Haralson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 July 2008
• Docket Number: No. 3-06-CV-1075-BD.,No. 3-05-CV-2513-BD.,3-05-CV-2513-BD.,3-06-CV-1075-BD.
• Citation: 564 F.Supp.2d 616
• Parties: Fred HARALSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

564 F.Supp.2d 616

Fred HARALSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v.STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.

No. 3-05-CV-2513-BD.

No. 3-06-CV-1075-BD.

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division.

July 8, 2008.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Evan L. Van Shaw, Janet R. Randle, Law Office of Van Shaw, Daniel Kevin Hagood, Fitzpatrick Hagood Smith & Uhl, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiffs.

Armando De Diego, Debra K. Atchison, Erica J. Bachmann, Heidi De Diego, The Law Office of Armando De Diego P.C., Dallas, TX, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JEFF KAPLAN, United States Magistrate Judge.

DefendantState Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company("State Farm") has filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, motion for judgment in this civil action brought by its insured, Virginia Haralson, seeking underinsured motorist ("UIM") benefits under a standard Texas personal automobile policy.For the reasons stated herein, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I.

On March 6, 2005, Fred Haralson sustained serious bodily injuries when the car he was driving collided with a vehicle that ran a red light.(Jt. PTOat 6 & 11, ¶ 3).His wife, Virginia, and daughter, Christina, were following behind in another car and witnessed the collision.(Id. at 11, ¶ 5).As a result of her contemporaneous observance of the accident and seeing her injured husband trapped inside his wrecked car, Virginia suffered extreme emotional distress manifested by a variety of physical symptoms, including headaches, migraines, stomachaches, nausea, and sleeplessness.(SeeDef. Mot.at 4;Plf. Resp.at 1-2).

Following the accident, the Haralsons settled their claims against the driver of the other car, Carmen Andrade-Silva, who had liability coverage in the amount of $20,048 per person or $40,048 per incident.(SeeJt. PTOat 11, ¶ 10).Fred Haralson accepted the per person policy limit of $20,048.(Id. at 11, ¶ 12).Virginia and Christina jointly settled their claims against Andrade-Silva for $18,000.(Id.).The Haralsons then filed a claim for UIM benefits under their policy with State Farm.The relevant portion of the policy provides:

We will pay damages which a covered person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by a covered person caused by an accident.

(Def. Mot.App.at 28).It is undisputed that the Haralsons are "covered persons" and that the State Farm policy provides UIM coverage in the amount of $50,000 per person or $100,000 per accident.(SeeJt. PTOat 11, ¶ 13).Although State Farm tendered the $50,000 per person policy limit to Fred Haralson,¹ it refused to pay Virginia because, inter alia,she did not sustain a "bodily injury ... caused by [the] accident."(Seeid. at 7 & 12, ¶ 15).

Unable to resolve their claims through negotiation, the Haralsons filed separate lawsuits against State Farm in state district court.State Farm timely removed both cases to federal court, where they were consolidated into one action.²In their most recent complaint, the Haralsons assert claims for breach of contract and violations of the Texas Insurance Code.(SeeF. Haralson Third Am. Compl.at 3, ¶¶ 4.1-4.2;V. Haralson Sec. Am. Compl.at 2-3, ¶¶ 4.1-4.2).³Because an insurer's contractual obligation to pay UIM benefits does not arise until liability and damages are determined, seeBrainard v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co.,216 S.W.3d 809, 818-19(Tex.2006), the court ordered separate trials-one trial on liability and damages and, if necessary, a second trial on the Haralsons' contract and extracontractual claims.Prior to the first trial, State Farm stipulated that the underinsured driver, Andrade-Silva, was liable for the accident and that Fred Haralson incurred medical expenses in excess of $100,000.(SeeJt. PTOat 11, ¶¶ 8-9).The issues of whether Virginia sustained damages because of "bodily injury" and, if so, the amount of those damages were tried to a jury on October 9-10, 2007.After hearing the evidence, the jury found that Virginia sustained a "bodily injury" as a result of witnessing the automobile accident involving her husband and awarded $25,000 in compensatory damages, $15,000 for loss of consortium, and $1,000 for loss of household services.

