) (denying section 1292(b) certification for lack of complexity), cited with approval in Kraus v. Board of Count......
  • Wagner v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 19748-9.
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    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
    • 8 Abril 1970
    ...for personal injuries or wrongful death that can be tried and disposed of on their merits in a few days. Haraburda v. United States Steel Corp., 187 F.Supp. 86, 94 (W.D.Mich.1960), cited with approval by this Court, Kraus v. Board of County Rd. Com'rs, supra 364 F.2d at ...
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