Haraszti v. Klarman

• Decision Date: 05 March 1976
• Docket Number: No. 35,35
• Citation: 277 Md. 234,352 A.2d 833
• Parties: Joseph HARASZTI v. Edward L. KLARMAN.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 234

277 Md. 234

352 A.2d 833

Joseph HARASZTI v. Edward L. KLARMAN.

No. 35.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 5, 1976.

Hartman J. Miller, Baltimore (Eugene A. Edgett, Jr., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Francis J. Meagher, Baltimore (Goodman, Meagher & Enoch, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE and O'DONNELL, JJ.

O'DONNELL, Judge.

By Chapter 534 of the Laws of 1970, the General Assembly enacted a new Maryland Vehicle Law, codified as Maryland Code (1957, 1970 Repl.Vol.) Art. 66 1/2, to take effect from and after January 1, 1971. ¹ Substantial portions of the new Article, including those within Subtitle 11 (Rules of the Road) were adopted from, and are identical with, corresponding portions of the Uniform Vehicle Code (1967). Here, upon the issuance of a writ of certiorari to the Court of Special Appeals, we are called upon to review, for the first time, the rights and duties of motorists under one of those sections, Art. 66 1/2, § 11-202(a)(2)(i), who, upon approaching an intersection, are faced with a steady yellow traffic signal.

A brief review of the relevant facts giving rise to the questions of law in issue is necessary.

At approximately 11:05 P.M., on the clear, dry, evening of June 25, 1971, the appellant (the defendant in the trial court), Dr. Joseph Haraszti, together with his wife, was operating his 1968 Oldsmobile, northbound and upgrade on Moravia Road, approaching its intersection with Sinclair Lane, in Baltimore City. At the same time, Edward L. Klarman, the appellee (the plaintiff in the trial court), en route to his employment at Washington National Airport, was operating his 1963 Volkswagen convertible, with its top down, southward and downgrade on Moravia Road. As Dr. Haraszti was making a left turn within the intersection, which was controlled by automatic traffic signals, to go westward on Sinclair Lane, the right front of his Oldsmobile collided with the front of Klarman's Volkswagen which was proceeding through the intersection.

Sinclair Lane, both east and west of Moravia Road, was described as 14 feet in width with two driving lanes in each direction. Moravia Road was depicted as being 88 feet wide north of Sinclair Lane and 100 feet wide south thereof; it accommodated three driving lanes in each direction. Although each of the highways additionally provided left-turn lanes, adjacent to medians, there were no left-turn arrows controlling such turning vehicles.

The automatic traffic signals governing motorists on Moravia Road, facing both north and southbound traffic, were suspended from a common cable hung midway across the intersection; the signals controlling traffic on Sinclair Lane were suspended from two cables located on the east and west sides of the intersection and respectively faced oncoming traffic. The regular sequence for all the signals was from green, to yellow, to red; then from red to green.

The evidence adduced at trial, though conflicting, indicated that Klarman, the plaintiff, was proceeding at 'about 35 to 40 m.p.h.' southward on Moravia Road and that, when about 100 yards north of the intersection with Sinclair Lane, he observed the traffic signal as 'green' for his approaching vehicle. Although he did not continue to watch the signal, he stated that, with his convertible roof down, he saw the 'glow of amber' from the signal just before he entered the intersection. Aware of headlights on a vehicle advancing northward, he assumed that that vehicle was proceeding straight through the crossing. Unfortunately, it was this car which 'turned out' (in front of him). Klarman could not recall whether there had been a red vehicle, proceeding ahead of him on Moravia Road, which had come to a stop north of the intersection before he entered it.

Dr. Haraszti, called as an adverse party by the plaintiff, ² testified that he had been driving northward on Moravia Road, within its 35 m.p.h. limit; that he approached the intersection on a green signal, that his left-turn signal had been activated and that as he entered the intersection, the Moravia Road signal turned to 'amber;' although he slowed down, he did not come to a stop. He noticed a red vehicle, southbound on Moravia Road come to a stop, north of the intersection line, in the easternmost of the southbound lanes; as he commenced his left turn, to go westward on Sinclair Lane, his vehicle was struck by the southbound Volkswagen. He had not observed the Volkswagen 'until a second or two before the impact, when the car was on top of him.'

