Harbin v. State
| Decision Date | 30 June 1916 |
| Docket Number | 8 Div. 349 |
| Citation | 72 So. 594,15 Ala.App. 57 |
| Parties | HARBIN v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Lauderdale County; C.P. Almon, Judge.
Joe Harbin was convicted of murder in the second degree, and he appeals. Affirmed.
Some of the exceptions to evidence sufficiently appear. Over the objection of defendant Mrs. Hinton was allowed to state:
"He never named Jerry Keeton, but said there was a man that would have to die some day, and that it might cause trouble, but he said he sure would have to die, and that he (Harbin) was wearing shot in his neck now."
The witness Sharpe was permitted to testify:
Charlie Brewer was permitted to say that Harbin came to him in the woods while he was logging and asked him if he had seen Keeton go up that day, and he answered, "No, sir," and he was then permitted to answer the question, "Did he have a gun with him then?" and the witness answered "Yes, sir; he did." Witness was further permitted to testify that Harbin said he heard Keeton had gone up the road with a drove of cattle, and that he might come back that way. The witness Wright, on cross-examination, was asked by the solicitor:
"Who did you tell that to here?" and "You don't know a single person in this house that you have told, not any one on these grounds, or in this house that you told that Keeton had made threats against Harbin?"
George P. Jones, of Florence, and A.H. Carmichael, of Tuscumbia, for appellant.
W.L Martin, Atty. Gen., and Harwell G. Davis, Asst. Atty. Gen for the State.
The appellant was indicted jointly with his two brothers John and Nathan for the murder of Jerry Keeton, and, demanding a severance, was tried and convicted of murder in the second degree. The fact of the killing by appellant is not disputed and the state's theory of the case--and there was abundant evidence tending to support it--is that Harbin and his brothers armed themselves and went to a blacksmith shop on the road leading from Waynesboro, Tenn., to Florence, Ala., knowing that the deceased was traveling along that road and would pass this shop in a short time after they stationed themselves there, and there lay in wait with the purpose to kill Keeton; that there was an opening on the side of the shop where these parties secreted themselves and through which they could observe the deceased as he approached; that just after Keeton passed the shop he was fired upon from behind, and, although mortally wounded, if not instantly killed, he retained his seat in the vehicle in which he was traveling; that deceased was accompanied by his nephew, a boy of 15 years of age, who was driving, and the defendant mounted his horse and followed down the road, and, when immediately behind the buggy, again fired upon deceased; and, although the whole top of his head was torn away and his brain scattered over his companion and the vehicle, he remained seated in the buggy until it was driven to his brother's, some distance from where he was shot.
The fact that a bullet wound was found on one of the mare's hind legs, the location of the wound, and the character of the bullet extracted from the wound on the mare, were all pertinent facts having some tendency to support the state's theory of the case.
There was what the evidence tended to show a bullet would on deceased's cheek ranging from the back toward the front and downward. The witness stated that the wound on the mare "was about where the big leader goes into her right leg." This was the mare drawing the buggy in which deceased was sitting when shot. The solicitor's question to the witness Bradley, eliciting testimony to the effect that the wound on the mare was in line with the range of the wound on deceased's face, was possibly subject to the objection that it called for a conclusion of the witness; but this objection was not urged, and by assigning other specific objections this objection was waived. Railroad Co. v Bailey, 112 Ala. 167, 20 So. 313; Sharp v. Hall, 86 Ala. 110, 5 So. 497, 11 Am.St.Rep. 28. The fact elicited was certainly relevant and material to the issues, and the only other objection at all tenable was that it was not shown that the deceased was in the same position when the witness saw him as when he was shot. The evidence subsequently offered, both by the state and defendant, tended to show that deceased was seated in the buggy when he was shot, and that he was so seated when the...
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Fuller v. State
...So[uthern] Ry. Co. v. Gullatt, 158 Ala. 502, 48 So. 472.' To like effect are the following cases: Adkins v. State, supra; Harbin v. State, 15 Ala.App. 57, 72 So. 594; Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Bailey, 112 Ala. 167, 20 So. 313; Jackson v. State, 35 Ala.App. 542, 50 So.2d 282; Holcombe v. State......
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...ground in the trial court. "The assignment of a single objection is a waiver of all other objections not assigned. Harbin v. State, 15 Ala.App. 57, 59, 72 So. 594 (1916). '[B]y assigning specific grounds of objection the defendant waived all others.' Gamble v. State, 19 Ala.App. 590, 591, 9......
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...stand, the witness testifying that he had not threatened defendant's life. Watson v. State, 15 Ala.App. 39, 72 So. 569; Harbin v. State, 15 Ala.App. 57, 72 So. 594; Allsup v. State, 15 Ala.App. 121, 72 So. The court did not err in sustaining the objection of the solicitor to the question to......
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...for appellate review. The assignment of a single objection is a waiver of all other objections not assigned. Harbin v. State, 15 Ala.App. 57, 59, 72 So. 594 (1916). "[B]y assigning specific grounds of objection the defendant waived all others." Gamble v. State, 19 Ala.App. 590, 591, 99 So. ......