Harbridge v. Pasillas
| Decision Date | 14 January 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:10-cv-00473 AWI JLT (PC) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER HARBRIDGE, Plaintiff, v. JESSE PASILLAS, et al., Defendants. |
Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This proceeding was referred to the Magistrate Judge in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 302. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's motion filed according to Federal Rules of Evidence 60(B)(1) and his amended complaint filed May 3, 2010.1
I. Rule 60(B) motion
A. Background
Plaintiff asserts that he mailed his motion to proceed in forma pauperis on February 18, 2010. (Doc. 6; Harbridge Dec) However, he mailed it to an "O" Street where the Court was located prior toits move in 2006. Id.. Plaintiff asserts that he obtained this incorrect address from "the 2006 supplement to the CALIFORNIA STATE PRISONER'S HANDBOOK, Third Edition, published by the Prison Law Office." Id.. Plaintiff states that this book was given to him by an inmate-employee who worked in the prison law library. Id.
Plaintiff reports that on March 7, 2010, he mailed his complaint for damages to the same "O" Street address. (Doc. 6; Harbridge Dec.) On March 10, 2010, the motion to proceed IFP was returned as "undeliverable." Id. Plaintiff reports that then he borrowed a fellow inmate's 2008 version of the handbook and discovered the Court's correct address. Id. He re-mailed the IFP motion to the correct address on March 11, 2010. Id. Likewise, when his complaint for damages was returned on March 12, 2010, he re-mailed it to the correct address on March 14, 2010. Id. In this motion, Plaintiff seeks a determination that his action was initiated on February 18, 2010, the date that he mailed his IFP motion. In essence, Plaintiff seeks an order preempting any defendants' ability to file a motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b) on statute of limitations grounds.
B. Analysis
Under the prison mailbox rule, the date that the pro se prisoner deposits his document with prison officials for mailing, is considered the filing date for purposes of evaluating whether it complied with the statute of limitations. Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009). The mailbox rule requires that the prisoner deposit the pre-addressed, postage paid package to prison officials in order to invoke the mailbox rule. See In re Flanagan, 999 F.2d 753, 759 (3d Cir. Pa. 1993) Moreover, the prisoner bears the burden of proving the elements of the mailbox rule (Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)) though "'when a pro se petitioner alleges that he timely complied with a procedural deadline by submitting a document to prison authorities, the district court must either accept that allegation as correct or make a factual finding to the contrary upon a sufficient evidentiary showing by the opposing party.'" Caldwell v. Amend, 30 F.3d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal citation omitted).
Notably, here the motion is filed before any party has been served and, in fact, before the Court has screened the case or authorized service. Moreover, the declaration submitted by Plaintiff appears to be insufficient on its face. For example, Plaintiff does not allege that he deposited the documents with prison officials or that he deposited it in the prison mailbox designated for legal mail. Douglas, 567 F.3dat 1108-1109. Instead, he says only that he "mailed to the U.S. District Court, Eastern Division, Fresno Office a Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis" and that "I mailed the above corresponding § 1983 Civil Rights Complaint to the same address above." (Doc. 5, Harbridge Dec.) In any event, because no defendant has appeared, the Court does not have the benefit of any opposing evidence.
Moreover, Plaintiff's motion purports to be filed pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rule 60(B)(1). This rule provides, "On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;..." Here, no final judgment or order has been entered against Plaintiff. Therefore, Plaintiff's motion raised under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(B) is procedurally improper and it is DENIED.
The Court is required to review matters filed by prisoners against government defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A)(a). The Court is required to screen complaint also where the plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Court must dismiss the action or portion thereof, if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2). If the Court determines the complaint fails to state a claim, leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of [state law]... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution... shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
To plead a § 1983 violation, the plaintiff must allege facts from which it may be inferred that (1) plaintiff was deprived of a federal right, and (2) the person who deprived plaintiff of that right actedunder color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 1989). To warrant relief under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege and show that the defendants' acts or omissions caused the deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutionally protected rights. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1993). "A person deprives another of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff complains]." Id. There must be an actual causal connection or link between the actions of each defendant and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71(1976)).
Section 1983 complaints are governed by the notice pleading standard in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which provides in relevant part that:
A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopt a flexible pleading policy. Nevertheless, a complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the plaintiff's claim plainly and succinctly. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In other words, the plaintiff is required to give the defendants fair notice of what constitutes the plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Although a complaint need not outline all the elements of a claim, there "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Vague and conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
Plaintiff raises a number of claims that stem from his placement in Administrative Segregation2at Pleasant Valley State Prison. Plaintiff was placed in Ad Seg on February 28, 2006, after he attended a hearing of the Institutional Classification Committee ("ICC"), made up of some of the defendants, who considered Plaintiff's single-cell status. (Doc. 9 at 10) At the hearing, the committee considered Plaintiff's extensive history of stated unwillingness to accept a cell mate. The committee considered also the report of a psychologist who determined that Plaintiff's "potential for violence, should he be housed with another inmate... is no greater than any other inmate housed on Facility D-SNY."3 Id.. In fact, Plaintiff had no history of violence or sexual abuse against a cell mate nor had he been the victim of such by a cell mate. Id.
When the committee cleared Plaintiff for double-cell housing, Plaintiff became "extremely agitated" and stated that "he would do whatever he needed to retain his Single-Cell status" and referred to his past threats to kill or inflict bodily injury on any inmate that the CDCR attempted to place with him. Plaintiff cautioned that the CDCR should place with him a cell mate who had committed "a terrible crime against a woman or a child" because "I am a man with a conscious and I want to make sure they deserve what I am going to do to them." Id. As a result of these statements, the hearing was terminated and the committee determined that Plaintiff would be placed in the "ASU to protect the safety of staff, other inmates, and the institution."
The committee decided to issue Plaint...
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