Mrs. Haraszti testified that as their Oldsmobile entered the intersection, the signal changed to yellow, and that thereafter the signal itself, then to the rear of their car, was no longer visible. She corroborated her husband's testimony concerning a red vehicle, southbound on Moravia Road, which had come to a stop north of the intersection. It was her further testimony that as her husband turned left, in front of that standing car, their vehicle was struck by Klarman's car, which she had not noticed until just before the impact.

A disinterested motorist, Aaron Kammerman, facing eastward, in compliance with a red signal had stopped his vehicle on Sinclair Lane, just west of Moravia Road, where he awaited a green signal in order to turn left and proceed northward. With a full view of the signals controlling the intersection, it was his testimony that as the Oldsmobile entered the intersection, the signal was 'amber' for vehicles on Moravia Road; that during its passage within the intersection the signal changed to 'red for Moravia and green for Sinclair,' causing him (Kammerman) to commence his forward motion. At this point he noticed the Oldsmobile, within the intersection, then about 15 yeards eastward and slightly to the left of his vehicle. As Kammerman, proceeding on a green signal, advanced a distance of three or four feet into the intersection, he saw 'from the corner of his eye' the Klarman vehicle, coming quite fast from his left; it seemed to Kammerman that 'it came through the (red) light and (that) the whole wreckage came toward me.' He described the entry of the Volkswagen into the intersection as 'very fast' and equated it with 'a shot in there like a bullet.'

Upon this posture of the evidence, the significance of the provisions of Art. 66 1/2, § 11-202(a)(2)(i) concerning the rights and duties of a motorist entering an intersection upon a traffic signal showing 'steady yellow,' is readily apparent. The complete subsection provides:

'(2) Steady yellow indication.

'(i) Vehicular traffic facing a steady yellow signal is thereby warned that the related green movement is being terminated or that a red indication will be exhibited immediately thereafter when vehicular traffic shall not enter the intersection.

'(ii) Pedestrians facing a steady yellow signal, unless otherwise directed by a pedestrian control signal as provided in § 1-203, are thereby advised that there is insufficient time to cross the roadway before a red indication is shown, and no pedestrian shall then start to cross the roadway.' (emphasis added).

At trial, in the Superior Court of Baltimore City, the trial judge (Sklar, J.) related to the jury the pertinent statutory provisions, not only of § 11-202(a) (2)(i), but as well the provisions of § 11-202(a)(1)(i) (green signal), § 11-202(a)(3)(i) (red signal), and those of § 11-402(a) (the duty of a left-turning vehicle to yield the right-of-way to a vehicle approaching from the opposite direction). ³

In expanding upon the provisions of § 11-202(a)(2)(i), the trial court instructed the jury that if they found 'that the Plaintiff entered the intersection with the amber or yellow light facing him at the time he entered . . . and that he could not stop with safety before entering . . . and the accident occurred,' their verdict should be for the plaintiff; that if they found that the traffic signal 'was amber or yellow prior to the time that he . . . entered the intersection, and if (they further found) that the Plaintiff could have, with the exercise of reasonable care, brought his vehicle to a safe and complete stop, prior to entering the intersection, and thereby (have) avoided the collision,' the verdict should be for the defendant.

Upon exception by plaintiff's counsel, the trial court supplemented its instructions as follows:

'(I)f you should find from the evidence that the Plaintiff, Mr. Klarman, entered the intersection with the green light in his favor, then your verdict should be for the Plaintiff. If you should find from the evidence that the Plaintiff, Mr. Klarman, entered the intersection against the red light, your verdict should be for the Defendant. Now, if you should find that the Plaintiff, while proceeding south on Moravia Boulevard had the amber, that is, the yellow light facing him at the time he was entering the intersection but he could not stop with safety, then he had a right to proceed cautiously through the intersection and in that situation he would be considered as lawfully within the intersection. Now, if you should find from the evidence that the Plaintiff, Mr. Klarman, had the yellow or amber light in his face as he was about to enter the intersection and that he could have with the exercise of reasonable care brought his vehicle to a safe and complete stop prior to entering the intersection and thereby avoiding the collision, then you should find for the Defendant.' (emphasis added).

The plaintiff renewed his objection to the construction placed by the trial court on § 11-202(a)(2)(i), in its supplementary charge, and objected as well to the failure of the trial court to grant a proffered instruction which requested that the jury be told that: '(I)f you find that the Plaintiff entered the intersection while the traffic signal for him was yellow, then your verdict must be for the Plaintiff, as a matter of law, for the...