State Farm now moves for judgment as a matter of law on the grounds that: (1) Virginia did not suffer a "bodily injury" as required by the policy; (2) the evidence is legally insufficient to support a claim for bystander damages; (3) loss of household services and loss of consortium are not "bodily injuries" as a matter of law; and (4) any recovery should be offset by the amount of money available from the underinsured driver.The motion has been fully briefed by the parties and is ripe for determination.

II.

Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate if "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue."Cano v. Bexar Co.,No. 07-50921, 2008 WL 2329203 at *1(5th Cir.June 4, 2008), quotingFED. R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1);see alsoConkling v. Turner,18 F.3d 1285, 1300(5th Cir.1994).The court"must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence."Cano,2008 WL 2329203 at *1, quotingReeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2110, 147 L.Ed.2d 105(2000).A Rule 50 motion should be granted only if "the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the defendant[] that reasonable jurors could not have arrived at the verdict reached in this case[.]"Fontenot v. Cormier,56 F.3d 669, 673(5th Cir.1995), citingCrist v. Dickson Welding, Inc.,957 F.2d 1281, 1285(5th Cir.), cert. denied,506 U.S. 864, 113 S.Ct. 187, 121 L.Ed.2d 132(1992).

A.

As a preliminary matter, Virginia contends that State Farm has failed to meet the procedural requirements for bringing a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law.Under the federal rules:

If the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made under Rule 50(a), the court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the court's later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion.No later than 10 days after the entry of judgment ... the movant may file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and may include an alternative or joint request for a new trial under Rule 59.

FED.R.CIV.P. 50(b);see alsoGiles v. General Electric Co.,245 F.3d 474, 481(5th Cir.2001).Although State Farm made an oral motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the evidence, Virginia argues that the motion was procedurally deficient because it was not made in written form.However, there is no requirement that a Rule 50(a) motion be reduced to writing.The only requirement is that the moving party provide the court with a sufficient basis for ruling on the grounds raised in the motion.See, e.g.Tharling v. City of Port Lavaca,329 F.3d 422, 426 & n. 4(5th Cir.2003)(oral motion for judgment as a matter of law held sufficient);see alsoFed.R.Civ.P. 7(b)(motion must be in writing "unless made during a hearing or trial").

Virginia further contends, without citation to the record, that State Farm asserts grounds in its renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law that were not included in its Rule 50(a) motion.The court disagrees.At the close of the evidence, State Farm moved for judgment as a matter of law on the grounds that Virginia did not suffer a "bodily injury" as required by the policy and that the evidence was legally insufficient to support a claim for bystander damages.Those are the same grounds raised in the instant motion.

B.

The principal argument made by State Farm, and the one advanced throughout this litigation, is that the physical symptoms experienced by Virginia are not "bodily injuries" covered by the UIM provision of the insurance policy.The State Farm policy does not define "bodily injury."The court therefore looks to Texas law for guidance.In Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Cowan,945 S.W.2d 819(Tex.1997), the Texas Supreme Court held that the term "bodily injury," which was defined by the policy as "bodily harm, sickness or disease:"

does not include purely emotional injuries ... and unambiguously requires an injury to the physical structure of the human body.Our decision comports with the commonly understood meaning of "bodily," which implies a physical, and not purely mental, emotional, or spiritual harm ... WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 245(1966) also defines "bodily" as "having a body or a material form: physical, corporeal."Likewise, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 175 (6th ed.1990) defines "bodily" as "[p]ertaining to or concerning the body; of or belonging to the body or the physical constitution; not mental, but corporeal."

Cowan,945 S.W.2d at 823.Thus, a purely emotional injury, unaccompanied by physical symptoms, does not qualify as a "bodily injury" in the insurance context.Id.;see alsoSouthern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Franklin, No. 07-05-0134-CV, 2006 WL 1373359 at *1(Tex.App.—Amarillo, May 19, 2006, writ denied)("[T]he phrase `bodily injury' appearing in an insurance policy does not encompass purely emotional injuries such as mental anguish, unless the policy states otherwise.").

However, the evidence in this case shows that Virginia suffered extreme emotional distress accompanied by a variety of physical symptoms, including headaches, migraines, stomachaches, nausea, and sleeplessness, as a result of witnessing the accident in question.The Texas Supreme Court has never decided whether physical manifestations of emotional distress constitute a "bodily injury" sufficient to trigger coverage under a standard insurance policy.SeeCowan,945 S.W.2d at 826 n. 5(expressly declining to...